

Bus and Coach Security

Recommended Best
Practice

Transport Security and
Contingencies Directorate

October 2005

Department for Transport
Great Minster House
76 Marsham Street
London SW1P 4DR
Telephone 020 7944 8300

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Department for Transport
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Wetherby
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Section 1:

Introduction

The Department for Transport's Transport Security and Contingencies Directorate (TRANSEC) is responsible for setting and enforcing counter terrorist security measures on a number of transport modes including aviation, the national rail network and the London Underground. TRANSEC does not regulate the bus industry but following requests for advice from some bus operators in the wake of the London attacks in July 2005 we have produced this security guidance for all bus and coach operators.

The measures outlined in this guidance are recommended best practice. Much has been based on simple good housekeeping practices, such as locking doors, windows, equipment boxes – measures you will already have in place. Other recommendations are based in part on the requirements for the rail industry and on some of the security measures that are already in place at some London stations and on London buses.

There are differences between the bus and rail industries and the London bus network may not have many similarities with your own network of operations. Not all of the measures contained in this document will be applicable to all bus and coach operations in the UK. However, you are encouraged to tailor the recommendations or use them as a basis of ideas for improving the security of your operation.

You may also see additional benefits such as a reduction in crime and increased passenger confidence in using bus services and facilities.

Whilst this document is one source of guidance it should not be treated as the only available reference source. We recommend that you contact your local police for advice. Each force has a Crime Reduction Unit and a Counter Terrorism Security Advisor both of whom will be able to assist you in determining security measures suitable for your organisation.

In addition you may also wish to contact other local bus operators to consider sharing good practice. If your bus station adjoins a rail one you may wish to contact the rail station manager to discuss security measures which may be of mutual benefit. Local authorities may also be able to provide advice and can assist if you have concerns regarding the positioning of street furniture such as litter bins or cycle racks.

The Department for Transport has consulted Transport for London, the British Transport Police and the Association of Chief Police Officers in the preparation of this document. The document is being issued to all bus and coach operators, Passenger Transport Executives and local authorities in the UK.

Should you wish to know more, or have any questions after reading this document, please contact TRANSEC via vicky.hutchinson@dft.gsi.gov.uk, tel. 020 7944 2783 or shelley.mason@dft.gsi.gov.uk, tel. 020 7944 4877.

Glossary of Terms

Bicycle Locker means an enclosed or partially open structure provided for the storage of bicycles.

Bicycle Rack means a device for the storage of bicycles that is of open construction and any article placed in the rack is clearly visible.

BTP means the British Transport Police which means the police force maintained by the British Transport Police Authority.

CCTV means closed circuit television.

Device includes for the purpose of this guidance, all types of explosive, incendiary, chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons.

IED means Improvised Explosive Device.

Left Luggage means any items deposited by a member of the public at a storage facility provided at a station (whether or not so provided by the owner or operator).

Non-public area means an area of a station to which the public do not generally have access or to which they do not normally have access in the absence of supervision by a member of staff.

Station means any bus station, termini or interchange.

Section 2: Security of Buses and Coaches

Searching of Buses and Coaches

- 2.1** It is advisable that drivers search their vehicles at the end of a route before the bus starts its return journey to ensure that nothing has been concealed or left behind. Checks should include underneath seats and any storage areas e.g. for pushchairs, bags etc. within the bus. Coach drivers or other coach crew should ensure that luggage holds, other storage compartments, overhead luggage shelves and toilets are also included in a vehicle check.
- 2.2** Suitable procedures will need to be agreed with drivers to deal with any items of concern that they find.

Securing of Bus/Coach

- 2.3** Drivers should ensure that vehicle doors are closed when they are at a stop where the vehicle may be left unattended, e.g. at the start and end of a journey or during a comfort break. Where possible, passenger doors and baggage holds should be locked and, if appropriate, windows secured.

Control of Passengers Boarding and Leaving

Buses

- 2.4** At the end of a route and before the bus begins its next journey, it is recommended that passengers are not permitted to board until a security check of the bus has been completed. Passengers should only be allowed to board if the driver is present.

Coaches

- 2.5** On scheduled services where tickets are issued, coach drivers should ensure that all passengers present a valid ticket before they board the coach. If the driver is responsible for loading the luggage, no passengers should be permitted to board until loading has been completed. If a coach makes a stop en route, e.g. at a service station, passengers should be asked to present their ticket before re-boarding.

Luggage Reconciliation on Coaches

- 2.6** Coach drivers, or any other member of coach crew if appropriate, should ensure that they are responsible for the loading and unloading of all items of passenger baggage. This is to ensure that a member of the public can not place an item into the baggage hold without boarding the coach.
- 2.7** Passengers should be reminded not to leave bags unattended and to report any unattended or suspect packages to a member of staff. Where practicable security messages can be displayed on posters and information screens and they can be delivered by making regular announcements on a public address system.

Section 3:

Security at Bus Stations, Termini and Interchanges

Areas of Concealment

- 3.1** Many bus and coach stations were designed and built at a time when security features may not have been a prime consideration. As a result many contain voids and spaces, which if large enough, could be used by a terrorist to conceal an explosive device. In addition any 'dark corners', particularly those which are out of view of staff and members of the public, can be potential areas of concealment.
- 3.2** Whilst it may not be possible to eliminate all areas of concealment some measures can be taken to reduce them. These include:
- Location of equipment – ask yourself if you are going to create a hiding space or if you can remove an existing one. Where possible, any grit bins, vending machines or other equipment boxes should be flush to walls so that nothing can be hidden behind or around any sides;
 - Boarding or sealing up voids which cannot be removed e.g. under vending machines or around equipment boxes; and
 - Lighting – additional lighting can be installed to improve security, particularly in any darker areas.
- 3.3** If any major building or renovation works are being planned, consideration should be given to designing in security features from the outset. Local police Crime Reduction Units are a good source of advice and assistance in the design of new stations or in modifications to existing ones.

Control of Access

Non-Public Areas

- 3.4** Members of the public should not be able to gain access to non-public areas such as staff rest rooms, store rooms and cleaners cupboards. All doors in public areas leading into non-public areas should be kept locked or controlled to prevent unauthorised access.
- 3.5** Ideally, keys for doors should be kept in a secure location and controlled by a responsible person. If access is controlled by keypad, the code should only be given

to persons with a legitimate need to know. It is also recommended that codes are changed on a periodic basis.

Vehicle Access

3.6 Other than authorised buses and coaches, the movement of vehicles at stations should be strictly controlled. Ideally all other vehicles should be prevented access but where this is unavoidable, e.g. delivery to a retail outlet, access to staff parking areas, we recommend the use of access controls. Measures which can be introduced include:

- A parking permit system for staff and, where appropriate, for vehicles of visitors and contractors; and
- Monitoring retail delivery vehicles to ensure that they do not stay on a station for longer than is necessary.

3.7 It is also important that local police are consulted to agree a system for reporting and dealing with any suspicious vehicles.

Visitors and Contractors

3.8 All visitors and contractors should be required to report to the station manager or other responsible person to notify them of their arrival on the station. It is recommended that they are given a security awareness briefing along the following lines:

- If you are given a visitors pass, you should wear it at all times when on the station;
- If you have a vehicle parked in the station, work/parking permits should be displayed in the windscreen;
- You should be aware of the need for vigilance when around the station. Should you find a suspicious item, please do not touch it but contact a member of staff as soon as possible. Similarly, you should contact a member of staff if you see a person acting suspiciously;
- Please ensure that you secure all doors behind you when leaving, particularly those doors which lead to non-public areas. If you are leaving a work site, please ensure that it is locked and that all equipment has been securely stored.

Patrolling Public Areas

3.9 Regular patrols by uniformed staff are a good deterrent and can be key in finding unattended or concealed items. Whilst dedicated and regular security patrols are the ideal, resources may not always permit this. Security checks can be shared by a number of staff and incorporated into their duties. For example, by those monitoring bus stands as part of their customer service and safety duties, by cleaners as part of

their routine cleaning duties and by ticketing or sales staff in ticket halls or concourse areas. It is important that staff become familiar with their work environment so that they are accustomed to spotting anything out of the ordinary.

3.10 In times of heightened threat or as the result of a bomb threat you may wish to consider carrying out more frequent and more thorough security checks of the public areas in a station. If properly planned in advance, a search need not be too time consuming. The key considerations when conducting a search of public areas are:

- **Define the search area** – Staff designated to undertake a search should be sufficiently briefed and aware of what is required. It is not sufficient to tell staff to ‘search the station’; they should have clearly defined start and finish points;
- **Plans** – The search process can be simplified if laminated plans of search areas are produced. The plans do not need to be particularly detailed but should highlight key features of the areas (such as toilets, emergency exits etc) to be searched;
- **Thoroughness** – Searches need to be sufficiently thorough in order to be able to detect any concealed item. Particular attention should be paid to any vulnerable areas and doors should be physically checked to ensure that they have been properly secured. Staff should not rely solely on visual checks. Any areas beyond doors found to be unlocked should be searched before they are secured; and
- **Use of Seals** – Any equipment boxes or cupboards which can not be locked can be fitted with tamper evident seals. This will eliminate the need to search inside such boxes or cupboards unless the seal is no longer intact.

3.11 In summary, security searches should focus on areas of the station to which members of the public have easy access but especially on any areas which are not in clear public view. Remember, terrorists do not want their bombs or their actions to be noticed.

3.12 Should staff find anything of concern, whether as part of a security patrol or during the course of their duties, it is important to have established procedures to follow. One such example for doing this, which is used to good effect on the rail network, is to apply the ‘HOT’ principle. This has been designed by the BTP to assist staff in determining whether an item or bag found is a genuine item of lost property (which is often the case) or if it is something more suspicious.

HOT asks staff to consider if the item is:

- | | |
|---------------------------------|---|
| H – Hidden | <i>Has the item been left in an open area e.g. on a seat or has it been more deliberately concealed?</i> |
| O – Obviously Suspicious | <i>Does the item look like it should, e.g. no wires protruding?</i> |
| T – Typical | <i>Is it something you would expect to see at a station or something that gets regularly left behind by passengers?</i> |

3.13 Whilst it is a useful tool, HOT may not be suitable for all environments such as on a bus or coach (see also section on searching buses and coaches). It is important that discussions are held with local police to establish a system for your station that will enable any unattended items to be reported and dealt with appropriately.

Waste Management

Litter Bins

3.14 Litter bins provide an easy and convenient method of concealment for a device and have been used by terrorists in the past. The bomb in Victoria train station in February 1991, which killed one person, was concealed in a litter bin. Certain types of bins such as those made of metal, concrete or plastic pose a greater risk as they can add to blast fragmentation which can cause serious injury and structural damage.

3.15 The vast majority of railway stations are normally permitted litter bins subject to strict design controls. The following recommendations are based on rail requirements but can be applied to bus stations, termini and interchanges:

- Litter bins should be of a type that would not contribute to an explosion if an IED were to explode inside it. An acceptable design is a clear plastic sack suspended from a metal or preferably plastic hoop;
- Hoops should be attached to concrete or brick walls, away from flammable structures;
- Litter bins should not be placed near control rooms, evacuation routes, sources of possible fragmentation, such as overhead glass canopies, windows, fire hydrants and electrical equipment;
- Litter bins should be checked and emptied on a frequent basis;
- Where possible bins should be sited near a staffed position for deterrent value;
- Bins should not be allowed to overflow;
- The number of litter bins should be kept to the lowest practicable level and monitored to remove those that are not really necessary; and
- Litter bins should, ideally, be covered by CCTV such that the face of anyone placing an item in the bin would be seen.

Bulk Rubbish Containers

- 3.16** Large bulk rubbish containers (including wheelie bins and skips) should be stored in secure non-public areas unless there is no such area. If large containers, wheelie bins or skips are to be stored in public areas such as in car parks or adjacent to concourses or entrances, they should be capable of being locked and sited in an area covered by CCTV cameras.

Bicycle Racks and Lockers

Bicycle Racks

- 3.17** There is a risk that explosive devices could be concealed in bicycle frames but there are measures that can be taken to reduce the risk of damage and injury. Consideration should be given to positioning cycle racks away from bus stands, waiting areas, entrances, concourses and large windows. If this is unavoidable it is recommended that the racks are covered by CCTV surveillance.

Bicycle Lockers

- 3.18** Bicycle lockers are increasingly being used to safeguard bicycles from theft. These bring their own risk as a large explosive device could be concealed inside a cycle locker. As with cycle racks, careful consideration of positioning (see above for recommendations) can minimise the risk. In addition, it is recommended that those using the lockers do not secure them with their own padlocks. Ideally keys and padlocks for lockers should be controlled and issued by the facility operator. This will also mean that staff have access to keys to enable lockers to be searched in the event of a bomb threat.

Equipment Boxes

- 3.19** It is recommended that all equipment boxes, such as sand and grit bins, fire extinguisher boxes, first aid equipment, are secured to prevent anything being concealed inside. One of the best ways of doing this is with a plastic tag that can easily be broken in the event of an emergency. A broken tag can also be a visual aid in that it will highlight if a box has been tampered with.

Public Toilet Facilities

- 3.20** Toilets have been used by terrorists in the past for the concealment of explosive devices. When searching a station, particular attention should be paid to potential areas of concealment (such as exposed cisterns). If refurbishment of a public toilet facility is being considered, designs that reduce or eliminate areas of concealment are preferred.

Tenants and Cleaners

3.21 Tenants and cleaners have their part to play in overall security. It is recommended practice to have periodic meetings with them (and indeed with all operators at the station) at which security issues can be discussed. Tenants and cleaners should be made aware of the importance of vigilance and given details of incident reporting procedures (who to report to, what to report etc). Tenants should also be aware of the need to secure any stock rooms and where appropriate, monitor and supervise any delivery vehicles. Cleaners should also ensure that they lock cleaning cupboards when not in use and do not leave any cleaning equipment unattended.

Security Awareness Measures for Passengers

3.22 Passengers should be reminded not to leave bags unattended and to report any unattended or suspect packages to a member of staff. Where practicable security messages can be displayed on posters and information screens and they can be delivered by making regular announcements on a public address system.

CCTV

3.23 CCTV can be a useful deterrent and as such it should be used to cover vulnerabilities such as litter bins, cycle racks/lockers and doors to non-public areas. CCTV cameras should be capable of producing a 50% picture size and run at a minimum of one frame per second. CCTV systems should be recorded and where possible, be monitored. It is recommended that recordings be retained for one month before any tapes or hard drives are reused. As with any technological system, things can go wrong and it is essential that good maintenance arrangements are in place so that any faults can be repaired in the minimum amount of time.

3.24 If current CCTV systems are to be replaced, digital systems are recommended. You may wish to consider liaising with other local organisations/operations (e.g. rail stations, local authorities etc) to identify whether it would be useful to have compatible systems or whether their CCTV surveillance covers any part of your operation to avoid duplication. It may be possible for you to agree the positioning of your and their systems to ensure that there are no potential gaps in coverage.

Left Luggage Facilities

3.25 Left luggage facilities present an obvious security risk. In particular, left luggage lockers are of concern as there is no control of persons depositing bags. In times of particular heightened threat you may wish to withdraw luggage lockers from use. Where left luggage lockers are installed it is recommended that they are covered by CCTV. At staffed left luggage facilities you may wish to consider only accepting bags for deposit from genuine passengers e.g. those who can present a ticket as evidence of travel.

Car Parks

- 3.26** It is recommended that public car parks are monitored to ensure that vehicles are not left longer than an authorised time. If public parking is available e.g. near station entrances or other passenger facilities, a procedure for dealing with suspicious vehicles should be agreed with local police.

Bomb Threats

- 3.27** Bomb threats are usually anonymous and communicated by telephone; written threats are rare. Bomb threats are usually intended to cause a nuisance but they may presage an act of terrorism or criminal intent. It is recommended that advice is sought from local police on how to handle any telephone bomb threats that may be received.

Section 4:

Security of Depots and Maintenance Facilities

Security Controls

- 4.1** All sites where buses or coaches are parked when not in service should be subject to security controls. This can include:
- Physical access barriers around the site such as walls and fences;
 - Access control measures at all entrances to ensure that only authorised people are permitted entry to the site; and
 - Where possible, the introduction of CCTV cameras to detect and monitor any unauthorised access. If CCTV is not available you may wish to consider implementing periodic site patrols. You may also wish to consider carrying out periodic checks on people within a site to ensure that they have a legitimate reason to be there.
- 4.2** It is recommended that buildings such as offices or staff rest rooms, within a depot or maintenance facility are subject to security controls. This should include locking all doors and rooms that are not in use. Where possible, consideration should be given to controlling access by way of key code systems or other electronic means. This will ensure that access is permitted only to those entitled to enter the area concerned. However, where such access controls are in place, staff should be reminded of the importance of ensuring that they do not allow others to ‘tailgate’.

Buses/Coaches on Site

- 4.3** Any buses or coaches within the site should be secured when they are not subject to maintenance work. It is also recommended that they are searched before they leave the depot prior to entering service and again when they are returned to a depot at the end of service. Such vehicle checks may be done by drivers or by cleaners.

Visitors and Contractors to a Depot or Maintenance Facility

- 4.4** It is recommended that on arrival at a depot or maintenance facility all visitors or contractors should report to the facility manager or other responsible person. A security briefing similar to that outlined in Section 3.8 is also recommended for visitors and contractors.