Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Transport, by Command of Her Majesty July 2007
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This is a White Paper that plans for the growth and development of our railways.
For too much of the past decade, policy on rail has been about repairing the problems of a flawed privatisation. The Government rightly focused on reversing decades of under-investment and putting the industry on a stable footing.
Challenges remain, but fundamentally this White Paper is optimistic about the future. More passengers than ever are using the railways – 40 per cent more over the last decade. More freight is being shipped by rail. And while we recognise that there is more to do, safety has improved and passengers are giving the railway credit for better reliability.
Our challenge now is to build on this success – to develop a modern, sustainable railway system that is accessible and easy for passengers to use. That is why our proposals in this White Paper are measured against the key tests of capacity, quality of service, value for money and the environment.
And it is passengers, and their priorities, which are at the heart of this White Paper.
Increasing capacity, particularly in those places suffering from the worst overcrowding, is central. But greater reliability and increased capacity are not passengers’ only concerns. They also want safer, more modern stations, simpler and easier-to-use ticketing information and sales. The White Paper delivers these and sets these plans in the context of a long-term strategy for the next 30 years.
Our ambitions are for a reliable network capable of handling
double the number of passengers we have today; that can cater
for a more diverse population that demands still more from
its public services; and that delivers its environmental
potential. A rail industry that is flexible in its planning
to adapt and deliver in a changing world.
For the first time in a long time, we have a railway that is
getting the basics right. It is delivering growth. This White
Paper now seeks to unlock its potential.
Rt Hon. Ruth Kelly MP
Secretary of State for Transport
July 2007
Britain now has a railway which carries more people and more freight than it has in over 50 years. It is safer than ever before. Reliability, which declined sharply after the appalling accident at Hatfield is now good and improving on most lines. And the finances of the industry are stable and improving. Network Rail is on course to improve efficiency by nearly one-third in five years, and strong growth in demand means that passenger services require less subsidy.
These are substantial achievements. The story of the railway used to be about managing decline. Now it is about enabling growth.
Passengers want a railway that is reliable, value for money, comfortable, accessible and easy to use. The public as a whole wants a railway that contributes to economic growth and helps Britain meet the environmental challenges ahead.
The railway can only meet these goals if it has the capacity to carry the passengers who want to use it. Rail has seen record levels of growth – over 40 per cent in the last decade – and in response the railway is running more services than before, and has provided more trains. But capacity has not kept pace with record demand across the network, and crowding on some of the busiest services has got worse. The priority for this White Paper is to tackle these trends. It is the first plan for major growth since the 1950s.
The Government is committing significant investment now. And the long-term ambition is for a railway that:
Over £10 billion will be invested in enhancing capacity between 2009 and 2014, with overall Government support for the railway totalling over £15 billion. This represents a higher level of investment than in 2004–09 with a lower level of public expenditure. This improvement reflects growing passenger demand and improved efficiency, especially by Network Rail. Such trends allow more of the money invested by Government to be directed towards increases in carrying capacity. Fares policy remains as today at RPI + 1 per cent, allowing more money to be invested to improve the service for passengers. The Government believes this strikes a fair balance between taxpayers and passengers; between the cost imposed, and the ability to fund the improvements passengers and the public say they want to see. And this White Paper will deliver substantial investment.
In the wake of Railtrack’s collapse it was taxpayers who stepped in to provide the additional funding necessary to support the railway and put it back on course. It is right that subsidy levels should now start to return to closer to the historic norm. At the same time, the Government is delivering improvements without imposing new burdens on passengers, about 80 per cent of whom travel on regulated or discounted tickets.
Today it is possible to frame an ambitious and deliverable strategy for growth. It was not possible to do so even three years ago, at the time of the last Government spending review. The challenge in 2004 was to deal with the legacy of a privatisation that had brought many benefits to rail users, but also had serious flaws.
Railtrack had lost control of costs. In 2003, the then regulator presented the Government with the bill – a £11/4 billion a year increase in funding until 2009. This led to the creation of Network Rail and the delivery of efficiency gains that will bring infrastructure costs back closer to an acceptable level by 2009. The regulator has indicated that further improvement should be secured by 2014. This creates the headroom for investment to increase the capacity of the railway.
In 2004, after the last review of Network Rail funding, the Government had to increase expenditure on the railway but freeze new investment. Network Rail’s renewals programme was protected, targeting the backlog of neglect of basic infrastructure (such as replacement of rails) that had occurred in the last years of British Rail and the first years of Railtrack. Also protected were committed projects, such as the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, West Coast Route Modernisation and the implementation of the Train Protection and Warning System. These are all worthwhile investments, but they do not of themselves deliver a significant increase in capacity.
The architects of privatisation made no provision for any single body to define the railway’s strategic priorities and the level of public expenditure required. In this White Paper, the Government discharges the statutory duty it gave itself in 2005 to set out a strategy and budget for delivering an environmentally and financially sustainable railway.
The formal communication to the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) appended to this White Paper sets out:
The Government is satisfied that the improvements it wants to buy are affordable within the funds available. The ORR will determine whether this deal is a fair one, and then ensure it is delivered.
These firm and costed plans for 2014 have been drawn up alongside considerations of the 30-year challenges that the railway may face. This is essential because trains ordered now will still be in service in 30 years’ time, and other assets will last even longer. But while the Government must plan 30 years ahead, it recognises that it is impossible accurately to forecast demand that far into the future. Some cities and regions will grow faster than others. People and firms are likely to respond to the challenge of cutting carbon emissions by changing travel patterns and re-engineering supply chains. The pace of technological change is equally unpredictable.
Forecasts have been wrong before, and any strategy that tried to build a rigid investment programme based on fixed long-term forecasts would inevitably be wrong again. Such an approach could well deliver additional capacity in the wrong place.
To overcome this challenge, the guiding principles in this strategy are:
These principles are consistent with the recommendations of the recent Eddington Transport Study, and are illustrated by the preparatory work on a new Intercity Express train, with a design that will give flexibility on power supply and train formation. They are also evident in proposals to prepare for the next generation of signalling that will make a difference in the middle part of the next decade. The Government is investing over £1/3 billion in these preparatory projects alone. But it would not be prudent to commit now to ‘all-or-nothing’ projects, such as network-wide electrification or a high-speed line, for which the longer-term benefits are currently uncertain and which could delay tackling the current strategic priorities such as capacity.
The railway is safe and getting safer. But the recent accident at Grayrigg demonstrated that the railway can never afford to take safety for granted. The industry has not identified a need for major safety-related investment or new regulation in the near future, but it must maintain momentum by constantly improving its safety management. The Government is therefore specifying a 3 per cent reduction in the risk of death or injury to passengers and employees.
Reliability has improved steadily since 2001, despite the railway getting busier. Passengers give the railway credit for this improvement. But there are still lines on which reliability is unacceptable. And there are still too many delays caused by basic problems with track and signals. Reliability currently stands at 88 per cent. The Government wants to secure an improvement to 92.6 per cent by 2014. The Government also wants to see a 25 per cent reduction in the number of delays over 30 minutes, which inconvenience passengers most.
The investment priority for the period to 2014 is increased capacity. The Government wants the industry to be able to accommodate a 221/2 per cent increase in passenger demand by 2014. It also wants average load factors – one measure of overcrowding – in major cities to reduce during the morning peak period, with the biggest improvements targeted on the busiest routes. To deliver this, the Government will fund an additional 1,300 new carriages, the procurement process for which will start now. Over 300 of these will address the rapid growth in demand seen in cities such as Birmingham, Cardiff, Leeds and Manchester. They will enable the railway to accommodate a further seven years of growth and will start to tackle crowding, bringing improvement to some of the busiest services. For regional and rural lines, the focus is also on growth, and in order to retain flexibility for the future there will be no line closures.
On some lines, provision of additional capacity will require new infrastructure. This ranges from the £51/2 billion Thameslink Programme, through the £600 million to tackle congestion at Reading station and Birmingham New Street, to a large number of relatively modest individual schemes to lengthen platforms, upgrade electricity supply and provide sufficient depots. The ability of the rail industry and its suppliers to deliver such a large and complex investment programme is a real constraint on the rate at which capacity can be increased.
Capacity is the investment priority for the period to 2014, and momentum must be maintained on safety and reliability. But the Government will also make progress on the wider passenger and environmental agendas.
The fares system will be simplified, so passengers have greater confidence that they are being sold the right ticket for them. Smartcards will be usable in all major cities and inter-city fares will be purchasable on mobile phones. This will cut queues at ticket offices and free staff to assist passengers and enhance their sense of security. Indeed, both personal and counter-terrorist security remain active elements of future planning.
£150 million is earmarked to modernise 150 stations across the country. The Government now looks to the rail industry to come up with a robust delivery plan, working with local authorities and harnessing developer contributions. This investment will focus on medium-sized stations that are run-down or lack basic facilities, and addresses an area which the railway has neglected for too long. It will be backed up by ‘travel plans’ to improve access to stations, and better provision for cyclists.
Rail’s biggest contribution to tackling global warming comes from increasing its capacity, so that it can accommodate demand growth as people and firms factor carbon costs into their travel and transport decisions and make greener travel choices. In addition to the passenger capacity improvements, the Government is also allowing for an additional £200 million within Network Rail’s regulatory asset base to enable work to start on a strategic freight network, to accommodate freight growth.
Rail must also reduce its own carbon footprint. Next year the
industry will set itself targets for reducing CO2 emissions
per passenger-kilometre and per tonne-kilometre. The
Government will encourage progress by funding research and
writing environmental objectives into passenger franchises.
But the Government will not subsidise train operators to
undertake efficiency measures, such as on-train metering,
that pay for themselves via reduced fuel bills. Train
operators must take greater responsibility.
The case for network-wide electrification will be kept under
review; it is not made yet. The right long-term solution for
rail will be the one that minimises its carbon footprint and
energy bill. That depends on the relative rates at which the
carbon footprint of electricity generation declines and the
rate at which options become available for low-carbon,
self-powered trains, neither of which can be forecast at
present. Additionally, the Government noted that it would
generally be more cost-effective to implement electrification
after the migration to cab-based signalling, rather than
before.
Investments that start before 2014 will deliver their full benefits in later years.
The Thameslink Programme will be completed by the end of 2015. It will deliver 12-carriage trains, running through central London at a frequency of 24 trains per hour. It represents a step-change in capacity. The Channel Tunnel Rail Link and the West Coast modernisation combined deliver 4,900 additional seats into London per peak hour. Thameslink will deliver 14,500 additional seats. Subject to Parliamentary approval and decisions on financing, Crossrail has the potential to make as big a difference to east–west travel in London as Thameslink does on the north–south corridor.
In other cities, continuing demand growth can continue to be met primarily by train lengthening. Infrastructure bottlenecks will be tackled and modern signalling introduced to improve reliability. The cities and regions will need increasingly to take their own view on the role of rail in delivering local economic development priorities alongside other modes.
Having completed the West Coast modernisation, there will be a need for modernisation and enhancement of other main lines, the East Coast and Great Western main lines in particular.
The flagship Intercity Express trains will enter full passenger service from 2015, starting on the East Coast and Great Western main lines. They will be lighter and more environmentally friendly than current long-distance trains. They will also be longer and capable of carrying significantly more passengers. Between now and 2014, Network Rail will have undertaken the investment necessary to accommodate the new trains. Intercity Express has demonstrated the value of the industry sitting down with its customers and suppliers to frame challenging specifications for new trains. A similar approach is now being adopted to the design of the next generation of ‘go-anywhere’ trains that will replace diesel and electric multiple units.
By the second half of the next decade and continuing thereafter, cab-based signalling will be implemented on a greater proportion of the network. This will increase capacity by allowing a higher frequency of train service, while maintaining safety. Trains will ‘know’ the position and speed of the trains in front of them, and will not require the 71/2 mile gaps between services that are standard on inter-city routes today.
Stations and customer services will continue to improve. Within 10 years, rail travel and tickets could be combining with other services in the use of ‘e-money’. The £370 million for All’ programme, to provide a network of stations with step-free access, will be completed in 2015. By 2020, all trains will be fully accessible for disabled people and others with mobility problems.
By the time of the next HLOS, the Government aims to have enough data on performance and costs to set a robust environmental output for rail, with the same status as those for safety, capacity and reliability. As the network is renewed, it will incorporate new severe-weather standards, improving its resilience to climate change.
On the basis of recent demand trends, if the investment committed in this HLOS is maintained through future control periods, in accordance with the capacity and funding projections set out in this White Paper, than the measures described would be sufficient to meet growth on all routes until about 2030. The first areas where demand growth might require additional interventions are on the London–Birmingham–Manchester corridor and on London’s busiest commuter routes. It would not be prudent to invest today to address capacity issues that are unlikely to materialise until two decades hence, and may not materialise at all. But a need exists to start planning work ahead of the next HLOS in 2012, to cover the possibility that demand growth accelerates.
For London, work with Network Rail suggests that extra-long trains (of up to 16 carriages) would provide a greater increase in capacity than double-deck trains at a similar cost. On inter-urban routes, current evidence suggests that maglevs and dedicated freight-lines are not appropriate solutions – both are too inflexible, and maglevs are too expensive to provide value for money. At present the balance of advantage would appear to favour new services running at conventional speeds and operating on an existing disused alignment. But this is not a decision that need or should be taken now. Further assessment of the options will be undertaken to inform the next HLOS. Any schemes will need to be considered alongside other modes and judged against the key criteria of capacity, value for money and environmental benefit.
Just as future growth rates are uncertain, so is the way in which people will use rail. In future, where people have double today’s income and half today’s carbon footprint, behaviour patterns may change significantly. Land-use, housing and education policies will all have impacts on where people live and work. This could result in moves toward a ‘24/7’ society with more dispersed patterns of life and travel. That is why rail must plan now against the future need for it to operate more consistently throughout the day and week, one reason why the Government is supporting the development of regional and local services.
Sustainability is at the heart of the Government’s commitments to 2014 and this future strategy. Sustainability demands a broader look at priorities for the railway alongside other modes, to find the best balance between the needs of the economy, society and the environment. Safety, reliability and cost are permanent priorities for the railway. But increasing capacity is the most urgent investment need – to accommodate record passenger numbers, allow rail to contribute to low-carbon economic growth, and move towards the service quality that more exacting consumers increasingly demand.
Delivering such a railway involves ensuring that investments are targeted and sustained, to deliver steady and efficient improvement against a long-term sense of direction, based on the best evidence available today. This will provide the rail industry with the flexibility to react to longer-term challenges, while not getting ahead of the realistic ability to predict.
This is the Government’s strategy: to deliver a sustainable, modern railway.
1.1 The prospects for Britain’s railways are better now than at any time for a generation.
1.2 For most of the post-war period, the railway was in decline. The railway’s share of freight and passenger markets went down and the industry’s financial position was always tight. [1] Investment was difficult to justify, rarely long-term and was always subject to changes in the annual public expenditure rounds.
1.3 But, from the mid-1990s, the railway’s fortunes began to change dramatically. [2] Over the last ten years, freight and passenger traffic has grown by 40 per cent (Figures 1.1 and 1.2). This reflects sustained economic growth. It also reflects the more successful aspects of privatisation, which gave freight and passenger operators the means and incentive to attract new business, and created greater financial certainty.
[1]
Slides
TPH3 (MS PowerPoint, 86KB) and FRT17b, Summary of Key
Research and Analysis, July 2007.
[2]
Slide
TPH5 (MS PowerPoint, 79KB), Summary of Key Research
and Analysis, July 2007.
1.4 Privatisation brought some real benefits, but it imposed an institutional structure that was seriously flawed, something which was exposed by the Hatfield accident in 2000. Although the statistics show that rail safety continued to improve under privatisation, public confidence in rail safety was undermined by a series of major accidents.
1.5 Railtrack’s response to Hatfield precipitated a downturn in reliability on the network from which the rail industry has only recovered recently. Train operators and Railtrack blamed one another for the poor performance of the railway, instead of working in partnership to solve the problem. The costs of major infrastructure projects (such as the West Coast route modernisation) rose sharply, as did the routine costs of operating and maintaining the basic infrastructure. Railtrack went into administration in 2001, but the company’s shareholders were not the only victims of its failures. In 2002, the Rail Regulator presented taxpayers with a bill for an additional £11/4 billion a year of increased infrastructure costs, which largely resulted from historic under-investment and Railtrack’s loss of control of its business.
1.6 Since then, the rail industry has turned a corner. The Government established Network Rail as a not-for-dividend private company to manage the railway infrastructure, and then addressed the remaining organisational problems of the railway. These changes were set out in the 2004 White Paper The Future of Rail and implemented in the Railways Act 2005. The key reforms were: to make the Secretary of State for Transport responsible for setting the strategy and budget for the railway in England and Wales; further rail devolution for Scotland and Wales; integration of safety and economic regulation; and changes to the industry structure to promote stronger partnership-working between Network Rail and train operators.
1.7 Today, rail demand continues to grow strongly. This is good news for the rail industry and the country as a whole, because rail makes an important economic contribution and is an environmentally friendly transport mode. However, this rapid expansion of demand has created pressures of its own for those rail users on the busiest services who find they are standing on long journeys, travelling in overcrowded carriages or simply unable to get onto a train because it is too full.
1.8 This rate of growth was not foreseen at the time of privatisation. The industry has responded with more trains and some additional capacity. But rising costs and the mismanagement of the Railtrack period reduced the return of the investments that were made. As a result, capacity has not kept pace with increased demand.
1.9 With the new structure proving stable, performance improving, and costs back under control, the industry is now well placed to respond to these challenges and deliver the necessary investment. But, in doing so, it is essential that the right choices are made based on an assessment of the long-term challenges ahead and the broader context in which the railway operates. Delivering a better railway or a better overall transport system is not a goal in its own right, but a means to delivering wider economic, environmental and social goals.
1.10 The Eddington Transport Study, [1] published in December 2006, confirmed that ‘transport can impact on the performance of the economy and will ultimately impact on overall output’. The Study found that Britain’s geography and existing transport networks already provided good connectivity (Figure 1.3). The priority, therefore, is not to create new connections, but to improve the performance of existing networks. The focus should be on enhancing the capacity and reliability of routes where crowding or congestion problems indicate that the transport system is already coming under strain.
1.11 The Eddington Study also identified three key transport markets that are crucial to the productivity and competitiveness of the economy:
1.12 The railway is well placed to serve such markets, but it is a minority mode and cannot be planned in isolation. The Eddington Study argued for a ‘sophisticated policy mix’, appraising options across modes to reflect their market strengths and taking full account of pricing options.
[1] The Eddington Transport Study, Main report: Transport’s role in sustaining the UK’s productivity and competitiveness, Sir Rod Eddington, December 2006.
1.13 This White Paper proposes a strategy for the railway in the context of this wider transport agenda. It focuses investments on those markets where rail offers a particular advantage over other modes and within the three key markets identified by the Eddington Study. Hence, a key aim of this 2007 White Paper is to enable rail to adapt and respond to any future decisions on road investment, air travel, logistics or local road pricing schemes.
1.14 Sir Nicholas Stern’s review, [4] published in October 2006, demonstrated the relationship between the economy and climate change. It stated that ‘on current trends, average global temperatures will rise by 2–3°C within the next fifty years or so’ and estimated that this could result in a permanent loss of up to 3 per cent of world economic output. The review concluded that there was a robust economic case for reducing CO2 emissions, and that the developed countries needed to secure reductions of at least 60 per cent by 2050.
1.15 While transport as a whole accounts for around 23 per cent of the UK’s CO2 emissions, rail travel accounts for less than 1 per cent (Figure 1.4). As a result, the contribution of the railway cannot be decisive, but it will be important. The rail industry can make a significant contribution by accommodating the increasing demand for this ‘greener’ travel choice, offering an attractive quality of service and reducing its own carbon footprint. Maximising that contribution must, clearly, be a key strand in any long-term strategy for the railway.
1.16 Climate change is the most important environmental issue confronting Britain, but it is not the only one. Transport impacts on air quality and thereby on health. It impacts on wildlife habitats and thereby on biodiversity. It generates noise and vibration, and thereby impacts on people’s quality of life.
1.17 In general, the rail industry’s performance in all these areas is good. But, as environmental sensitivity increases, it is likely to come under increased regulatory and public pressure to improve its performance further. This would pose particular challenges for an industry that uses assets with a relatively long life, increasing the lead times for the introduction of new technologies. It is important that assessments of the impact of any new environmental requirements take a comprehensive view of all the consequences, including the effect on CO2 emissions, of making the railway more costly or less convenient. But it is also important that the rail industry integrates the wide-ranging environmental agenda into its own planning.
1.18 Social goals cannot be as simply encapsulated as economic or environmental goals. At the broadest level, the key challenge for transport is to support social inclusion by improving personal mobility. The aim must be to ensure that people are not prevented from securing jobs or a better quality of life because they lack access to transport. To ensure this in the longer term, rail planning must co-ordinate still more closely with national and regional spatial plans. It must respond to a developing metropolitan and regional agenda and it must cater for people with reduced mobility.
1.19 The rail industry must also position itself to respond to the challenges and opportunities of an ever-more diverse society – a society whose patterns of work and leisure are constantly evolving – and whose citizens increasingly demand higher standards quality and convenience in the provision of services.
1.20 Once every five years the Secretary of State for Transport must set out the rail improvements he or she wants to secure for the coming five-year ‘Control Period’. This is a new requirement of the Railways Act 2005. It gives the Secretary of State the power to set the strategic direction for the rail industry. It also means the Government must specify with clarity what it wishes the railway to deliver and the funding available to do so. It is then the job of the independent Office of Rail Regulation to ensure that the specifications and the budget balance.
1.21 The letter annexed to this White Paper discharges that remit for the next ‘Control Period’, which will start in April 2009 and run until March 2014. [5] The improvements being purchased by the Secretary of State are set out in Appendix A and are formally termed the Railways Act 2005 Statement. This comprises a High Level Output Specification and various other requirements. For simplicity these are referred to collectively in the White Paper as HLOS. The budget is termed the Statement of Funds Available.
1.22 However, rail investments made in the coming years will have a very long life. New trains should still be in operation 30 years from now. New infrastructure will last even longer. This means that the Government and rail industry need to think 30 years ahead.
1.23 This is challenging. Economic models and rail forecasting tools are essential to project appraisal and can assist forward planning. But the further into the future they attempt to predict, the wider the error-margin.
1.24 Rather than base its strategy around a prescribed response to any one forecast, the Government has assessed a range of ways in which the future might develop, considering the potential implications for the rail industry and how it might respond. The most challenging of such planning scenarios is one that combines high average per capita GDP with a high sensitivity to CO2, and the risk of climate change, alongside a diverse society. This is the scenario which is the most likely to see success in tackling climate change but is also the most demanding future for the railway. It therefore forms the ‘base case’ for this White Paper, since a strategy that enables the railway to thrive in this future scenario will be well placed to adapt to less demanding outcomes. And it would clearly not be right to plan for economic or environmental failure.
1.25 Such a scenario produces a cash-rich but carbon-poor society, compared with today. Higher average incomes imply that people will have higher values-of-time and will be less tolerant of delay and unproductive uses of time. They will be more concerned about risks to their personal safety or health. They will expect higher standards of service and quality of life.
1.26 Nothing in this ‘base-case scenario’ suggests that the rail industry can afford to relax its vigilance on safety, reliability and cost. These are permanent priorities for the railway. But this White Paper establishes three further goals for the rail industry if it is to address today’s challenges and contribute to the sort of planning scenario described above:
1.27 This White Paper sets out how these three goals are to be achieved over three time-horizons, which could be summarised as ‘commit, plan and anticipate’:
1.28 The most valuable options and strategies are those that enable the railway to adapt successfully to the widest range of plausible futures. As a result, the Government favours solutions that can be introduced incrementally (and therefore adjusted in the light of emerging knowledge) and seeks opportunities to support investments that will improve flexibility, even if these entail some additional initial expenditure.
1.29 The Intercity Express train, which will replace the current InterCity 125 fleet, illustrates this approach. It provides a significant increase in capacity with only modest infrastructure cost. It will be readily deployable on different lines, with different service patterns. It can be lengthened if demand on a route grows faster than forecast or shortened if demand grows more slowly. And it can be readily adapted to different sources of power. In essence, the approach is about ‘buying flexibility’ while developing the capability of the existing network.
1.30 With certain exceptions, such as safety, rail policy is a devolved matter in Scotland, so the geographical scope of the strategy is primarily limited to England and Wales, recognising the powers of the Welsh Assembly Government in relation to Welsh and cross-border services.
1.31 The Government believes that the issues and trends raised in this strategy have important linkages with Scotland, Northern Ireland and the EU and intends to work closely with the devolved administrations to ensure as consistent an approach as possible.
[4]
The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change,
October 2006.
[5]
Elsewhere in this White Paper this is referred to as
‘2009–2014’ for ease of reading.
|
Summary The provision of safe and reliable services is a fundamental requirement of the railway. Passengers are entitled to expect to travel in safety and on time. Staff are entitled to work in safe conditions. The safety of the railway has improved steadily over several decades, and there have been some significant improvements in recent years. The introduction of the Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS) has greatly reduced the risk of trains passing red signals, Network Rail has invested heavily in renewing infrastructure, and older trains have been replaced by modern designs with better crashworthiness. The rail industry must maintain this momentum. The Government is requiring a further improvement by 2014 of at least a 3 per centreduction in the risk of death or injury to passengers and employees. In addition to these improvements to operational safety, the rail industry must maintain its focus, and will continue to work with Government on issues of personal and counter-terrorist security, while maintaining the fundamentally ‘open’ nature of the rail network. The Government is committed to protecting passengers, employees and infrastructure from acts of terrorism. Rail networks have historically been a target and more recent attacks in Madrid (2004), London (2005) and Mumbai (2006) demonstrate the continued threat. Government–industry structures are in place and work in close co-operation with the police and security services to ensure that appropriate security regimes are in place; they will continue to respond and adapt to any changes in threat. At the same time, passengers are sensitive to concerns of personalsecurity on the railway. Such concerns need to be factored into future planning decisions, for instance in the refurbishment of stations and the design of trains. Over time, passengers are likely to attach more, rather than less, importance to all facets of personal risk. |
2.1 Safety on Britain’s railway system compares well with other modes. It has a comparable safety record to bus and coach, and travel by rail is roughly seven times safer than travel by car. [1] Over the last 30 years, there has been a strong downward trend in the number of train accidents and fatalities (Figures 2.1 and 2.2). [2]
2.2 In recent years, the safety of the railways has improved significantly. But it can never be taken for granted. Even against a backdrop of general improvement, the fatal accident at Grayrigg in early 2007 demonstrated – as others have done before – the potential consequences of any lapses in safety management.
2.3 That such accidents have become less frequent over time is welcome. The frequency of fatal accidents fell from six over the five-year period 1992–96, to four between 1997 and 2001, and then to two between 2002 and 2006. [3] This is reflected in improved passenger and public perception. Work by Passenger Focus confirms that the risk of rail accidents is one that does not register highly with passengers, who take it as read that they are using an inherently safe mode of transport.
2.4 A number of factors have contributed to this improvement. The introduction of in-cab warning systems [4] has reduced by over 90 per cent the risk of a train passing a signal at danger, [5] previously one of the major sources of risk on the railway. Network Rail has invested heavily in renewing the basic infrastructure of the railway and has introduced new ways of monitoring the condition of the track. As a result, rail assets are in better condition and the industry has improved its ability to detect and remedy small defects before they create a material safety risk. The replacement of older rolling stock with a modern fleet of trains has also helped improve safety. Last, but not least, improved safety will continue to require good management, a strong safety culture and constant attention to detail.
2.5 It is essential to maintain this momentum. But there are also other aspects of safety that need to be addressed.
2.6 Historically, the rail industry’s record on employee safety has been less satisfactory. It has improved considerably in recent years – from 15–20 fatalities per year in the late 1980s to an average of about six in the early 2000s. [6] The fatality rate is some 45 per cent lower for rail track workers than for road construction staff. [7] Yet staff safety remains a key concern for the railway.
[1]
Derived from Transport Statistics GB
2005, table 1.7 (1994–2003 average).
[2]
Slide
SAF3 (MS PowerPoint, 89KB), Summary of Key Research and
Analysis, July 2007.
[3]
RSSB’s Annual Safety Performance Report data (excludes
public fatalities at level crossings).
[4]
Principally, the Train Protection Warning System, or
TPWS.
[5]
The ORR’s Quarterly SPAD report April 2007 (against
March 2001 benchmark).
[6]
The RSSB’s Annual Safety Performance Reports 2004 and
2005.
[7]
The RSSB ‘Overview of the workforce’ safety performance
report, November 2006.
2.7 Rail accidents statistics of the kind cited above provide one measure of safety. They are also what drives media coverage and public perception. However, they do not tell the whole story. That is because the fewer accidents there are, the more difficult it is statistically to infer actual underlying safety performance by counting the number of accidents over any given period. A single fatal accident does not mean that the railway has become less safe, and a long period without fatal accidents does not necessarily mean that the railway has become safer.
2.8 The Government wants to use a comprehensive means of measuring safety performance, one that considers the underlying risk and not just the frequency of accidents.
2.9 The two measures are different. Just because a hairline crack in a rail or an over-run signal did not cause an accident, it does not mean it is not a problem. The industry has worked effectively and collaboratively to develop a Safety Risk Model, [8] which assigns weightings to all the different factors that could cause an accident and monitors trends in them. The Government supports this work and will use this measurement of risk as its principal means of measuring the safety of the railways.
2.10 The Government wants to see further and continual improvement in the safety of the railway. Given the high levels of safety to which the industry already operates, the Government recognises that delivery is more likely to be incremental, through the development of existing management and working practices. Nevertheless such improvements are essential to maintain momentum, not least because increased demand for rail travel and changing demographics will increase some safety risks.
2.11 The Government also wants to include both passengers and employees within its specification of safety. The rail industry has a duty to transport its customers safely and to provide a safe working environment for its staff. These responsibilities should remain the industry’s primary focus.
2.12 On this basis, the safety output that the Government is specifying for the rail industry is a reduction of at least 3 per cent in the risk of death or injury to passengers and employees for the period between 2009 and 2014. This represents an important, incremental improvement in safety risk on what is an already safe mode of transport.
2.13 This reduction in risk is broadly in line with the industry’s own assessment of the improvement it can deliver by 2014, having regard to the increase in freight and passenger numbers that it will be expected to accommodate. Clearly the rail industry’s aim will be to exceed these if possible.
2.14 The Government believes that this output requirement, which supplements the industry’s ongoing legal obligations and responsibilities, will provide a yardstick to assess whether individual safety decisions are delivering real improvement across the industry. It will also encourage a more system-based approach to safety, targeting efforts where the greatest reduction in risk can be secured most cost-effectively.
2.15 Risk to passengers and employees is an important focus, but the majority of deaths on the railway involve third parties, with suicide, trespass and incursion onto level crossings being the major causes. [9]
2.16 These risks cannot be neglected, and in recent years the rail industry has improved safety in this area, with a 16 per cent reduction in the average number of deaths in 1996–2005 compared to 1986–1995. [10]
2.17 Delivering improvement is a challenge. Of all third-party fatalities, 95 per cent are suicides. [11] The rail industry has identified and targeted locations where there is a high risk of suicide attempts, but due to the open nature of the railway there are obvious limits to the preventative measures that can be taken when people are intent on taking their own lives.
2.18 There are many other incursions onto the railway – by vandals, by children who are unaware of the dangers, or by people who are crossing the railway as a short-cut. The rail industry seeks to respond through publicity, policing and prevention. In many countries it is normal for busy urban railway lines to be unfenced, and there is a clear presumption that it is the responsibility of the public to keep off the railway. In Britain, the law imposes on the rail industry a duty of care to third parties.
2.19 The Government believes that this principle should be retained, but it must be supported by robust cost–benefit analysis of preventative measures balanced by a vigorous policy of prosecution of trespassers.
2.20 The misuse of level crossings has been a particular focus of attention, because it poses a risk to both road and rail users, with the greater risk to road users. As other rail safety risks have declined, misuse of level crossings has become a more significant source of risk to rail passengers, and the rail industry is devoting more attention to it. As well as the number of level crossings being reduced, they can also be better protected using CCTV or radar-based obstacle detection equipment.
2.21 Many of the most appropriate remedies are available to highway authorities. The Road Safety Act 2006 introduced measures to improve level-crossing safety by allowing controls to be introduced at level crossings to manage better the behaviour of motorists. For example, using ‘rumble strips’, implementing built-out kerbs, and better signage designed both to slow the motorist and reduce cases of ‘zig-zagging’ around barriers.
2.22 However, highway authorities have the same responsibility as their rail counterparts to make decisions on their safety priorities, and level crossings accounted for less than 1 per cent [12] of the 32,000 [13] deaths and serious injuries on Britain’s roads in 2005. This points to the need for co-ordinated approaches between rail and highway authorities, as has been piloted in Lincolnshire with its road-rail partnership between Network Rail and the County Council. This is a model which Network Rail and local authorities may wish to build on in other areas where there are large numbers of level crossings.
[8]
www.rssb.co.uk/srmodel.asp
[9]
Slide
SAF7 (MS PowerPoint, 84KB), Summary of Key Research
and Analysis, July 2007.
[10]
Overview of RSSB’s Annual Safety Performance Report,
2005.
[11]
Including suspected suicides.
[12]
There were four fatalities of road vehicle drivers at
level crossings in 2005.
[13]
Road Casualties Great Britain, 2005. Precise figure
32,155.
2.23 Work by Passenger Focus has confirmed that the risk of rail accidents is not seen as an issue by passengers, but that some passengers are seriously concerned about personal security. Passenger Focus advise that this issue now ranks, along with increasing the capacity of the railway, as one of the top priorities for rail users. Awareness of the risks from terrorism is high, and public health risks may feature as a matter of future concern.
2.24 An RSSB research report in 2004 [14] examined the issues of personal security in some detail. Despite a significant mismatch between perception and reality, there is a substantive issue that needs to be addressed. Doing so can also have commercial benefits. Research has shown the potential for increased patronage (particularly at off-peak times) if passengers’ personal security concerns are addressed. [15]
2.25 Through the efforts of the rail industry, British Transport Police (BTP), local police forces and central and local government, significant improvements have been made in personal security. The biggest overall impact on crime has come from targeting crime hotspots on the busiest services and stations. On more lightly-used services and stations, there are low-cost measures to reduce crime and the fear of crime (Figure 2.3), such as good lighting and signage, a well-maintained environment, up-to-date information, and clear sightlines.
2.26 In addition, Network Rail and most Train Operating Companies are participating in the Secure Stations Scheme, which is designed to improve security standards at rail stations. The Government will continue with its recent policy of asking franchise bidders to achieve Secure Stations Scheme accreditation covering 80 per cent of passenger usage [16] and to have a priced option to achieve a higher level of coverage if it is value for money and affordable.
2.27 A more visible staff presence on trains and platforms reassures passengers. There is greater scope for this as ticket retailing becomes less labour-intensive. But passenger security has to be balanced against the risk of assaults on staff, which is a serious issue for the industry.
2.28 The rail industry also has to manage various health risks from infectious and contagious diseases, which are brought into sharpest focus by the threat of pandemics.
2.29 In relation to crime, terrorism and health, there are four main strands to the Government’s approach to rail security. First, crime, and security risks, should be factored into the design of stations and carriages, in precisely the same way as accident risk. Second, staff must be effectively deployed and will need proper training, support and a clear understanding of their remit and powers. Third, the Rail Technical Strategy that is published alongside this White Paper identifies other options and approaches, such as automatic behaviour recognition systems drawing on experience from other countries. Fourth, the reduction of non-accident risks should be a key focus of the industry Research Strategy to be published later this year.
2.30 A further element to improving the security of staff and the travelling public is the need to protect people and infrastructure from acts of terrorism. The UK Government’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy has four elements to it:
2.31 The Department for Transport works closely with colleagues in Whitehall, the Police, the Security Service and the rail industry to develop and maintain effective and proportionate measures to manage the risk of terrorist attacks on the railway, including:
2.32 The open nature of the railway network means it is not possible to completely eliminate the risk of a terrorist attack. The measures outlined above, supported by the co-operation and vigilance of railway staff and the travelling public, seek to reduce this risk to a minimum, while enabling the rail industry to provide a good service to the travelling public.
2.33 Over time, the public is likely to attach even greater importance to all facets of personal risk. As people become more affluent, they become more risk-averse. In addition, public perceptions of risk may change as the population ages, leading to a greater emphasis on the safety and security of the passenger environment. Passengers and the public will care about more aspects of safety and to greater degrees. The rail industry needs to monitor and influence attitudes, as well as being prepared to adjust its agenda to anticipate and take account of change.
2.34 Technological trends will contribute to that response as newer rolling-stock fleets and infrastructure enhancements are introduced, incorporating the latest safety features. Changes in technology are also likely to reduce risk to staff, as less line-side equipment is required and self-monitoring equipment is built into trains and signalling systems, which reduce the need for staff to work near the operational railway.
2.35 In short, a key objective for the rail industry over the period of this strategy is to recognise safety, passenger security and well-being as a single agenda and to deliver continual improvement. The longer-term trends in public expectations and concern are challenging, but, with good monitoring, can be readily anticipated. The industry is therefore well positioned to plan accordingly.
[14]
There were four fatalities of road vehicle drivers at
level crossings in 2005.
[15]
People’s perceptions of personal security and their
concerns about crime on public transport, Department for
Transport, 2004.
[16]
Excluding major stations, which are provided for
separately.
[17]
More detail on the UK Government’s Counter Terrorism
strategy can be found at
http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy/about-the-strategy/
|
Summary Reliability matters to the railway’s customers and to the economy at large. The reliability of the railway improved a little after privatisation, but declined sharply in the wake of the Hatfield accident in 2000. Rail reliability is now back above pre-Hatfield levels. This is a significant achievement against a backdrop of strong demand growth, and passengers give the rail industry credit for it. The Government believes the rail industry can go further. It will specify an overall improvement in train reliability from 88 per cent today to 92.6 per cent by 2014. The Government will also specify a 25 percent reduction in delays of more than 30 minutes. It believes that these are realistic but challenging requirements. They take account of the plans to increase the capacity of the railway, which are critical to improving reliability. Train reliability is crucial, but it is not the whole of the picture. The Government commissioned work from Passenger Focus that identified other causes of delay for passengers, such as the time taken to purchasea ticket. These issues are addressed in chapter 10 of this White Paper,and the Government will monitor improvements throughout the next control period. In the longer term, demand-growth and climate change will add to the challenge of meeting rising passenger expectations of reliability. To reflect this, there will be a need for capacity enhancements,investment in the resilience of the network, improved train design and radio-based signalling. |
3.1 A reliable railway is the single most important requirement of passengers. Delays are an unproductive use of people’s time, and serious delays disrupt their travel plans. The Eddington Transport Study confirmed that unreliability has an economic cost. Business interests who contributed during the preparation of this White Paper confirmed that reliability and frequency of service both have an impact on business-location decisions.
3.2 The rail industry’s record on reliability has fluctuated. There was some improvement after privatisation, but it then deteriorated by nearly 9 per cent in a single year, after the Hatfield accident in October 2000. Since then, performance has steadily improved. Reliability currently stands at 88 per cent, which is back to the pre-Hatfield level. Figure 3.1 shows the recent trends.
3.3 As reliability has improved, so has overall customer satisfaction. [2] The close correlation confirms that reliability is the key factor in passengers’ judgement of quality of service. Because reliability has improved, passengers now identify other issues – such as capacity and security – as top concerns. But this does not mean that reliability has ceased to matter or can be taken for granted.
3.4 In focus groups, passengers give the rail industry credit for its improved performance. They recognise that rail travel now compares well with other modes (Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Like-for-like comparisons between road and rail are not possible, but increased congestion has undoubtedly affected predictability of journey times by road. And the reliability of long-distance rail operations is better than most domestic air services.
| Table 3.1: Punctuality of domestic flights between major UK airports, including arrivals and departures (December 2006) [3] | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Airport | On time -15 mins late (%) | 16-30 mins late (%) | On time - 30 mins late (%) | Average mins delay |
| Birmingham | 75 | 9 | 84 | 17 |
| Edinburgh | 68 | 13 | 81 | 20 |
| Gatwick | 61 | 15 | 76 | 26 |
| Glasgow | 73 | 11 | 84 | 17 |
| Heathrow | 61 | 15 | 76 | 25 |
| London City | 63 | 19 | 82 | 20 |
| Luton | 69 | 14 | 83 | 19 |
| Manchester | 72 | 11 | 83 | 18 |
| Newcastle | 72 | 12 | 84 | 19 |
| Standsted | 69 | 13 | 82 | 19 |
| Table 3.2: Punctuality of intercity rail services, including arrival times only(July–September 2006)[3] | |
|---|---|
| Long distance route | On time-10 mins (%) |
| Great Western | 72.7 |
| East Coast | 81.9 |
| Midland Main Line | 90.6 |
| Greater Anglia (Norwich–London) | 81.1 |
| Trans-Pennine | 88.2 |
| Cross-Country | 80.9 |
| West Coast | 86.0 |
3.5 Improving reliability against the backdrop of steep growth in demand is a significant achievement. Increased numbers of passengers on trains require longer stops at stations to get on and off. Increased numbers of trains on the network mean that lines become congested. Pushing reliability up in these circumstances has required close co-operation between Network Rail and train operators to timetable train movements and get services running normally again as quickly as possible after an incident. Joint performance improvement plans and integrated control centres are critical. The 2004 White Paper facilitated these changes. It gave Network Rail the lead responsibility for improving reliability, promoted local partnership working and committed the Government to align rail franchises more closely with Network Rail’s operational boundaries.
3.6 Although the overall improvement in reliability is good, performance varies from route to route and by time of year. It is no consolation to users of an unreliable service to know that performance has improved dramatically in another part of the country. Railways across northern Europe experience operational problems during autumn leaf-fall, and no transport mode is immune from the most extreme weather conditions, but passengers are rightly less forgiving when services are disrupted by light snowfalls or modest increases in summer temperatures.
3.7 The reliability of freight services has also improved. Freight movements are not quite as time-critical as passenger journeys, but freight customers do rely on goods arriving within a prearranged delivery window. They identify improved reliability as one of the key reasons for switching to rail. Unreliable freight services also have an impact on passenger services and vice versa. The broken-down freight train used to be a common cause of passenger delays, but new, very reliable freight engines have considerably reduced this problem.
[1] Slide
REL5 (MS PowerPoint, 80KB), Summary of Key Research and
Analysis, July 2007.
[2]
Slide
PAX3 (MS PowerPoint, 66KB), Summary of Key Research
and Analysis, July 2007.
[3]
Slide
REL16 (MS PowerPoint, 81KB), Summary of Key Research and
Analysis, July 2007.
3.8 The initial cause of a delay can be:
About 40 per cent of delay is directly attributable to these initial causes (Figure 3.2). Congestion and knock-on delays from an initial incident account for the remaining 60 per cent. This is why co-ordinated recovery plans, implemented by control centres where Network Rail and train operators’ staff work closely alongside one another, are so critical to improving reliability.
3.9 Delays that are initially caused by infrastructure problems are attributed to Network Rail, as are delays caused by bad weather or factors beyond the industry’s control. The proportion of total delay minutes attributable to Network Rail has risen from 45.7 per cent in 1999/2000 to 54.3 per cent in 2006/07. [4] This is partly because some of the delays attributed to Network Rail are inherently more difficult to manage, but it also suggests that the heavy investment in renewals is not delivering as rapid an improvement as it should in the reliability of the basic infrastructure of the railway. Network Rail has recognised that there are aspects of its performance, including preparedness for bad weather, that it must improve.
3.10 The most common causes of train operator delays are engineering failures. Even a minor defect can mean that a train cannot leave a depot. As train designs become more complicated, there are more on-board systems (for example, visual information displays and electronic doors) that can go wrong. New train designs are particularly prone to such problems. The reduction in delay minutes attributable to train operators (Figure 3.3) reflects the elimination of these ‘teething problems’ with new trains and the sharing of best practice on fleet reliability among operators.
3.11 As with safety, the Government is seeking to maintain the momentum of recent improvements up to 2014.
3.12 The Secretary of State is therefore specifying an overall improvement in reliability from 88 per cent today to 92.6 per cent by 2014. This is to be achieved by securing reliability of 92 per cent on inter-urban services, 93 per cent on London and South-East services and 92 per cent for services elsewhere. The biggest improvement will be in the inter-urban services, where current performance is most variable.
3.13 The Government has also specified a 25 per cent reduction in the proportion of services that arrive more than 30 minutes late or are cancelled. This focuses on the delays that most inconvenience passengers and have the most serious impacts on productivity as well as on public perceptions of the railway. It requires Network Rail and train operators to reduce excessive delays and improve their recovery plans. The biggest improvements will be to inter-urban and regional services.
3.14 In specifying these improvements, the Government has had regard to the following considerations:
[4]
Slide
REL13 (PowerPoint, 109KB), Summary of Key Research and
Analysis, July 2007.
[5] Slide REL9
(PowerPoint, 80KB), Summary of Key Research and Analysis,
July 2007.
[6] Slide
REL13 (PowerPoint, 109KB), Summary of Key Research and
Analysis, July 2007.
[7]
Slide
PAX2 (PowerPoint, 80KB), Summary of Key Research and
Analysis, July 2007.
3.15 Rail reliability is currently measured by the Public Performance Measure (PPM). The PPM is not met if a scheduled train service is cancelled or arrives at its final destination more than 5 minutes late (or 10 minutes for inter-urban services). The Government is using PPM to specify the improvement in reliability, because it is a well-established measure, with a time-series against which future improvements can be gauged. However, PPM only measures the reliability of train services and will not reflect other factors that might delay passengers.
3.16 The Government therefore asked Passenger Focus [8] to insert additional questions about delays into the spring 2007 National Passenger Survey (NPS). The results (Table 3.2) give a less robust picture of delay than PPM, because they depend on passengers’ subjective views of lateness, but they identify a number of factors that can cause a passenger to be delayed, even though the train arrives within 5 or 10 minutes of its scheduled time. It is important to note that the survey asked a sample of passengers who had experienced delay, rather than being a sample of all passngers.
| Table 3.3: Reasons given for the delay in NPS | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | London and South East | Long Distance | Regional | |
| Sample size |
5,921 % |
3,648 % |
1,263 % |
1,010 % |
| The train was late departing at the beginning of my journey | 59 | 59 | 56 | 61 |
| The train was late arriving at the destination | 49 | 50 | 53 | 45 |
| The train I had planned to catch was cancelled | 12 | 12 | 7 | 14 |
| Could not get on train as it was overcrowded | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 |
| It took longer than expected to buy train ticket | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Train I took to this station was late and I missed my connection | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Crowding at station meant it took me a long time to reach platform and I missed my train | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Lack of/poor information caused a delay to my journey | 3 | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| Other | 12 | 11 | 13 | 12 |
| Don’t know/no answer | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
3.17 The key conclusion the Government draws from this is the importance of focusing on the end-to-end journey (see chapter 10). This view is reinforced by recommendations of the Eddington Study. [9] Passengers can be delayed by queues at ticket offices, station congestion, inability to get on a crowded train, or missed connections. And they will perceive themselves to be delayed by a cancellation, if they are unaware that a service has been temporarily withdrawn or a timetable changed. The Government will therefore continue to monitor this passenger perspective over the next control period, alongside PPM, to ensure that the understanding of the passenger experience of delay is as comprehensive as possible.
3.18 Continuing growth in passenger numbers will add to the challenge of improving reliability. Without enhancements to capacity, performance would begin to decline. Increasing rail capacity is therefore critical to delivering better reliability, as well as being an important goal in its own right. The new Strategic Freight Network (see chapter 9) will have a particularly significant role here, because the speeds and patterns of freight and passenger services are so different. Separating different service types will enhance overall capacity.
3.19 Improved reliability can also help increase capacity. More services can be run on a given line if all trains run precisely to their allotted timetables. This will be facilitated by new radio-based signalling technology, which has the additional benefit of reducing the disruption caused by maintenance work.
3.20 The Rail Technical Strategy, published alongside this White Paper, identifies many other ways in which the railway can improve reliability by exploiting technology more effectively. The approach to the Intercity Express programme reflects this thinking. The specification for the trains will improve their reliability by engineering complexity out of the design, and they will be tested in service for 15 months so that ‘teething problems’ are solved before the trains come into full operation.
3.21 As noted in chapter 1, passenger expectations of reliability are likely to increase as incomes grow and people value their time more. The rail industry must plan for a future in which people are less tolerant of delays and unproductive use of their time. This will place even more importance on the end-to-end journey, interchange at stations, ease of ticket purchase and quality of information.
3.22 At the same time, climate change presents a future risk to reliability. Experts do not forecast steep increases in average temperature by 2037, but they warn that severe weather incidents could become much more frequent. Network Rail is already planning for this and designing increased resilience into its renewals work. A more ambitious programme of investment, for example to strengthen earthworks and improve drainage, is likely to be needed in 2014–24.
3.23 In summary, the goal of continuous improvement that Government is setting for 2014 is one that the rail industry will have to continue to pursue in the period to 2024 and beyond.
[8]
Passenger Focus, Passenger Experience of Delay, May
2007.
[9]
Paragraph 1.152, The Eddington Transport Study, The
Case for Action, 2006.
|
Summary For most of the post-war period the number of people using the railway fell and the size of the network shrank. The rapid growth indemand since the mid-1990s has caused load factors on many trains to increase. A full train is a good thing, but an overcrowded train is not. Investment targeted at overcrowding is a priority for the first HLOS, underpinned by steps toward longer-term increases in capacity needed for rail to contribute to sustainable economic growth. The main challenge on the capacity agenda is the sheer scale of works needed to deal with the 40 per cent demand growth of the last decade and the 30 per cent projected for the decade ahead. By prioritising the quickest and most effective capacity-increasing measures, this level of growth can be accommodated, while containing, or even improving levels of crowding in major cities and most London termini. The biggest benefits will be seen on some of the most overcrowded services. This requires over 1,300 additional carriages, the Thameslink upgrade, major station works at Birmingham and Reading and an ambitious programme of platform lengthening, power-supply upgrades and depot facilities. All these will be provided. In addition, there are significant investments in the current specification that are designed to enable the industry to deliver further capacity improvements beyond 2014,and which the longer-term plans set out in this chapter would sustain. |
4.1 For most of the post-war period, the railway was in almost continual decline. Between 1955 and 1994/95, the number of journeys made by rail each year fell by nearly 400 million, and rail’s share of the passenger market dropped from 16 per cent to five per cent. [1]
4.2 Over the past decade, these trends have been reversed. Between 1996 and 2006, the railway regained all the passenger journeys it had lost in the previous 40 years. Despite increasing car ownership, rail has actually regained 2 per cent of market share. [2] Growth has occurred in all sectors, but has been exceptionally strong on commuting services into cities such as Birmingham, Leeds and Manchester.
4.3 This increased demand is being accommodated on a 14,300 kilometre network that is substantially smaller than the network of 1955, before Beeching’s cuts. More significantly, the speed and mix of traffic that the network can handle has also remained largely unchanged from the late 1980s – with a few key exceptions, such as on the West Coast Main Line.
4.4 Over the past ten years, the rolling-stock fleet has been modernised, with significant safety and passenger benefits. While the overall size of the fleet has increased by only 9 per cent, by using trains more efficiently the rail industry increased timetabled train-kilometres by 17 per cent between 1997/98 and 2005/06. [3]
4.5 Despite the increases in the size of the fleet and in train-kilometres run, the unprecedented growth of the last decade means that average load factors have increased. In some cases, this is a welcome development, since a full train is more cost and energy-efficient than a half-empty one. However, some services, in particular on key commuter and inter-urban routes, are facing capacity challenges that need to be addressed.
4.6 Capacity needs to increase so that rail can continue to contribute to sustainable economic growth. There is an alignment here between the Government’s environmental, economic and social objectives. The Eddington Transport Study concluded that Government should tackle first those routes where existing crowding and congestion problems are evidence that capacity does not match demand. The CBI has stressed the impact of crowding on productivity and its influence on inward investment decisions. Research by Passenger Focus confirms that capacity is now high on the list of rail-user concerns.
4.7 However, the magnitude of the challenge should not be under-estimated. Rail has seen demand grow by 40 per cent in the last ten years, and a further 30 per cent growth is projected for the next ten years on the base scenario. Taking the two decades together, demand will have grown by over 80 per cent. Such an increase will take time to accommodate. With the improvement in rail’s finances (discussed more fully in chapter 12), affordability is no longer the overriding constraint as it was in the last Government spending review, when the taxpayer had to meet the bill for Railtrack’s loss of financial control. Value for money remains essential but with the level of investments now being committed, it is also increasingly important to consider the length of time it takes to deliver complex engineering projects, and the number of schemes that can be taken forward simultaneously without overloading rail industry management, making demands that suppliers cannot meet, or causing undue disruption to existing rail services.
4.8 It is therefore necessary to have a plan for each route that provides the best solution available to address capacity challenges in the short to medium term, with clearly identified options for addressing continued growth in demand in the long term. The production of detailed route plans is the responsibility of Network Rail. But the Government must decide what increase in capacity it wants to purchase in the period to 2014, what projects it wants Network Rail to embark on before 2014 in order to deliver increased capacity in the next five-year control period, between 2014 and 2019, and what steer to give the rail industry on its preferred options for meeting further growth in demand in the longer term.
4.9 To do this, the Government has looked at a hierarchy of solutions. The starting point for each route is to seek ways of increasing capacity that are straightforward to implement, low-cost and uncontentious, in order to bring prompt increases in capacity. Where these solutions are inadequate, the search moves on to alternative approaches that have longer lead times, or are more costly or more contentious. In more detail, the sequence in which options have been tested in framing the proposals in the following chapters of this White Paper is as follows:
4.10 The right solution varies from route to route, because their starting positions and demand-growth prospects differ. In London, for example, Thameslink capacity can only be increased by a major upgrade, while there are adjacent lines where early relief of overcrowding can be secured by train-lengthening alone. On inter-urban routes, train-lengthening or increased frequencies can deliver most of the increases required before 2014, with new Intercity Express trains and radio-based signalling delivering further increases beyond that, and the possible need for additional tracks towards the end of CP6 (2024) in a high-growth scenario and where that growth occurs. In major cities beyond London, train-lengthening can address most capacity problems without additional infrastructure, but action is needed to increase the passenger handling capacity of Birmingham New Street. Growth in the demand for rail in these cities beyond 2014 will depend on their overall strategy for transport, including choices about the role of rail and other public transport alongside measures to manage congestion on the highway network (for example road pricing).
4.11 In short, ‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions are inappropriate. But an appropriate way forward for each route has been identified by applying the same hierarchy of solutions, as well as using a consistent approach to demand forecasting and to defining acceptable load factors.
[1]
Slide
TPH3 (PowerPoint, 868KB), Summary of Key Research and
Analysis, July 2007.
[2]
Slide
TPH3 (PowerPoint, 86KB), Summary of Key Research and
Analysis, July 2007.
[3]
Page 21, National Rail Trends Yearbook 2005–06.
4.12 In order to decide what increase in capacity it wants the railway to deliver by 2014, the Government must forecast demand growth for each of Network Rail’s 23 routes and decide what load factor it wants to achieve. Forecasts were produced using the industry Passenger Demand Forecasting Handbook. These results were then compared with recent growth-rates and with forecasts from independent consultants and Transport for London. These approaches produce a consistent picture for demand on inter-urban corridors, in London and the Sout