

GUIDANCE FOR THE SECURITY OF DANGEROUS GOODS BY RAIL

REGULATION 10A OF THE CARRIAGE OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND USE OF TRANSPORTABLE PRESSURE EQUIPMENT REGULATIONS 2004 AS AMENDED

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Introduction

The carriage of dangerous goods presents opportunities that may be exploited by terrorists. In December 2002, the United Nations Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods and on the Globally Harmonised System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals agreed changes to the text of the UN Model Regulations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods to address the security of dangerous goods in transport by all modes.

The UN Recommendations resulted in changes to Regulations concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail, agreed in November 2003. These changes, principally new Chapter 1.10, become UK statutory requirements from 1 July 2005.

The UK statutory requirements will be strictly based on the new RID Chapter 1.10 and complements similar statutory UK requirements based on chapter 1.10 international agreement for the carriage of dangerous goods by road - ADR.

The guidance contained in this document recognises the Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994 and the Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 2003. It also references rail industry security requirements and arrangements identified in Railway Group Standards specifically:

GO/RT3053 Working Manual for Rail Staff – Handling and Carriage of Dangerous Goods

GO/RT3422 Explosives - Rail Conditions of Acceptance and Carriage

GO/RT3471 Incident Response Planning

GO/RT3602 Security of Explosives in Transit on the Rail Network

GO/GN3674 Guidance on Dangerous Goods – Rail Served Facilities

NB GO/RT3601 and GO/RT3602 will be revised as Network Rail documents during 2004. Also, access to the relevant security implications of these documents should be sought from the intended carrier.

The Department for Transport website - www.dft.gov.uk/security/dangerousgoods - contains useful templates to help you meet the new security requirements, such as a security plan and a risk assessment template. We would encourage you to use these. The website also has a copy of the inspection form that the TRANSEC inspectors will be using when they carry out a site visit.

Explanation

In this guidance the term TOC is used to identify train-operating companies holding an accepted Railway Safety Case which provides for the carriage of dangerous goods. This guidance is therefore more applicable to TOCs operating freight trains, particularly those that carry high consequence dangerous goods.

Reference to the infrastructure controller will, for the national network, apply to Network Rail.

Many sidings and depots are controlled by train operating companies and other private companies. It is important therefore this guidance is considered by them for those sites and areas.

References

| | |
|--|--|
| BTP | British Transport Police. |
| Company with Access to Rail Network (CARN) | Consignor or enterprise, which despatches dangerous goods on its own behalf, or for a third party. |
| Infrastructure Controller | Network Rail for the national main lines and train operating companies for sidings and depots. |
| OCNS | Office for Civil Nuclear Security, acting on behalf of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. OCNS forms part of the Department of Trade and Industry, responsible for administering and enforcing the Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 2003. |
| RID | Regulations concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail |
| TOC | Train Operating Companies – passenger and freight. |
| TRANSEC | Transport Security, part of the Department for Transport, responsible for administering and enforcing transport security requirements issued under powers contained in the Railways Act 1993. |

RID

CHAPTER 1.10

SECURITY PROVISIONS

NOTE: For the purposes of this chapter, 'security' means measures or precautions to be taken to minimise theft or misuse of dangerous goods that may endanger persons, property or the environment.

1.10.1 General provisions

1.10.1.1 All persons engaged in the carriage of dangerous goods shall consider the security requirements for the carriage of dangerous goods set out in this chapter commensurate with their responsibilities.

Guidance

This basic requirement relates to a person's responsibilities. These responsibilities and associated authority can range from:

- relatively simple requirements for security. Examples are identifying and reporting any person:
 - not authorised or not expected to be in a particular area,
 - interfering with wagons carrying dangerous goods,

to

- more substantial security requirements. Examples are:
 - setting the security policy for a company,
 - ensuring application of security requirements at a rail terminal.

Those involved with the carriage of dangerous goods need to be identified and their security responsibilities determined. It would be appropriate to record these details in job descriptions to ensure that individuals understand their responsibilities for dangerous goods security.

1.10.1.2 Dangerous goods shall only be offered for carriage to carriers that have been appropriately identified.

Guidance

The Railways (Safety Case) Regulations 2000 including 2001 and 2003 amendments require that the infrastructure controller and TOCs hold a Railway Safety Case providing for the carriage of dangerous goods where they undertake this activity. Rail carriers are therefore clearly identified.

This requirement also needs to be applied to the intermodal transfer of dangerous goods to or from road carriers. Dangerous goods should only be transferred to, or accepted from, appropriately identified carriers whose drivers can produce identification as in 1.10.1.4.

- 1.10.1.3 Areas within temporary storage terminals, temporary storage sites, vehicle depots, berthing areas and marshalling yards used for the temporary storage during carriage of dangerous goods shall be properly secured, well lit and, where possible and appropriate, not accessible to the general public.

Guidance

RID includes within the definition of temporary storage, stops made necessary by the conditions of carriage as well as periods involved in order to change the mode or means of transport – transshipment as well as stops necessitated by the circumstances of transport. This also includes locations where wagons are loaded or unloaded, such as oil terminals or container handling facilities. CARNs will need to co-operate with the dangerous goods carrier to ensure security is considered.

Ensuring safe operations, for example shunting, at these locations necessitates them being secure and well lit. Safe operation also helps ensure the safety of rail personnel and the control of risks to the public. Being secure and well lit also helps ensure the security of dangerous goods involved. Railway Group Standard GO/GN3674 gives guidance on the construction, operation and maintenance of facilities transferring dangerous goods.

Physical security standards for lighting, fencing and access control may however need to be greater than required for safe operations. Any additional necessary requirements can be identified by an assessment of the security risks presented by either or both of:

- the assessed security level either because of:
 - the location involved, for example adjacent to a military establishment
 - the national general threat
- or
- consequence potential for high consequence dangerous goods as in 1.10.3.1.

Annex A outlines the physical arrangements that could be implemented in response to the appropriate risk.

- Organisations other than freight operating companies and the infrastructure controller can obtain national threat information in the first instance from the freight operating companies. Otherwise it could be obtained from TRANSEC.

- 1.10.1.4 Each crew member of a train carrying dangerous goods shall carry with them means of identification, which includes their photograph, during carriage.

Guidance

A driver's safety critical work card requirement in accordance with the Railways (Safety Critical Work) Regulations 1994 has a photograph of the holder and provides compliance with these requirements. It would also be appropriate for staff in terminals to carry photo identification.

- 1.10.1.5 Safety inspections in accordance with 1.8.1 shall cover appropriate security measures.

Guidance

RID Chapter 1.8.1 requires safety checks to be undertaken without endangering persons, property or the environment and without major disruption to rail services. Undertaking security checks at the same time should not present a problem. However, when considering the risks presented at particular locations, for example, intermodal depots, it may be more appropriate to undertake separate security checks on a pre-planned structured regular basis. The frequency of security checks can also be varied on a predetermined basis to meet changes in the assessed threat level. See 1.10.1.3.

1.10.2 Security training

- 1.10.2.1 The training and the refresher training specified in Chapter 1.3 shall also include elements of security awareness. The security refresher training need not be linked to regulatory changes only.

Guidance

RID chapter 1.3 outlines required training for those involved in the carriage of dangerous goods appropriate to their responsibilities and duties. Whilst at a basic level adding security awareness should present no problem, the security training requirement needs to relate to the responsibilities of the particular personnel. Specific security training will be needed for those who are only involved in security duties as in 1.10.1.1 or 1.10.2.2. **Annex B** gives further details.

- 1.10.2.2 Security awareness training shall address the nature of security risks, recognising security risks, methods to address and reduce such risks and actions to be taken in the event of a security breach. It shall include awareness of security plans (if appropriate) commensurate with the responsibilities and duties of individuals and their part in implementing security plans.

Guidance

This is linked to 1.10.2.1 with, as previously stated, security awareness training necessarily related to a person's security responsibilities. Records should be kept of training given as with 1.10.2.1.

1.10.3 Provisions for high consequence dangerous goods

1.10.3.1 "High consequence dangerous goods" are those which have the potential for misuse in a terrorist incident and which may, as a result, produce serious consequences such as mass casualties or mass destruction. The list of high consequence dangerous goods is provided in Table 1.10.5.

Guidance

TOCs involved in the acceptance for carriage of high consequence dangerous goods will need to establish a documented system whereby:

- a consignor's offer of traffic to be carried is identified and whether these are high consequence dangerous goods. Note that Railway Group Standard GO/RT3602 defines explosives as "explosives and explosive articles accepted in accordance with Railway Group Standard GO/RT3422 and also ammunition and small arms";
- the necessary information is obtained to enable the requirements of the security plan prepared in accordance with 1.10.3.2 to be determined;
- an assessment is undertaken of the carriage security implications for carriage;
- relevant information is given by the TOC to the infrastructure controller and other security organisations identified in the security plan, for example the BTP; and
- the arrangements are identified for handing over the dangerous goods to the intended consignee.

Such a system (along with application of appropriate security controls in the security plan) can after initial set up be readily applied to regular traffic. However, whilst with infrequent traffic flows the gathering of information will follow the same basic system, it will be necessary to give specific consideration to determining and applying the particular security requirements that may be necessary for a movement. The requirements may of course be covered by the arrangements in place for regular traffic flows. A process will be needed whereby the TOC and the infrastructure controller liaise with each other. Also the TOC should involve the consignor and consignee as appropriate to ensure the necessary information is obtained as a basis for the security plan.

It is recommended that employees and their representatives be involved in all stages of the introduction of security measures.

1.10.3.2 Security plans

- 1.10.3.2.1 Carriers, consignors and other participants specified in 1.4.2 and 1.4.3 engaged in the carriage of high consequence dangerous goods (see Table 1.10.5) shall adopt, implement and comply with a security plan that addresses at least the elements specified in 1.10.3.2.2.

Guidance

Note that the text identifies minimum requirements for security plans. TOCs, the infrastructure controller and CARNs may apply additional requirements or be required by TRANSEC (instructions) or OCNS (approved security plan) to apply additional requirements. The OCNS will be responsible for the carriage of nuclear material as defined in the Nuclear Industries Security Regulations.

The security plan should also consider any other plans that are in place for other modes of transport or for a particular site.

A structured approach to the identification and documentation of required security measures, associated roles and responsibilities is necessary. This requirement reflects a similar approach to that required for normal railway safety operational arrangements. It will also add to existing security policies and detailed requirements, which involved TOCs and infrastructure controllers will no doubt already have been documented in the Railway Group Standards in the series GO/RT3601 – 3610. In particular GO/RT3602 identifies arrangements that must be applied to the rail carriage of explosives.

The security plan should clearly identify those involved in the carriage and supply chain and state what their responsibilities are. It should also identify who should take the lead when dealing with an incident.

- 1.10.3.2.2 The security plan shall comprise at least the following elements:

- (a) Specific allocation of responsibilities for security to competent and qualified persons with appropriate authority to carry out their responsibilities;

Guidance

As recognised with 1.10.1.1, responsibility and authority for security arrangements will vary considerably within the organisation of each TOC, infrastructure controller or CARN, and according to an individual's role. With some this will be a basic responsibility, again parallel with that for an operational safety role. Being alert to the unusual and knowing what actions to take is a key basic need. With others, such as those employed specifically as security guards, much more focussed security requirements need to be specified. The same applies to those with a managerial role with security forming part or all of their responsibilities. The specific responsibilities and associated authority need to be documented.

See item 2 in guidance to 1.10.3.2.2 (d) relating to employee/employment verification.

Documenting these responsibilities can therefore be a relatively simple add on in some cases to an existing job specification such as an operational safety role. They may already form the total job specification for those with full time security responsibilities.

These documented responsibilities will form the basis for necessary briefing or training. Here again this might:

- take the form of a simple addition to existing safety briefing; and
- require specific specialised training for a particular security responsibility, for example search awareness and operation of detection equipment.

1.10.3.2.2

- (b) Records of dangerous goods or types of dangerous goods concerned;

Guidance

The high consequence dangerous goods involved are shown in Table 1.10.5. TOCs and infrastructure controllers need to maintain records of the specific high consequence dangerous goods they have carried and the quantities. It would be appropriate to retain these records for, say, four years. See 1.10.3.1 regarding the need to identify these dangerous goods when offered for carriage.

1.10.3.2.2

- (c) Review of current operations and assessment of security risks, including any stops necessary to the transport operation, the keeping of dangerous goods in the wagon, tank or container before, during and after the journey and the temporary storage of dangerous goods during the course of intermodal transfer or transhipment between units;

Guidance

TOCs, infrastructure controllers and CARNs will need to decide who has the competence to undertake an assessment of the risks to and from high consequence dangerous goods on the network. For example TOC or infrastructure controller specialists may undertake this together with the BTP. Those undertaking this role will need to:

- work with the TOC and infrastructure controller and, with the TOC's co-operation, the consignor and or consignee as necessary;
- understand the nature of the actual and potential risks;
- understand how these risks might be delivered, hence the vulnerability of the rail network;
- have dangerous good specialist input to properly understand the potential risks from the dangerous goods involved, hence the security measures that may be necessary; and
- understand routeing vulnerability, for example critical infrastructure

nearby and the security risk mitigating options available.

A further security review will be necessary to review any change that might be necessary with new high consequence dangerous goods traffic.

A key objective is to reduce the potential risk as far as possible by:

- minimising the time taken for carriage on the network; and
- specifically minimising or preferably eliminating any time high consequence dangerous goods are held en route, for example after acceptance before movement, for train marshalling or train crew change, waiting at a station and at destination awaiting acceptance. Managing the time of delivery prior to the rail move and collection after is one aspect that should be considered.

1.10.3.2.2

(d) Clear statements of measures that are to be taken to reduce security risks, commensurate with the responsibilities and duties of the participant, including:

- training;
- security policies (for example, response to higher threat conditions, new employee/employment verification, and so on);
- operating practices (for example, choice/use of routes where known, access to dangerous goods in temporary storage (as defined in (c)), proximity to vulnerable infrastructure and so on); and
- equipment and resources that are to be used to reduce security risks.

Guidance

This requires documentation of the various planned security measures by each TOC, infrastructure controller or CARN. In the case of traffic using the Channel Tunnel subject to the Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994, liaison will be necessary between the TOC, Eurotunnel and the other railway undertakings and infrastructure managers involved in mainland Europe, to ensure a co-ordinated plan.

- **Training**
(See (a) above) and 1.10.2.
- **Security policies**

Two examples are given in the RID text as follows.

(1) Response to higher threat conditions

As in 1.10.1.3 there needs to be an awareness of the security level in place. There also need to be arrangements for dealing with specific threats targeting a particular location, train or line of route and so on. **Annex C** gives advice on this. The response arrangements for specific threats are detailed in Railway Group Standard

GO/RT3601.

For specific threats GO/RT3601 identifies the need for:

- Giving the BTP or other agreed agency details of threats received to enable these to be assessed;
- Receiving and responding to advice of specific threats targeting a particular location, train, line of route and so on. These arrangements need to recognise that there may be very little time to respond to specific threats. Network Rail has the lead role in co-ordinating the rail industry response to specific threats whilst recognising the responsibilities of individual organisations involved;
- Allocating the responsibilities to specific individuals or positions on a 24-hour cover basis;
- Outlining the relationships and agreed communication links between the TOCs and infrastructure controllers and also other organisations such as the BTP, TRANSEC and OCNS; and
- Recording detail of advice/actions taken.

(2) Employee/employment verification

Annex D gives guidance on requirements for recruitment and vetting dependent on the security roles and responsibilities of the person involved.

- **Operating practices**

The plan should document how high consequence dangerous goods are accepted and the process for determining specific security requirements necessary for a particular movement such as:

- how movements are controlled and monitored to ensure security;
- how any problems with the movement are dealt with, for example security during unplanned stoppages;
- how road hauled inwards and outwards interfaces are managed at intermodal depots. See 1.10.1.2.; and
- how public access to wagons and trains has been restricted.

- **Equipment and resources**

This is in effect the need to identify and record physical security arrangements relating to high consequence dangerous goods movements. Bear in mind that the equipment may not be solely for that purpose. Lighting may be provided for operational safety and CCTV for the purposes of preventing vandalism and criminal activity. See 1.10.1.3.

1.10.3.2.2

- (e) Effective and up to date procedures for reporting and dealing with security threats, breaches of security or security incidents;

Guidance

The process for dealing with specific threats or security incidents is identified in Railway Group Standard GO/RT3601 and involves close co-operation between TOCs, the infrastructure controller, the police (principally the BTP), response organisations and CARNs.

1.10.3.2.2

- (f) Procedures for the evaluation and testing of security plans and procedures for periodic review and update of the plans;

Guidance

A key need is to maintain records of security incidents and security measures applied to be able to check on their effectiveness. The evaluation and testing of security plans and procedures is in effect a parallel requirement to that for ensuring the effectiveness of operational arrangements and the response to operational incidents. Exercises may take the form of tabletop exercises or a full size response to a particular type of security incident. The type of exercise needed should be considered by TOCs and the infrastructure controller, both involving each other and the BTP, TRANSEC or OCNS as appropriate.

It would be appropriate to ensure that security plans are reviewed on a regular basis (for example, annually in line with the requirements of Railway Group Standard GO/RT3471) to ensure the continued accuracy of the content and actions required as well as following any security incidents to ensure that necessary lessons are learned and applied.

1.10.3.2.2

- (g) Measures to ensure the physical security of transport information contained in the security plan; and
- (h) Measures to ensure that the distribution of information relating to the transport operation contained in the security plan is limited to those who need to have it. Such measures shall not preclude the provision of information required elsewhere in RID.

Guidance (g) and (h)

Arrangements for restricting the availability of information, subject to the need for operational safety in carriage, are for TOCs, infrastructure controllers and CARNs to determine based on their established arrangements for controlling other security information. See also the requirements of the Nuclear Industries Security Regulations and supporting Guidance. The security plan itself should be issued on a controlled basis to nominated personnel.

NOTE (to 1.10.3.2.2):

Carriers, consignors and consignees should co-operate with each other and with competent authorities to exchange threat information, apply appropriate security measures and respond to security incidents.

Guidance

This note refers to TOCs but also involves the infrastructure controller. The need to co-operate also extends to determining and documenting processes, arrangements and equipment necessary to ensure appropriate security and incident responses.

- 1.10.3.3 Devices, equipment or arrangements to prevent the theft of the train or wagon carrying high consequence dangerous goods (see Table 1.10.5) or its cargo shall be applied and measures taken to ensure these are operational and effective at all times. The application of these measures or arrangements shall not jeopardise emergency response.

Guidance

Anti theft equipment can offer significant security enhancements but needs to be properly assessed. It is likely that in the majority of cases the equipment involved will probably take the form of locks, security seals etc. The precise requirements will need to be determined by the TOC with the consignor, taking account as appropriate of any specialist security advice provided by the BTP and/or TRANSEC or OCNS. Any high consequence dangerous goods that might be carried will also influence the requirements.

The equipment fitted should not undermine any existing safety rules, for example, use at petro-chemical sites.

Examples of operational measures or arrangements that can be applied to prevent theft are:

- loading containers on wagons so that doors are positioned inwards;
- scheduling trains so stops are not required or are minimised; and
- constant attendance or regular surveillance during transit stops.

NOTE (to 1.10.3.3):

When appropriate and already fitted, transport telemetry or other tracking methods or devices should be used to monitor the movement of high consequence dangerous goods (see Table 1.10.5).

Guidance

This note is self-explanatory. Some TOCs have *Global System for Mobile Communications* applications in use. The rail *Total Operations Processing Systems* and *Enhanced Railfreight Intermodal Control* computer systems may also be used for tracking.

1.10.4 Provisions in 1.10.1, 1.10.2 and 1.10.3 do not apply when the quantities in each wagon or large container are not greater than those referred to in 1.1.3.6.

Guidance

This relates to limited quantities referenced in RID, below which the requirements of these security provisions do not apply.

High consequence dangerous goods are those listed in the table below and carried in quantities greater than those indicated therein.

Table 1.10.5: LIST OF HIGH CONSEQUENCE DANGEROUS GOODS

| Class | Division | Substance or Article | Quantity | | |
|-------|----------|--|--|-----------|---------------|
| | | | Tank (l) | Bulk (Kg) | Packages (kg) |
| 1 | 1.1 | Explosives | a | a | 0 |
| | 1.2 | Explosives | a | a | 0 |
| | 1.3 | Compatibility Group C Explosives | a | a | 0 |
| | 1.5 | Explosives | 0 | a | 0 |
| 2 | | Flammable Gases (classification codes including only the letter F) | 3,000 | a | b |
| | | Toxic Gases (classification codes including letters T, TF, TC, TO, TFC or TOC)(Excluding aerosols) | 0 | a | 0 |
| 3 | | Flammable Liquids of packing groups I and II | 3,000 | a | b |
| | | Desensitised Explosives | a | a | 0 |
| 4.1 | | Desensitised Explosives | a | a | 0 |
| 4.2 | | Packing Group I substances | 3,000 | a | b |
| 4.3 | | Packing Group I substances | 3,000 | a | b |
| 5.1 | | Oxidising Liquids of Packing Group I | 3,000 | a | b |
| | | Perchlorates, ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate fertilizer | 3,000 | 3,000 | b |
| 6.1 | | Toxic Substances of Packing Group I | 0 | a | 0 |
| 6.2 | | Infectious Substances of Category A | a | a | 0 |
| 7 | | Radioactive Material | 3,000 A ₁ (special form) or 3000 A ₂ , as applicable, in type B or type C packages | | |
| 8 | | Corrosive Substances of Packing Group I | 3,000 | a | b |

a

Not relevant.

b

The provisions of 1.10.3 do not apply, whatever the quantity.

NOTE:

For purposes of non-proliferation of nuclear material the Convention on Physical Protection Nuclear Material applies to international transport supported by IAEA INFCIRC/225 (Rev.4).

Guidance

This is self explanatory, although as in 1.10.3.2.2 those involved with security responsibilities may well need to seek specialist dangerous goods advice to ensure that they properly understand the potential implications of release of the identified dangerous goods.

Note 2 relates to nuclear material. This Code should only apply to nuclear material that is not already covered by The Nuclear Industries Security Regulations, which are enforced by the OCNS.

CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS

- 1.3.1 Add the following sentence at the end: "Training requirements specific to security of dangerous goods in Chapter 1.10 shall also be addressed".
- 1.8.1.1 Amend to read: "...the carriage of dangerous goods including the requirements of 1.10.1.5 have been met".
- 1.8.3.3 add a final bullet "the existence of the security plan indicated in 1.10.3.2.

Guidance

Note that in relation to security the role of the dangerous goods safety adviser is limited to ensuring that there is a security plan.

United States Department of Transportation Security Requirements

The US Department of Transportation requires that all foreign based organisations that ship or transport hazardous materials into the US must develop and implement security plans for those hazardous materials. The US Hazardous Materials Regulations provide that security plans that conform to regulations or guidelines issued by international organisations, such as this UIC based guidance document, may be used to satisfy these security plan requirements.

ANNEX A - Physical requirements

Purpose

The purpose of this Annex is to set out the measures for the security of freight facilities to ensure that during the loading, unloading and stabling of freight trains:

- (a) a prohibited article is not taken on board or affixed to any part of the train;
- (b) the train is not interfered with in any way that may endanger the safety of the train, its crew or the railway network; and
- (c) a load is not stolen or interfered with.

Security controls

Sites where freight trains are loaded, marshalled, or unloaded, or areas where dangerous goods are temporary stored could have the following as minimum-security standards:

- physical access barriers around the site (fencing, walls, railway lines and so on);
- access control measures at all entrances to prevent unauthorised access;
- measures to protect rolling stock within the site (locking whenever the stock is not being worked on, loaded or unloaded, regular searching and so on);
- systems for recording site patrols, monitoring and checking of visitors and train searches; and
- a system to ensure dangerous goods shall only be offered for carriage to carriers that have been appropriately identified.

Beyond this, those sites could:

- be regularly patrolled; and
- have the trains on site regularly searched.

ANNEX B - Training

Purpose

The purpose of this Annex is to set out the type of security training that could be undertaken to ensure staff are aware of their security responsibilities and how to respond appropriately.

Application

The provisions of this Annex should apply to staff whose primary duties include:

- (a) searching or checking a train;
- (b) searching or patrolling a public area;
- (c) controlling access into a non-public area;
- (d) issuing passes to persons seeking access to a non-public area; and
- (e) handling dangerous goods.

The provisions of this Annex should also apply to those appointed as:

- (a) security managers;
- (b) directors and other senior staff whose appointments involve executive, operational or administrative responsibility for railway security;
- (c) any person directly engaged by a train operator to carry out the duties of a staff security instructor, or any person subsequently employed on those duties whether directly engaged or engaged under contract; and
- (d) train crews.

Security managers

The security managers, employed within the railway industries and who have direct managerial responsibility for:

- a) security policy within the organisation; and
- b) security personnel

should attend the relevant TRANSEC course before beginning to manage security personnel carrying out railway security duties. Where the manager has not been able to attend the relevant course, efforts should be made to ensure attendance is made at the earliest opportunity.

Classified course notes would be supplied. Personal notes will be given a security classification in accordance with their contents and will need to be protected.

Nominations should be sent to:

Railways Training Co-ordinator
TRANSEC
Floor Five
SouthSide
105 Victoria Street
London
SW1E 6DT

Security trainers

Companies should satisfy themselves that trainers are competent to carry out security training.

The following two courses are available should trainers wish to further their knowledge:

- DfT search instructors course; and
- DfT recognition of firearms and explosives course.

Course details

Search Instructors Course

This course is targeted at operational staff employed directly or under contract by ports, shipping, rail and Channel Tunnel industries who are responsible for training and carrying out security duties.

The aim of the course is to provide an understanding of the security aims and objectives for these industries and it gives an update on threat issues, awareness of improvised explosive devices and an explosives demonstration.

Recognition of Firearms, Explosive and Incendiary Devices (RFX) Course

This course is targeted at transport security instructors. Attendance will enable them to organise and conduct the recognition of firearms, explosives and incendiary devices sections of initial and refresher training courses for security staff.

The duration of the course is two days and it is held at the Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham. A test is given at the end of this course.

On completion of the course, candidates will be issued with an identity card in the event they may need to travel with training aids.

Nominations should be sent to:

Railways Training Co-ordinator
TRANSEC
Floor Five
SouthSide
105 Victoria Street
London
SW1E 6DT

Non-security staff

Directors and other senior staff

Directors and other senior staff, whose appointments involve executive, operational or administrative responsibility for railway security, should attend the same course as outlined for security managers.

Cleaning personnel

Cleaning personnel are only required to receive security training if they have access to trains or controlled areas.

Handlers of dangerous goods

Security managers and security trainers should organise training for any person that handles dangerous goods appropriate to their needs and responsibilities. Particular attention should be given to people that handle high consequence dangerous goods.

Training records

Records of security training should be kept and should contain the following:

- a the date that each staff member took up a particular post requiring security training; and
- b the initial and refresher training given to each staff member, the date or dates on which it was given and the duration of the training.

Security training records should be in such a form as to enable each staff member to sign an acknowledgement in respect of each entry detailing training received by them, to confirm that they received that training.

Videos

Training videos dealing with railway and general security have been produced by TRANSEC.

ANNEX C - Dealing with threats and incidents

Purpose

The purpose of this Annex is to outline how to produce, develop and practice security contingency plans in response to specific threats. The appropriate personnel should be aware of what the plan requires of them, in particular if there is an appropriate response in the event of an act of violence or unlawful interference, a breach of security or an industrial dispute likely to affect railway security.

A copy of the relevant contingency plan should be accessible at all times and staff should know where to find it if required. The nominated security contact and the local BTP should also hold copies. It should be noted that in any incident in the United Kingdom where an act of unlawful interference with the railways is committed, the police have primacy.

Contingency plans

The plan should ensure that, in the event of an act of unlawful interference, security occurrence, breach of security or industrial dispute likely to affect railway security, appropriate action is taken.

Plans of response action should be prepared and developed in respect of:

- a) bomb threats against particular trains;
- b) bomb threats against the line;
- c) bomb threats against other railway facilities (freight yards, stabling sidings, infrastructure sites, training centres and so on);
- d) discovery of a suspect or prohibited article;
- e) a breach of security;
- f) the type of dangerous good being transported; and
- g) a heightened level of risk.

The common approach to many of these incidents is covered in Network Rail Group Standard (GO/RT3601).

The plans should take account of the need for co-ordination between the train operators, infrastructure controller, BTP and other agencies involved and should detail the responsibilities of:

- a) the train operator in respect of staff and trains and any other relevant asset;
- b) BTP, who have primacy in dealing with any act of unlawful interference against the railway; and
- c) TRANSEC, who should be informed by train operators, station managers and the infrastructure controller as appropriate, and by the BTP, of all acts of unlawful interference, excluding vandalism, against the railway.

The plans should also provide for the continuity of security in the event of an act of unlawful interference against the railway, security occurrence, industrial dispute or change in the risk.

Provision should be made to collate information about acts of unlawful interference against the railway, security occurrences and breaches of security for analysis to facilitate the development of measures to prevent a recurrence. This information should be sent to both TRANSEC and the infrastructure controller. Plans should be amended as necessary, reviewed and updated at least once every 12 months and whenever these plans have been implemented.

The CARN should describe the responsibilities and the actions required in response to acts of unlawful interference against the railway, security occurrences, breaches of security and industrial disputes likely to affect the railway in its:

- a) security programmes;
- b) staff instructions; and
- c) staff training programmes.

Exercises

Contingency plans should be tested on an annual basis. Tabletop exercises may be run.

Bomb threats

Guidance on how to deal with bomb threats can be obtained from GO/RT3601.

ANNEX D - Recruitment

Purpose

The purpose of this Annex is to set out guidelines for the recruitment of staff by managers, train operators or by agents acting on their behalf, to carry out railway security duties. Staff engaged on railway security duties should be reliable, reputable and capable of carrying out those duties effectively.

Application

The provisions of this Section should apply to any person whose primary duties include:

- (a) searching or checking a relevant train;
- (b) searching or patrolling a public area; and
- (c) controlling access into a non-public area

whether employment on such duties is permanent or temporary.

Responsibility

The security manager, as appropriate, should be responsible for ensuring the implementation of the measures described in this Annex.

Recruitment application

This section sets out the framework which train operators, freight operators and CARNS should follow before deciding whether an employee or a potential recruit is of a suitable character and has sufficient integrity to be trusted to carry out their activities. It also applies to operators or managers who have engaged agents to perform specific duties.

The following procedures should be carried out whenever:

- (a) the employer proposes to recruit a new member of staff, regardless of the nature of the candidate's previous employment, even if that employment was under the Crown or was with another train operator, freight operator, CARN or the agent of a train operator;
- (b) it is proposed to re-deploy an existing employee onto such duties unless that person has been employed full time by the train operator, freight operator, CARN or agent for a continuous period of at least five years immediately prior to the re-deployment; or
- (c) it is proposed to re-employ an ex-member of staff although in such cases it will not be necessary to obtain fresh verification of any periods of employment if that person's documentary records relevant to the period of employment have been retained.

Record of employment and candidates' declarations

In each case, candidates are to be required to complete the employer's job application form giving full details of their education, training and employment during the preceding five years or since they reached the age of 16, whichever is the shorter period. The form should incorporate:

- a) a declaration that the information given is complete and accurate;
- b) a declaration that the candidate has no criminal convictions other than any treated as spent under the provisions of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 and those disclosed on the form;
- c) an acceptance that any misrepresentation of the facts is a ground for refusal of employment or disciplinary proceedings (and, perhaps, criminal charges);
- d) an authorisation for approaches to be made to former employers, educational establishments, government agencies and personal referees for verification of the information; and
- e) where applicable, an acceptance that TRANSEC may carry out a counter terrorist check and that the final offer of employment is conditional on a satisfactory result of such a check.

The candidate should complete and sign the form.

Interview

A person who has been specifically trained for the task should interview the candidate.

The interviewer should be required to:

- a) check that the candidate understands the full implications of the record of employment and candidate's declarations; and
- b) work through the record with the candidate, seeking to obtain any further information that may be relevant (for example, reasons for leaving previous employers) and ensuring that no periods are unaccounted for.

If it emerges that there are any gaps in the record (or any periods for which it is unlikely to be feasible to obtain verification) the interviewer should be required to ask the candidate to provide the names and addresses of persons who will be able and prepared to confirm from their own personal knowledge what the applicant was doing during the periods in question. If the candidate does not provide such names and addresses, he or she must be asked to provide some other form of substantiation (for example marriage/ birth certificates, immigration records, and so on).

After the interview

Written confirmation should be sought from the former employers, educational establishments and so on listed by the candidate that the dates given are accurate and that there is nothing in their experience of the candidate which suggests a lack of integrity or otherwise reflects adversely upon his suitability for security employment.

In the case of candidates who were self-employed, either wholly or in part, for any of the periods in question, verification should be sought as appropriate from the Inland Revenue, accountants, solicitors and so on.

Confirmation of periods of registered unemployment should be sought from The Department for Work and Pensions or other government agencies.

Where the candidate has nominated personal referees in accordance with the paragraph above, verification should be sought from those referees. The employer should be required to satisfy himself, so far as is reasonable, as to the bona fides of the referees.

Where for any reason it proves impossible to obtain the confirmations of employment history, the candidate should be asked to provide (further) personal references or some other form of substantiation.

Records

In all cases, the employer should maintain sufficient records to show:

- a) that the verification process was properly carried out;
- b) the results of the verification process including the conclusions reached about any periods for which it was not possible to obtain complete verification; and
- c) who took the decision(s) on the candidate's suitability.

Nature of employment

This Section applies to the selection of candidates for employment of any duration whether temporary or permanent.

Physical qualities

People employed on railway security duties should be capable of carrying out those duties. In this respect the following criteria should apply both in respect of candidates being considered for such employment and those so employed.

Security staff should:

- a) have good general health, reasonable strength and no physical incapacity which would prevent them from undertaking the normal range of railway security duties;

- b) with or without spectacles or contact lenses, be able to read correctly a vehicle number plate at 23 metres distance and be able to read labels on bottles of spirits and aerosols at a distance selected by the candidate of between 30 and 50 centimetres;
- c) have colour perception sufficient to use colour x-ray equipment (if relevant) and to check passes with colour codes;
- d) with or without an aid, be able to hear radio and telephone communications, audio signals emitted by security equipment, and an average conversational human voice at a distance of 2.5 metres in a quiet room; and
- e) be free from dependence on alcohol or illegal substances. Staff taking prescribed drugs should be considered on an individual basis to ensure that their ability to undertake their duties would not be adversely affected.

Most of these requirements will probably be covered by the general medical requirements for staff already existing within the railway industry.

Other qualities

Security staff should also have:

- a) reasonable command of the English language, both oral and written, which allows the undertaking of the duties to a satisfactory standard; and
- b) powers of observation and concentration sufficient to carry out their railway security duties effectively.