TRANSEC: Transport Security

Overview

The Secretary of State for Transport is responsible for the security and (less directly) resilience of UK transport systems. Recent events such as the attacks on London, 9/11 and the Madrid bombings have brought security concerns to the fore and transport security is an important part of Government's long-term counter-terrorist strategy (CONTEST) with its four pillars Protect, Prevent, Pursue and Prepare.

The Secretary of State is empowered by legislation to require the regulated transport industries to implement security measures designed to protect their infrastructure, their hardware, staff and the public using it, from attack. The Director of Transport Security and Contingencies (TRANSEC) is authorised to sign Directions obliging the industries to carry out the Government's requirements.

There is no equivalent legal basis on the resilience side, although the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 placed requirements on most transport operators to cooperate with the primary responders in contingency planning and in sharing information. DfT (not just TRANSEC) acts less formally through its contacts with operators to ensure that they are aware of the Government's assessment of risks and have made their own plans accordingly.

Ministers play an important role in the Government-wide counter-terrorist and resilience and recovery machinery, primarily through membership of the relevant Ministerial level committee. In the event of a serious threat or an actual incident the Secretary of State and/or ministers would be involved in key decisions (for example cessation of flights or closure of a railway station) and would be expected to attend Ministerial level COBR (Cabinet Office Briefing Room) meetings.

Fundamental Principles of Transport Security

As the transport industries' security regulator, TRANSEC devises and enforces standards taking account both of the costs to the industry of security measures and the consequences of security failures. Responsibility and costs for carrying out security measures rests entirely with the regulated industries. The industries currently regulated are aviation, maritime, railways (including London Underground, DLR and Glasgow Subway) and Channel Tunnel, and, with effect from July 2005, all industries in respect of the security of dangerous goods in transport.

Two fundamental principles are applied:

Risk Management

• Allows TRANSEC to balance the need for protective security against the cost to the transport network by focusing security measures on those potential targets that are most at risk.
• An evaluation of risk is based on a consideration of the threat of an attack, the vulnerability of a target and the potential consequences of an attack.
• Threat is a measure of the likelihood that terrorists will attack a particular target and is dependent on the terrorists' intent and their capability. The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) and the Security Service provide threat information to TRANSEC (in respect of international and domestic threat respectively).
• The vulnerability of a potential target is dependent on the specific characteristics of the target and the extent to which these could be exploited in an attack. Thus the inherent vulnerability of each mode varies considerably.
• The objective of risk management is to bring the risk to an acceptable level. If the threat to a target is high and the vulnerability is not inherently low, then action must be taken.

Proportionality and Practicality

• TRANSEC aims to develop measures whose costs are in proportion to the risk, are not unduly burdensome to industry and are practicable. Procedures that are especially intrusive or which cause long delay will not be generally acceptable to the public or industry, unless an exceptional level of threat warrants such an approach temporarily.

The Government Security Agenda and DfT's Role

The goal of the Government's long-term counter terrorist strategy (CONTEST), co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office, is "to reduce the threat from international terrorism so that our people can go about their business freely and confidently". Progress is monitored by the official committees for counter terrorist work and resilience reporting to the ministerial committees.

Transport Security and Contingencies Directorate (TRANSEC)

TRANSEC is the DfT's Transport Security and Contingencies Directorate and its aims are:

• To protect the travelling public, transport facilities and those employed in the transport industries primarily from acts of terrorism and to retain public confidence in transport security, whilst not imposing requirements that impact disproportionately on the travelling public or on the effectiveness and efficiency of industry operations; and
• To co-ordinate the Department for Transport's arrangements for responding to serious disruption of national life, actual or threatened, however caused.

TRANSEC sits within the Department but operates independently from the transport policy directorates.

UK Transport Security Programmes and Compliance

The Security Programmes

Management of the risk is delivered through the application by the industries of National Security Programmes that contain recommended practice as well as mandatory requirements.

The aviation programme is the most mature, having been in place since the mid 1970s. The broad thrust of the programme is that every person and item being placed on public service aircraft is subject to security screening, and that the aircraft is searched on entry to the secure zone of the airport. This high level of security reflects the history of attacks against aviation and the potential consequences of an attack.

Until 2004 the core of the maritime security regime had been the selection, on international ferry routes and cruise ships, of a percentage of people/baggage for security screening. Since July 2004 (when the first international requirement for maritime security was introduced) the scope has extended considerably to encompass all international shipping, including cargo shipping, and the related port facilities.

TRANSEC has regulated the security of the Channel Tunnel in co-operation with France since operations began. As open systems, the potential for effective security of rail is far more limited. Following the attacks on the railway in Madrid in 2004 TRANSEC undertook a comprehensive review of railway security. Implementation of the recommendations of the review are well on the way to completion and represent a step change in the standard of UK railway security. We will continue to work with the industry, the Police and other Government Departments to explore what further practical measures can be taken, following the London attacks in July 2005.

The security of dangerous goods in transport has been the subject of regulations since July 2005. This is supported by a comprehensive set of guidance which has been compiled following dialogue with industry, police, unions and other Government Departments.

We are also working within the light rail and bus sectors providing guidance on security issues.

Compliance

TRANSEC monitors compliance with the National Security Programmes through a programme of regular inspections, tests and audits of the industries. TRANSEC adopts a stepped approach to enforcement ranging from informal requests for improvements, through to the issue of Deficiency Notices, Enforcement Notices and ultimately prosecution.

As well as being the security regulator, DfT seeks to work closely and consultatively with transport operators to develop security measures and practices that are effective, sustainable and responsive to the changing nature of security threats. We liaise with industries both informally and formally through a structure of National Security Committees (to consider strategic issues) supported by working level sub-groups.

International Involvement

The UK presses within the EU and internationally to ensure the development and implementation of appropriate transport security standards.

The UK has for many years been an active member of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC).

The events of 11 September 2001 brought a new global focus on aviation security, and within that special attention to the possibility of aviation being used as a means of attack, as well as the object of it. This has driven security enhancements designed to reduce the risk of hijack, notably the fitting of secure cockpit doors and a growth internationally in the use of "sky marshals".

The importance of all states having robust security arrangements has led TRANSEC to increase the resources it devotes to driving up standards globally, both through bilateral dialogue and in the relevant international fora - notably ICAO but also the EU, ECAC and G8.

DfT played a leading role in the adoption by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) of its International Ship and Port facility Security Code (ISPS) in 2004. Before 9/11 the UK was one of the very few countries that had a maritime security programme in place.

Cross Government Links

TRANSEC's closest relationships within Government are with the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), which is designed to improve the quality and flow of assessed current intelligence to customer departments, and with the Security Service. We base our decisions about what level of protective security is appropriate on the threat information we receive from them.

On a wider basis TRANSEC works closely with the Home Office, the Police (particularly the Metropolitan Police), The British Transport Police and the Border Agencies to ensure our respective work programmes are mutually supportive and consistent - this presents a "joined-up" approach to industry.

On resilience and recovery issues we have close links with the Cabinet Office's Civil Contingency Secretariat as well as with the Home Office. In the area of contingency planning and crisis response, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 sets out the framework for planning and response.