



Secure Stations Scheme

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Introduction to the Secure Stations Scheme

The Secure Stations Scheme represents a national standard for passenger safety and security on Britain's railway stations. Launched in 1998, the Scheme has recently been independently reviewed and subsequently revised in order to simplify some procedures and encourage more operators to take part.

These resource materials have been prepared to assist operators in making improvements to stations for the security of staff and passengers. They contain information which may be useful in improving the physical environment and management of any station - from a busy, major, urban interchange to one in a small, quiet, rural community.

For stations that fall short of the Scheme's accreditation standard there is a new category of 'working towards accreditation'. This category recognises the efforts that are being made by some operators to get such stations to meet the standard, and provides them with the guidance and support to do so.

The Scheme guidance pack includes:

An **Overview of the Scheme**, including an explanation of the criteria for accreditation, costs and benefits to the operator, and the assessment process.

Guidelines for **design and management** to reduce opportunities for crime and provide reassurance for passengers, including specifically those design and management features that will be assessed for accreditation under the Scheme;

A **Design and Management Audit** by which operators can make their own early assessment of whether they comply with the design and management requirements of the Scheme, or where there is need for improvement, and which will require endorsement by the British Transport Police Crime Reduction Officer (CRO);

The procedure for **obtaining recorded crime data** from the British Transport Police. For accreditation under the Scheme, operators will need to supply crime data expressed in the context of passenger throughput figures;

The procedure for **obtaining passenger views** about the station. This has been revised, subsequent to the review, to enable operators to make greater use of the results of the National Passenger Survey (NPS). The NPS provides independent, reliable and consistent data that enables national comparisons to be made, and its use will reduce costs for operators;

Guidelines for **working in partnership** with other agencies, including other public transport operators, local authorities, the police and Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships, to address issues relating to the security of passengers across the whole journey;

A procedure for **Working Towards Accreditation** by which operators who manage stations that do not meet the accreditation standard can get support and recognition for their efforts to make the necessary improvements to them;

Guidelines for **tackling crime at stations in high crime and socially excluded areas** to see what actions have been undertaken at similar stations to reduce crime and improve personal security; and

Finally, there is a **Record Sheet** to record your passenger survey results and crime data, and an **Application Form** to be signed off by you, your local British Transport Police Crime Reduction Officer and the British Transport Police Independent Accreditor.

Guideline 1 - Overview of the Secure Stations Scheme

What is the Secure Stations Scheme?

The Secure Stations Scheme is an opportunity for Britain's rail companies to improve security at their stations and display to their customers their desire to reduce crime. Recognising the public's fear of crime at stations, the Scheme provides an incentive to station operators to improve security and provide reassurance to passengers and staff.

This national Scheme covers all rail and underground networks which are policed by the British Transport Police [BTP]. It establishes standards of good practice and accredits individual stations which have worked with the BTP and other local partners to implement security measures.

What are the accreditation criteria?

There are four accreditation criteria:

- the **design of the station** must conform to standards judged by the local BTP Crime Reduction Officer to prevent and reduce crime and improve passenger perceptions [see Guideline no 2];
- the **management of the station** must enable you to take steps to prevent crimes, respond to incidents, and communicate effectively with passengers [see Guideline no 3];
- crime statistics for the station over the twelve months prior to the inspection must show that you are **managing crime** [see Guideline no 4]; and
- a survey of users must show that, on the whole, **passengers feel secure** when using the station [see Guideline no 5].

The Scheme recognises that security can be improved both through physical design measures and through management practices. Many stations are old and were designed without personal security in mind. In such cases operators will need to make whatever improvements are possible (through, for example, lighting and signage) and take steps to manage the problems that remain.

The design of a new station or a major refurbishment will provide an opportunity to incorporate good practice in the features of the physical environment. Even so, management practices which give priority to preventing crime and providing a reassuring environment will be crucial to ensuring that the station is - and remains - secure.

Benefits to the operator

- reduced crime levels which, in turn, mean reduced costs in terms of repairing vandalism, cleaning graffiti, and staff time off as a result of assault, for example;
- increased passenger numbers which, in turn, means increased revenue;
- a boost in public confidence which, in turn, will be reflected in improved status;
- good local publicity for the rail company, arising from the issuing of the certificate and any local ceremony to mark the event;
- the possibility of leveraging in investment from other agencies (such as the local authority) to improve the station approaches and immediate environment; and
- the professional satisfaction of adopting acknowledged good practice.

Costs to the operator

The main cost of the Scheme to the operator will be in the design and management improvements which need to be made to bring the station up to standard. The size of this task will obviously depend on how far the station fell short and how difficult it will be to make the changes. Some stations will meet the standard with little or no additional expenditure; while others will require major investment. The Guidelines suggest a range of measures, some more costly than others.

What is involved?

In the first instance make your own assessment of whether a station meets the standard, using the enclosed Design and Management Audit. If you identify a problem either with a design feature or an aspect of management, use **Guidelines 2 and 3** for some ideas as to what you might do, and liaise with your local BTP Crime Reduction Officer (CRO) to prepare for the independent assessment.

The local CRO will also help you to identify the crime figures which you will need to supply in your application (see **Guideline 4**).

Guideline 5 explains how to find out how passengers feel about personal security at your station.

When you and the local CRO agree that the station may meet the accreditation criteria, the BTP Independent Accrerator will formally accredit the station. When successfully accredited, you must send the completed **Record Sheet** (endorsed by the independent accrerator) and **Application Form** to the Department for Transport for processing and confirmation of your accreditation. The Application Form states which documentation you need to send to the Department for Transport (DfT) - at the address shown on the Form.

DfT will confirm your successful accreditation and send you the Scheme award, in the form of a certificate signed by the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police which can be displayed at the station and advertised in your publicity materials and station signage, and a publicity pack. DfT will also notify your station's local MP of the accreditation.

The certificate is valid for two years from the date of issue. A certificate can be withdrawn during this time if there is a clear breach of the standard. After the two years the operator may apply for a new certificate, following the same procedure.

If the local CRO finds that the station does not meet the accreditation standard, they will specify what needs to be done and advise you on the 'working towards accreditation' award process. Details of this process can be found in **Guideline 7**. Achieving the 'working towards accreditation' award will entitle the station operator to use this in their publicity. Once the local CRO and BTP Independent Accrerator are satisfied that full accreditation has been achieved within the timescale agreed, the enclosed Record Sheet and Application Form can be completed and submitted to DfT.

You may have a station in a high crime and socially excluded area which, despite your efforts to improve the design and management of the station, continues to have a crime rate adversely affected by the neighbourhood it serves. To help you overcome this obstacle and to move to the accreditation standard, **Guideline 8** provides examples of successful measures to reduce crime and improve personal security that have been introduced at similar stations. You will need to discuss with the Local CRO how best to apply these measures to your station.

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Guideline 2 - Design and crime

There is now an established link both between design and crime and design and the reduction of fear.

Good design of the physical environment can reduce opportunities for crime, by making it harder to commit the crime or by making it more likely that the offender will be caught. For example, the use of anti-graffiti paint makes it harder to commit the crime, and the presence of CCTV makes it more likely that the offender will be caught.

Design of the physical environment can also reduce fear. Good lighting, for example, can help to remove the fear created by darkness, and clear sightlines can reassure someone that no one is lurking, waiting to pounce.

Since the inception of Secure by Design in the late 1980s - by which new buildings could conform to design standards which would reduce opportunities for burglary - a wealth of expertise has developed in relation to design features which reduce crime.

More recently these design principles have been drawn upon by transport planners and operators, and it is standard good practice to involve the British Transport Police Crime Reduction Officer in the design of any new station and any refurbishment.

In relation to disability interests, there is also a body of good practice incorporated in the Strategic Rail Authority's Code of Practice on meeting the needs of disabled people - *Train and Station Services for Disabled Passengers*. The Code was drawn up in close consultation with the Disabled Persons Transport Advisory Committee [DPTAC]. Any design measures introduced to improve passenger security should ensure that the specific needs of disabled passengers are addressed.

These guidelines

- identify the principles for improving personal security through design features, and
- provide examples of ways in which those principles could be achieved.

Stations differ enormously in size, age, levels of patronage, nature of the surrounding physical and social environment, and crime levels. These guidelines are not - and cannot be - prescriptive. You will need to identify the potential problems you have in relation to design and crime, and select from a range of possible measures those which can best be adapted for your station.

You will need to consider all parts of the station, but pay particular regard to those places where passengers are - or feel - most at risk.

Passengers' feelings of security will be affected not only by risks to them personally but also by risks to their property. Confidence that their left luggage, bicycle or car is safe from theft or vandalism will affect confidence in their own security.

Crime within TOC-managed station car parking facilities are considered within this Scheme and if the station has a car park you may wish to apply for an award under the Safer Parking Scheme, or suggest that whoever is responsible for the car park should do so.

Site perimeters, entrances and exits

Entrances and exits should be clearly marked and, when the station is open, allow clear visibility both inwards and outwards. Where it is necessary to define the limits or boundaries of the station, this needs to be done in such a way that it does not unnecessarily restrict opportunities for informal surveillance i.e. for passers-by and those living and working nearby to see and be seen by passengers waiting at the station.

An example of good practice would be:

- the use of 'open' fencing rather than solid walls

In relation to any fencing at the station your own technical staff or the Crime Reduction Officer should be able to advise you as to whether you comply.

Formal surveillance

The presence and visibility of staff and CCTV provides a reassurance to passengers and a deterrent to potential offenders. The Data Protection Act 1998 introduced a Code of Practice for public space CCTV systems. This should be referred to at all times when planning, installing and managing public space CCTV. The CCTV system should also be registered with the Information Commissioner.

Station staff need to be located in prominent positions so that they can see and be seen by waiting passengers. The effectiveness of CCTV depends on the number and location of cameras, the quality of image, and the monitoring in place. The Crime Reduction Officer can advise you on the selection and siting of CCTV so that it is effective in deterring crime, reassuring passengers and securing successful prosecutions.

Examples of good practice include:

- locating station staff so that they have a clear view of waiting areas
- the use of picture windows on staff offices so that they can see and be seen
- by passengers (taking care that cash and valuables are not on view)
- ensuring a regular patrol of the station by staff, especially during quiet
- periods, to provide a reassuring presence to waiting passengers
- high visibility vests worn by station staff so that they can be clearly seen
- creating a core area where facilities such as passenger information Help Points, passenger emergency alarms, public telephones, seating and CCTV monitoring are concentrated
- the placement of CCTV cameras so that they cover each other, to deter vandalism
- alarming the CCTV to protect it from theft
- the placement of CCTV cameras so that they cover station approaches,
- in particular subways and any paths that are felt to generate insecurity
- the placement of CCTV cameras so that their view is unobstructed and
- well illuminated
- letting passengers know that CCTV is monitored so that they are reassured
- that the surveillance is real and immediate
- careful storage of CCTV data to enable their later use in detection
- quick repair of any faulty or damaged CCTV equipment.

Further guidance about the standard of CCTV required by the Scheme is available from your local Crime Reduction Officer.

Informal surveillance

Through informal surveillance, passengers and staff can both see and be seen by passers-by, road users, residents and local workers. If an access path or platform is remote from view, passengers will often feel unsafe and the opportunities for vandalism to and theft of property are increased.

The operator will need to pay particular regard to times of the day when the station and its environment may feel abandoned - especially after dark - and ensure everything possible is done to increase opportunities for and the quality of informal surveillance at these times.

Examples of good practice include:

- the use of 'open' fencing rather than solid walls
- encouraging the presence of retailers on the station - in the booking hall and on the platform - and in the immediate vicinity, to generate a 'busy' atmosphere (taking care that they do not obstruct passenger exits)
- making waiting areas visible to other passengers and staff, through the use of glazing (polycarbonate, where there is a risk of vandalism) rather than solid walls.

Landscaping

Landscape design can make a station more attractive and develop a sense of ownership by local residents and users. It can also be a crime prevention measure in itself, for example, training ivy against a wall to protect it from graffiti.

However, care needs to be taken to ensure that landscape features do not become targets for vandalism or provide cover for potential criminal activity. Regular maintenance is essential to ensure that landscaping which was designed to prevent crime and improve the environment does not deteriorate and present opportunities for crime and fears for personal security.

Examples of good practice include:

- using slow-growing shrubs which cannot grow too large, thus obscuring visibility
- use of prickly shrubs to minimise opportunities for concealment
- making checks of landscaping part of the regular station inspection and maintenance procedures.

Lighting

Apprehension about personal security and crime increases after dark. Lighting throughout the station needs to be such that waiting passengers can clearly see other users as they could in daylight. Particular attention needs to be paid to the lighting of timetables and other information which needs to be easily read.

An assessment of lighting requirements should be made during hours of darkness.

Examples of good practice include:

- uniform lighting, so that it does not create pools of intense brightness, silhouette on-coming pedestrians, or temporarily blind people with its intensity
- the use of matt surfaces to minimise the possibility of creating glare
- the use of light coloured paint to enhance the effectiveness of the lighting
- lighting which enhances CCTV pictures so that individuals can be identified
- the illumination of signs and service information which is good enough for

- them to be clearly readable after dark
- regular inspection and maintenance checks made during hours of darkness.

Visibility

Visibility is a key requirement in design. It is not only the ability to see ahead and along a route but, in the case of any potential threats to personal security, to have space and time to anticipate problems and plan precautionary action. For example, blind corners, recesses and wide pillars can all provide a hiding place for an attacker and make passengers feel vulnerable and at risk.

Examples of good practice include:

- avoiding corners, wide pillars and recesses, where possible, in the initial design
- blocking off recesses
- extending sight lines at corners and wide pillars through the installation of convex mirrors or CCTV cameras and monitors
- where corners and recesses are unavoidable, enhancing surveillance in those areas, for example through the presence of staff and CCTV cameras
- the use of clear glazing in waiting areas
- regular inspection and maintenance of recesses that cannot be blocked off, to ensure that they do not become subject to misuse.

Information to passengers

Confidence in finding one's way around the station and proceeding on one's journey is fundamental to a passenger's sense of security, and can discourage those with criminal intent. Maps, signage and timetables help the passenger make informed decisions and proceed confidently.

Information given over public address systems needs to be clear and audible, taking account of noise levels on the station.

Guidelines for presentation of timetables are issued by the Association of Train Operating Companies [ATOC] and the Disabled Persons Transport Advisory Committee [DPTAC], and should be used to ensure that you conform to current best practice.

Examples of good practice include:

- clear directional signs around the station so that passengers can find their way to the appropriate platform and towards the booking hall, passenger facilities and the exit
- in the case of large stations a clear plan of the station, located at the entrance, showing platforms, booking office, telephones, toilets, other facilities and the exit(s)
- a map of the station in relation to the surrounding locality, located at exits, so that passengers are clear about which way to leave the station for nearby facilities
- the provision of service information in the booking hall, on the platforms, and available for passengers to take away
- clear, readable timetables which are dated so that passengers are assured that they are current
- at transport interchanges, the provision of timetables of other transport modes

- the announcement of service changes through the public address system, which has the added benefit of reassuring passengers of a staff presence and of effective management of the service
- Help Points through which passengers can seek service information from a central point of control
- visual display of 'real time information' which informs passengers of service delays and enables them to make an assessment of their options
- staff who are visible and available to answer service enquiries
- the display of information about local taxi services, and signs towards a rank if there is one
- crime prevention advice posters and leaflets relating to specific local crime problems, such as pickpocketing or car theft
- Crimestoppers advertisements, giving a freephone number for anyone wanting to report an incident.

Calling for help

Passengers need to know that they can get help in an emergency. Their confidence in such systems depends on a reliable, fast and effective response.

Examples of good practice include:

- passenger emergency alarms or Help Points which are clearly signed and well lit, so that their location is clear from anywhere on the station platform
- passenger emergency alarms or Help Points which are located where passengers are most likely to want to use them, and which are easy to use and reach
- information telling passengers when to use the system, and what will happen when they do
- covering the passenger emergency alarm or Help Point with a CCTV camera so that when they are used, the incident can be monitored and recorded
- the provision of a public telephone and freephone number for passengers
- to summon help or report an incident
- regular inspection of the passenger emergency alarm or Help Point
- and quick repair of faulty or damaged equipment.

Guideline 3 - Managing a secure station

Crime is a risk that can be managed. This involves monitoring the nature and scale of incidents so that resources can be targeted, knowing what crime is costing you to ensure that initiatives are cost effective, and measuring results to identify whether what you are doing is working.

Management of the crime risk should be integral to the management of the station as a whole and, as such, should be considered in every aspect of the operation. Inspection and cleaning of the waiting areas, selection and training of staff, handling and transporting cash, and liaising with other local organisations, are all part of managing the station, and can all have an impact on crime and feelings of personal security.

In some cases management is all the more important because the design of the station presents risks to passenger security which cannot easily be resolved. In such cases you will need to make whatever improvements are possible (through, for example, lighting and signage) and take steps to manage the problems that remain.

Any measures introduced to improve passenger security should ensure that the specific needs of disabled passengers are addressed.

These guidelines

- identify the principles for improving personal security through management, and
- provide examples of ways in which those principles could be achieved.

Stations differ enormously in size, age, levels of patronage, nature of the surrounding physical and social environment, and crime levels. While some management principles are fundamental and will apply in all cases, the application of others will depend on the nature of the problem. You will need to identify the potential problems you have, especially those which you have not been able to address through physical design improvements, and take steps as appropriate to manage those that remain.

Passenger security: a statement of intent

Your organisation should have a personal security policy which sets out its principles and objectives in relation to personal security. This will underpin all initiatives taken to improve passenger and staff security. It should include a commitment by the organisation, endorsed at Board level. Ideally a senior member of staff or Board member should have specific responsibility for this issue, to ensure that the policy is implemented.

You should publish a statement of intent, confirming your commitment to:

- setting, monitoring and publicising standards of personal security that individual passengers can reasonably expect, and
- monitoring of passenger satisfaction.

This should be exhibited in prominent positions in the station. The display of your statement of intent may also be used to give passengers:

- a contact name and number for reporting complaints and incidents,
- your commitment to the personal security of your staff, which includes prosecuting those who threaten or assault them, and
- your policy on providing a reasonable maximum time a passenger would have to wait when summoning help from staff.

Staff deployment, role and training

Staff can play an important role in deterring offenders and providing reassurance to passengers. The desire for a staff presence can be addressed by the sensitive deployment of staff, by increasing their visibility and mobility, and by widening their range of responsibilities. This can be achieved through:

- station facilities that are staffed, with glazing to maximise their visibility to passengers (taking care that cash and valuables are not on view);
- use of public address which is clearly 'live' by informing passengers of service alterations and responding to incidents as they arise;

- mobile staff teams deployed on stations and at times that are identified as being when passengers feel most at risk;
- making existing staff multi functional to improve the service to the passenger and to create the impression of a service that takes care of its passengers; and
- using the public address system to direct information to passengers at specific locations, which gives confidence to people on isolated platforms that they are under staff surveillance.

The presence of security staff who also have a responsibility to protect passengers enhances their actual and perceived level of security. Operators who contract a security company should ensure that the company they use is a bona fide organisation whose staff have been vetted and trained to a high standard, and conform to the Security Industry Authority's regulations.

Station staff should be selected and trained to deal with the public on a regular basis, and in circumstances where there may be anxiety, conflict, or aggression. Consideration should be given to providing new staff with an opportunity to spend time with experienced staff as part of their induction training before they are required to work alone.

As part of the process of accreditation for the Secure Stations Scheme you will need to demonstrate that:

- 1. the ability to deal effectively with conflict is assessed as part of the selection of station staff;**
- 2. all induction of station staff contains an element of dealing with the public in the context of potential anxiety and conflict;**
- 3. training to deal with conflict and aggression is available to all station staff and refresher courses are offered from time to time; and**
- 4. any security company you use is regulated and registered with the Security Industry Authority (SIA).**

Staff security

Staff security is vital to passenger security. Staff who do not feel secure are unlikely to make themselves visible and available to passengers, and are unlikely to respond effectively to situations where there is potential or actual conflict or aggression. Staff security is achieved through a combination of measures, including the provision of safe facilities, and through management and training. The appropriate level of measures in individual cases should be based on a risk assessment of each job.

Examples of good practice include:

- training for staff to deal with conflict and aggression
- high physical security in the booking office, with alarms for staff to summon rapid assistance in the event of a robbery
- personal alarms for staff for their use around the station and when leaving, preferably those which are linked to a source of assistance
- CCTV surveillance of staff on duty
- a staff rest room for when they are not on duty

Ticketing and cash

The storage, handling and transport of cash presents a risk in terms of robbery and therefore for the personal security of the staff concerned.

As part of the process of accreditation for the Secure Stations Scheme you will need to demonstrate that:

- 1. a risk assessment has been made for all staff whose job involves handling cash;**
- 2. adequate measures have been made to protect them, based on that assessment of risk;**
- 3. adequate steps have been taken for the physical security of the booking office;**
- 4. where practicable, ticket machines are emptied daily so that they do not present a security threat overnight;**
- 5. booking staff are conversant with the 'personal attack' systems in place;**
- 6. staff handling cash have been trained and understand what they should do in the event of a robbery or attempted robbery.**

Securing passenger property

Knowing that their property is secure can contribute towards a passenger's overall sense of personal security. Examples of good practice include:

- secure car parking, such that it conforms to the Safer Parking Scheme
- sufficient and convenient bicycle parking places under the surveillance of station staff, CCTV or other surveillance
- the provision of left luggage facilities

Notices which seek to limit legal liability for loss of or damage to property, by, for example, saying that it is left 'at the owner's risk' are unlikely to be perceived by passengers to be reassuring.

Maintenance

A station which is clean and well maintained creates a sense of management and control, thus reducing fear.

Some design features become a potential threat if they are not well maintained. Landscaping needs to be cut back so that it does not obscure visibility and provide opportunities for crime. Lighting needs to be repaired and replaced as necessary to maintain acceptable levels of illumination. CCTV cameras need to be cleaned regularly and video tapes replaced.

Out of date posters and timetables can be misleading and generate an impression of dereliction. Posters which portray sexual images of women can contribute to female passengers' sense of unease and vulnerability.

If a station is busy at times but quiet at others, some entrances and exits could be closed off during off-peak times to enhance passengers' sense of security, although the access needs of disabled passengers need to be considered.

As part of the process of accreditation for the Secure Stations Scheme you will need to demonstrate that:

- 1. you have a regular inspection of the station to identify maintenance needs;**
- 2. you encourage reporting by passengers of damage and graffiti;**
- 3. you have adequate regular cleaning and maintenance procedures;**
- 4. you have a policy and adequate arrangements for the rapid removal**
- 5. of graffiti;**
- 6. you have a policy and adequate arrangements for the rapid repair of damaged CCTV, passenger emergency alarms, telephones and Help Points; and**
- 7. litter is removed promptly.**

A Secure Stations certificate is valid for two years, after which you will need to apply for a new certificate. It is all the more worthwhile, then, to make sure that any improvements you have made are maintained to a high standard.

Guideline 4 - Recording and monitoring of crimes and other incidents

Recording and monitoring incidents is essential if you and the police are to direct your resources to where they are most needed.

The first step is to encourage reporting by the public and station staff. Crime on public transport, and other incidents which affect feelings of security, are under-reported. Passengers and staff need to be encouraged to report any incident, knowing that they will be taken seriously and that the information they give is useful in building up a picture so that action can be taken.

The next step is to record the information given in a way that will be useful in identifying trends. Make sure that you can easily see what type of incident it is, when it is happening (by time of day and day of week if possible), where and to whom or what. Some incidents, while not criminal, none the less may affect perceptions of personal security. These incidents, such as nuisance by a drunk, or intimidation of booking office staff, for example, should be recorded in station records.

It is important that crime is recorded with enough information so that you can identify the groups of people who are most at risk (e.g. by age, gender and ethnic origin), and, where known, a profile of the perpetrators.

All crimes should be reported immediately to the British Transport Police (BTP). Notify them quickly and they will be better able to take steps to catch the offender.

Finally, monitor the information regularly so that you can identify trends and develop long term preventive measures. Seeing what is happening over time may help you to understand the cause of the problem. And understanding the cause is vital if you are to be effective in tackling it. The BTP can provide assistance in the task of monitoring.

Regular liaison with the BTP is helpful in developing a coordinated response. A problem may be most effectively tackled through several measures taken together, such as an enhanced presence of station staff at certain times, backed up by a police patrol on the trains.

As part of the process of accreditation for the Secure Stations Scheme you will need to demonstrate that you:

1. **encourage reporting of crime and incidents;**
2. **maintain a record of crime incidents at your station;**
3. **have monitored these and the BTP crime data for the station;**
4. **have identified trends in crime and incidents at the station which affect personal security; and**
5. **have taken appropriate and effective steps to manage the problem.**

For accreditation under the scheme you will need to supply crime data expressed in the context of passenger throughput figures.

Responding to incidents

Every reported incident should receive an appropriate response. This may range from a letter thanking a passenger for reporting a damaged display, through to an emergency 'blue light' police response to an assault.

Passengers need to know what response they can expect in the case of an emergency. If the station is staffed this may be from a member of staff; if not it may be from a member of staff at the nearest station or from a police officer.

Staff receiving reports of incidents from passengers need to be trained to judge what in each case an appropriate response is. They do not need to be trained counsellors, but they may benefit from some training in basic communication skills.

All crimes must be reported by staff to the police. A passenger who is the victim of a crime may or may not want to make a statement to the police.

Staff need to have an understanding of what information might be useful to the police in responding to the incident in the longer term, including the legal requirements relating to suspect descriptions and witness details.

As part of your strategy to prevent crime you should provide advice to passengers, to help them to avoid the risk of crime at the station.

As part of the process of accreditation for the Secure Stations Scheme you will need to demonstrate that:

1. **you can respond appropriately to an emergency, whether through a member of your own staff in the first instance, or through the police; and**
2. **your staff are trained to respond appropriately to reports of incidents, from the point of view of the immediate needs of the passenger and for the purposes of taking action in the longer term**
3. **you offer relevant crime prevention advice to passengers.**

Now complete part 2 of the record sheet of passenger survey results and crime data

Guideline 5 - Passenger perceptions

Using the National Passenger Survey

An important aspect of the accreditation process is gauging passenger perceptions of the station. It is crucial to the credibility of the Scheme that stations given accreditation are perceived by passengers to be secure.

In order to facilitate the process of gauging passenger perceptions, the Scheme will make use of existing data obtained by the National Passenger Survey (NPS).

The National Passenger Survey is administered ¹ twice a year, in the early Spring and the Autumn. Passengers are asked for their opinion on many aspects of the rail journey, including how safe they feel at the station. It is carried out across the country, currently at 620 of the 2,500 rail stations. The benefit of using the NPS, in addition to the convenience of utilising an existing resource, is that it provides independent, reliable and consistent data that enables national comparisons to be made.

The NPS is a paper-based questionnaire that is distributed to passengers with a pre-paid envelope for return. The questionnaire is too long to administer through an interview. Passengers' age, gender, journey purpose, disability and frequency of travel are collected. Results from the NPS are adjusted for each station to ensure that they are representative of weekday and weekend users. Questionnaires are distributed until 10.00pm.

The results of the NPS for the previous 2 years (i.e. the last 4 surveys) will be available to the station operator for the purposes of gauging passenger perceptions for Secure Stations accreditation. Station operators should make requests for data to Peter Thompson, Passenger Research Manager at Passengerfocus (email address Peter.Thompson@passengerfocus.org.uk). Data will normally be supplied within 10 working days.

Stations with a sufficient sample from the NPS will no longer have to undertake a separate survey. Those that cannot achieve a large enough sample from the NPS will have to carry out or commission a new survey, as they currently do. ²

Any survey carried out under the Scheme, where the NPS results do not provide an adequate sample, will need to ask the same question as that used in the NPS (see below) regarding rating of personal security at the station, in order to enable the results to be used in the accreditation process.

Where a new survey is required, station operators are encouraged to use an independent agency to conduct it. This will ensure independence, and will have the benefit of being administered by skilled and experienced staff. The station operator may decide to commission the agency carrying out the NPS for this purpose.

If the NPS for the previous 2 years does not yield an adequate sample and the operator decides to conduct or commission a booster survey rather than a full one, this should be carried out at the same time of year as the NPS, so that passengers are influenced by the same external factors that could affect their response

(e.g. weather, daylight hours, etc). All booster surveys using NPS data should be undertaken within one month of the NPS survey.

Sample sizes

The sample sizes are:

- For stations with less than 300 passengers a day, 30 responses ³
- For stations with between 300 and 1,000 passengers a day, 10% of the daily throughput
- For stations with more than 1,000 passengers a day, at least 100 responses

In terms of statistical accuracy, even given a very high passenger throughput, from a survey with 100 responses will provide results to within 10% ⁴. This 'confidence bound' will be factored into the scoring for the survey. Since most of the big (and busier) stations will get more than 100 responses through the NPS anyway, results would be more reliable than this confidence bound, based on 100 results, suggests.

Survey question: the Scheme requirements

Only the following question is required under the Scheme:

- How do you rate the station in terms of your personal security while using it:
 - - very good
 - fairly good
 - neither good nor poor
 - fairly poor
 - very poor
 - no opinion

Station operators are encouraged to reflect the NPS methodology in any passenger surveys that they conduct, and to ensure that respondents are representative of their customer base.

Given that only one question is to be asked, station operators are recommended to administer the survey through face-to-face questionnaire. This approach will probably be cheaper and yield a higher response than distributing paper questionnaires.

LUL

London Underground's passenger surveys are not station-specific and cannot therefore be used to provide data for the accreditation process. They will therefore need to continue to conduct additional surveys for the purposes of the Scheme. The survey requirements for LUL will be the same as for other stations.

Costs

Where the NPS does not cover the station or does not provide an adequate response for the Scheme, the cost of the survey or booster survey will be met by the station operator. The costs will vary across the stations:

- Those where NPS produced an adequate sample - no cost
- Those where NPS produced an inadequate sample - some additional cost
- Those not covered by NPS - full cost.

Re-accreditation

The survey requirements outlined in this paper will also apply to re-accreditations.

¹ Continental Research, an independent market research agency, has carried out the NPS since spring 2003, and are used by some Passenger Transport Executives to carry out booster surveys.

² The largest sample required will be 100 respondents. Where this is only partially yielded by the NPS, the operator will need to conduct a survey to make up the shortfall. However, given the small numbers involved, they may find it no more costly to conduct or commission a full sample as opposed to a partial one.

³ A sample of 30 is a minimum both to protect confidentiality and to ensure a meaningful result. However, special consideration might be given to very small stations that struggle to get 30 passengers a day in total.

⁴ For example, if the survey showed that 64% of people that were asked said they felt either safe or unsafe you would be confident that the opinion of all users of that station would be between 54% and 74%.

Guideline 6 - The whole journey: involving other organisations

If any part of your station is managed by another Train Operating Company, you will need to liaise with them and work together to improve security for passengers and staff on all parts of the station.

The journey to or from the stop or station often provokes more anxiety than the time spent waiting. The passenger may feel quite secure while on the train and on arrival at the station, but may find the walk home or wait at the bus stop a threatening experience. The impact of the 'whole journey' - e.g. the local street lighting, car parking facilities, the availability of bus timetables and information, and telephone numbers and accessibility of local taxi services - may make all the difference to the passenger's perception of the rail journey.

Problems experienced by rail operators often reflect those in the wider community, such as those caused by young people after school or during the long summer holiday, or by gangs of people who have been to a football match. [Guideline 8 gives examples of actions undertaken at stations in high crime and socially excluded areas to reduce crime and improve personal security.]

The Secure Stations Scheme covers the station and TOC-managed car parking facilities only, and so the surrounding streets do not come within the inspection. However, they may affect your ability to meet the standard set by the Scheme by impacting on the passengers' overall perceptions of security.

As part of the accreditation process you will need to demonstrate that you are managing the crime problems that affect your station [see Recording and monitoring guideline no 4] and that passengers are satisfied with the steps you are taking [see Passenger perceptions guideline no 5].

Which other organisations?

These are the organisations you should consider involving. Who you involve at any time will depend on what the problems are.

Other TOCs - who may manage certain parts of the station, or who are users of the station and who may be involved in funding any alterations to the station and whose passengers will benefit.

Network Rail - who have an interest in securing the property and who may be responsible for the car park (if there is one).

the Passenger Transport Executive - in Metropolitan areas, who are responsible for ensuring that an effective public transport system is available, maintained and developed in the area.

the police - your local force, who will know about the crime problems in your area.

the local authority - Community Safety Officer, if they have one; Planning Department; Youth Service; Education Department (including individual schools); Leisure Services.

Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships - a partnership between the police, local authority and other agencies, tasked with developing a strategy to reduce crime across their district.

other transport operators - rail, bus, light rail, underground, taxi, community transport.

voluntary/community organisations - representing interest groups such as Victim Support, Citizens Advice Bureau, Tenants' Associations, and groups representing particular passengers such as elderly and disabled people and women.

local businesses - particularly large employers and those whose staff and customers rely heavily on public transport.

passenger groups - such as [Passengerfocus](#) .

Guideline 7 - Working towards accreditation

The aim

A new category of award has been introduced into the Secure Stations Scheme, with the aim of:

- providing an incentive to station operators who believe that few or none of their stations would gain full accreditation, in order to engage them in the Scheme;
- recognising the efforts of station operators that are working to get their stations to an acceptable standard in the context of run-down infrastructure and limited resources, or a crime rate that is higher than the permitted threshold for the Scheme; and
- providing station operators with guidance and support towards attaining full accreditation at such stations.

The scope

The category 'working towards accreditation' can be awarded to a station operator on the basis of its work towards achieving security at a specific, named station.

Stations that could be considered by a station operator for the 'working towards accreditation' category are those which:

1. fail at the outset because of their high crime rate; and those which
2. have a low enough crime rate to pass the threshold, but fail full accreditation because of the scoring of the design and management audit.

It is for the station operator to decide that, despite (or possibly because of) these obstacles, they want to 'work towards accreditation'.

The process

Once a station has failed, either because of its high crime or because of its scoring on the checklist, the station operator and local BTP Crime Reduction Officer should meet with a view to developing an Action Plan. This Action Plan will form the basis for the 'working towards accreditation' award.

The Action Plan should be based on the weaknesses revealed by the crime information (i.e. an understanding of the crime risk at the station, which could be adversely affected by crime in the neighbourhood it serves - see Guideline 8 for advice on tackling crime in high crime and socially excluded areas), and the design and management checklist scoring. That being so, it will be important to undertake an analysis of the crime problem, so that preventive measures can be targeted appropriately. And it will be essential for even those stations that failed on the crime rate to go through the design and management checklist.

The Action Plan should be tailored so that it requires enough of the station operator that if they follow it, they can be confident of full accreditation, but not so demanding that it is not achievable.

The Action Plan should be:

Specific
Measurable
Achievable
Realistic
Time limited.

The timescale for the 'working towards accreditation' should be between 6 and 18 months, depending on the requirements of the Action Plan. This is intended to be long enough to be realistic, but short enough to provide focus. The Action Plan itself should set its own timescales, within these parameters.

All Action Plans will be cleared by the British Transport Police Independent Accreditor, in order to ensure that a consistent standard is being applied nationally.

Once an Action Plan is signed off by the station operator and BTP, a copy should be sent to the Department for Transport (see address on the enclosed Application Form). A 'working towards accreditation' award will be sent to you by the Department.

Progress towards achieving full accreditation will be monitored by the Secure Stations Scheme Steering Group. As with full accreditation, the Steering Group reserves the right to withdraw the 'working towards accreditation' award in the case of a serious breach. Unless there are exceptional extenuating circumstances, a station operator that fails to deliver the Action Plan for the station within the 18 months, will have the award withdrawn. It will then be for the station operator to reapply to the Steering Group for 'working towards accreditation' status.

Publicity and accountability

Achieving the 'working towards accreditation' award will entitle the station operator to use this in their publicity. In the interests of public accountability, Action Plans will be submitted to the Strategic Rail Authority by the Scheme Steering Group, and should be made available by the station operator to the relevant Rail Passenger Committee and individual passengers on demand.

Flow chart - Working towards accreditation process

Guideline 8 - tackling crime at stations in high crime and socially excluded areas

The DfT commissioned research (carried out during 2005-06) to identify appropriate measures that can effectively address crime and fear of crime at stations in high crime and socially excluded areas. This was in order to help those station operators who are frustrated that, no matter what they do in terms of design and management of the station, its crime rate is adversely affected by the neighbourhood that it serves and the station is consequently excluded from the Scheme.

Measures to improve rail stations and tackle crime and disorder were identified by TOCs and other partners involved in successful crime reduction initiatives as crucial for positively changing the image of an area or centre and for helping to convince other partners that regeneration of the wider area was both feasible and attainable. Issues about financing station improvements in the short term need not be a serious obstacle because relatively small-scale initiatives and the redeployment of existing resources can bring about significant improvements.

The following research findings could be helpful for station operators in high crime and socially excluded areas to see what actions have been undertaken at similar stations to reduce crime and improve personal security.

Research methodology

The study had four main elements:

- 1) A literature review to identify what is already known about personal security at railway stations in socially excluded/high crime areas, and what is known about the effectiveness of measures taken to reduce crime and fear of crime in disadvantaged neighbourhoods and the rail environment.
- 2) Research at eight rail stations in socially excluded/high crime neighbourhoods that have benefited from crime reduction initiatives to identify with key stakeholders 'what works' and the evidence for their effectiveness, explore how and why measures have been effective or failed, and the inter-relationship with community-based solutions. The research explored whether the extension or replication of initiatives between the railway station and the neighbourhood created synergy that was of benefit to both.
- 3) Research at four rail stations that have not benefited significantly from crime reduction initiatives to identify with passengers, the wider community and other stakeholders the extent to which problems at the stations reflect those in the wider neighbourhood, their priorities for improvement, and what mix of crime reduction and community-based solutions are required to tackle these problems. Passengers and other residents were also asked whether their patronage of the station and rail services would change if remedial measures were in place to reduce crime and fear of crime.
- 4) Interactive research at three rail stations to test the findings from the earlier research to identify and/or coordinate, in partnership with local stakeholders, practical measures to enhance the personal security and perceptions of passengers and potential passengers at those stations. The 'what works' research was used to inform the initial discussions for 'testing the findings'. An action plan was prepared for each station with costs and a programme for implementation.

Research findings

An analysis of the nature of crime and disorder problems that had been experienced at each of the eight rail stations revealed that:

- In all case studies, the problems (with the exception of fare evasion) were identified as a characteristic of the area or neighbourhood and not specific to the railway.
- Alcohol misuse to some degree or other was associated with the problems of anti social behaviour and disorder by adults and young people.

- In half of the case studies, the stations had been a venue for drug dealing or for drug couriers to use as a means of travel and, for these case studies, illegal drug use was associated as a particular problem in the locality as well.
- Young people were often associated with anti social behaviour and with problems of disorder and track trespass. Lack of controlled access to the stations and trains, and ease of access to the track between stations was often identified as features contributing to these problems.
- Anxieties about anti social behaviour, disorder and other crimes were a significant factor in deterring passengers and potential passengers from using the stations and train services, especially after dark. Staff perceptions of their own personal security were often said to be undermined by experience of and anxieties about the problems identified with the stations.
- High incidence of fare evasion was a common problem across all the case studies. The BTP associate ticketless travel with anti social behaviour and disorder on stations and trains.

The literature review drew on evidence from the evaluations of crime reduction initiatives to identify a series of strong indicators of what works best in tackling area-based crime. In summary these are:

- The co-operation and involvement of key partners, including the police, local authority and community representatives, is essential for crime prevention initiatives to be appropriate in design and effective in outcome.
- Sound and up to date evidence and robust analysis is needed to effectively target initiatives in terms of geographical location and/or types of crime to be prevented or reduced. Systems need to be flexible enough to respond to changes and to meet new challenges presented by offenders.
- Crime prevention measures need to be sustained and the level of activity maintained. Analysis of crime and disorder in deprived neighbourhoods has revealed that many of the problems are entrenched and require sustained activity to be effectively tackled. For example, there is evidence that graffiti will stop reappearing if initiatives for prompt removal are maintained. One-off attempts to solve problems of persistent criminal damage rarely work.
- Achieving long term changes to the crime and disorder profile of a neighbourhood often requires changing the behaviour of perpetrators and potential perpetrators. These are usually longer term solutions that need to go hand in hand with shorter term measures that reduce the opportunities for crime through target hardening and other situational crime prevention measures.
- The regular monitoring and evaluation of crime reduction measures is necessary to ensure they are being delivered in a way that best achieves their objectives and provides good value for money.

Examples of good practice identified that having the following in place can contribute significantly to improved partnership working, data collection and analysis:

Partnership working

- The partnership approach, that involves local communities and local businesses as well, is often essential because the problems affecting rail stations mirror those in the wider neighbourhood, city or town centre.
- A close working relationship between the BTP, transport providers and local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership is important for ensuring public transport related problems are on the agenda

and ideally tackling crime on public transport should be an integral part of the Partnership's Strategy.

- A good working relationship between operational staff, the BTP and private security officers can help develop a seamless approach to security operations on stations and trains.
- Although their responsibilities may be similar, local authorities often work very differently and time must be allowed for the BTP and train operating companies to understand their processes and requirements, for example with greater time required for officer recommendations to be agreed by local authority committees.
- The research highlighted that the TOC/Network Rail partnership is crucial for taking forward initiatives. Other agencies sometimes find it difficult to understand who is responsible for what, and TOCs and Network Rail should consider identifying someone with sufficient seniority and expertise to take the lead, involving local staff as appropriate.

Data collection and analysis

- The systematic and regular collection of quantitative and qualitative data on crime and disorder problems should be a common starting point for the identification and subsequent monitoring of the effectiveness of measures.
- Stations that are located at the convergence of local authorities and different policing districts will benefit from a mechanism that enables crime data for the whole area to be gathered and analysed.
- The analysis of incident data can help to target staff resources for patrolling stations and trains with particular emphasis on days and times when anti social behaviour can be especially problematic.
- It is important that the information from data analysis is presented in an accessible form and available to brief operational staff on trends and hotspots and encourage staff to regularly communicate the situation to the public.
- Staff need to be encouraged to report incidents and the delivery of effective measures to tackle crime and disorder can help give staff the confidence and belief to report.
- Developing formal data exchange protocols to facilitate full and open data exchange between partner agencies.
- Having a close working relationship with the local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership, including taking an active part in the crime audits, can be an important channel for developing a joined up approach to data collection and exchange.
- Having data and other information relating to neighbourhood problems as well as those at the station can help develop a greater understanding of the issues and help to target a partnership approach to crime reduction measures.
- Data on passenger throughput and the incidence of fare evasion can be valuable in understanding incident data for crime and disorder.
- Qualitative information from passengers, staff and other residents is an important and often unused source for identifying problems at the station and the neighbourhood, helping to correct to some extent under-reporting of incidents in the recorded crime and calls for assistance data.
- Passenger satisfaction surveys and mystery shopper exercises are additional sources of information that have been used to effectively identify the scale of problems and trends over time.
- Employing a crime analyst who is dedicated to regularly and consistently collecting and interrogating data can be a valuable resource, both for identifying problems and trends and for providing data as statistical evidence for subsequent action.
- It is important for the results from data gathering and analysis to be made available widely, including to operational/frontline staff to ensure that everyone is aware of hotspots from problems and when

the peaks occur (for example during school holidays or at the closing times of a local pub or club). Mapping this information can make it more accessible than tables of statistics.

- Regular meetings to present and explain the data, trends and hotspots should include staff from a range of disciplines to ensure the discussion is informed by those with different perspectives and experiences.
- Developing protocols that provide for access to databases to a wider but appropriate audience (for example to other police forces nationally and internationally for graffiti tags) can be a valuable tool for detecting and apprehending perpetrators who extend their practices across the transport network.
- A problem solving partnership approach to the problems is often key to the successful identification and delivery of effective measures.

Specific measures in place to tackle crime and anti social behaviour at some of the stations include:

Law Enforcement measures

Policing

- Dedicated BTP policing initiative
- BTP base at the stations to enhance visibility
- Enhanced and high visibility policing (examples include air surveillance patrols, use of police community support officers and special constables)
- Targeted BTP policing operations (examples include to tackle illegal drug dealing and use, carrying of offensive weapons, misuse and trackside vandalism by young people)
- Establishing a Priority Policing Area that includes the rail station

Other security presence

- Private security patrols
- Travel Support Officers, Rail Enforcement Officers and Retail Security patrols at stations and trains
- Street and neighbourhood wardens
- Financial incentive to encourage train conductors to gather fares from those travelling without a ticket and increase on-train visibility

Legal remedies

- Anti Social Behaviour Orders and Section 30 Dispersal Orders extending to the station premises as well as operating in the town centres.
- Specific measures taken especially through local youth workers and schools to inform young people of the existence of a Dispersal Order.
- Raising awareness amongst Magistrates on the seriousness of public transport related crimes and anti social behaviour
- Alcohol Exclusion Zones operating in the locality that includes the rail station or operating network wide on all stations and trains

Reporting crime

- Measures to encourage the reporting of incidents, including targeted publicity and free phone and text facility

Situational crime prevention measures

Physical improvements

- Rail station development with measures to tackle crime and disorder and provide good visibility
- Refurbishment works at rail stations including measures to increase informal surveillance and reduce fear of crime
- Special lighting in toilets to deter illegal drug use
- Upgrading of footbridges over track to deter prevent vandalism and placing of on-track obstacles
- Reduction of vegetation and greater security on the trackside to prevent trespass and other misuse

Enhanced surveillance

- Across all the case studies, the presence of CCTV cameras is the most common measure for providing surveillance at the stations
- Enhanced CCTV camera surveillance in station car parks to tackle vehicle theft and damage
- CCTV camera surveillance on the trains
- To tackle crime and disorder and fear of crime over the whole journey, there are examples of CCTV camera surveillance in the locality of the station (including for example in the surrounding streets or main approaches to the station) or through use of a street mobile camera facility

Encouraging activity and informal surveillance

- The letting of previously unused premises at stations for other uses as an important and cost effective means of increasing activity and generating more informal surveillance. Tenants should be chosen carefully to ensure they will contribute towards and not detract from perceptions of personal security.
- The use of premises for an on-station café and shops to increase activity and create a comfortable environment for passengers. Selling of alcohol at such premises should not be allowed unless it can be strictly supervised.
- Revenue from the letting of premises used to employ a caretaker for the commercial premises and with a wider remit involving on-station facilities such as public toilets

Other situational measures

- Automatic ticket barriers or gating to prevent open access to the stations and train services and reduce fare evasion
- BTP encourage marking of property and strong noisy Velcro closures to alert owners of anyone tampering with their luggage

Criminality prevention

Many of these measures were in place to tackle problems much wider than the rail station or public transport network and were often delivered by agencies other than the transport operator.

Initiatives relating to children and young people

- Working with children and young people to deter their involvement in crime and anti social behaviour on the public transport network and in the wider neighbourhood
- The issuing of Acceptable Behaviour Contracts to young people as a means of deterring disorder and anti social behaviour by young people
- Providing diversionary activities for young people

Other measures

- Diverted donations scheme to discourage vagrancy and support for those wanted to embark on an alternative lifestyle
- Illegal drugs project to offer support to those wanting to tackle their reliance and associated health and crime risks
- Working with black and minority ethnic communities to address their concerns for personal security and improve relationships with the police
- Continuous publicity on the trains, at the stations and in the local press about the Section 30 Dispersal Orders and ASBOs can be important in getting the message across that measures are being taken to tackle anti social behaviour and, as a consequence, the network is getting safer. This can also give the message to potential offenders that anti social behaviour will not be tolerated.
- Reducing fear of crime by publicity on television screens in the stations that focus on the 'good news' including falling numbers of incidents and the work of the local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership

Specific measures in place for regeneration and tackling social exclusion around some of the stations include:

- Partnership working to implement environmental improvements at trackside parks and housing estates.
- Introduction of changes to the traffic system to reduce kerb crawling and on-street prostitution.
- Development of a new station as the focus for economic regeneration, including a major educational, housing and retail site adjacent to the new station with improved rail and bus links to provide access to training and employment opportunities
- Bar and pub watch schemes, and Alcohol Exclusion Zones in the town and city centres.
- Zero tolerance schemes to tackle fly posting, begging, unlicensed street trading, litter and graffiti. Regular power-washing of the streets to create a cared for and orderly appearance.
- Compulsory purchase of properties in multi occupation to create a revitalised sea front with new housing, hotels, shops, restaurants and bars.