



National Contingency Plan For Marine Pollution from Shipping and Offshore Installations



Exercise Unicorn

10 June 2008

Final Report

 W Kennedy Project Sponsor Date: 09 January 2009	 H Shaw Project Manager Date: 09 January 2009
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Distribution List

The distribution list has been entered in alphabetical, by organisation, order and comprises of stakeholders and participants involved in Exercise Unicorn.

Organisation	Name	Role / Title
Audit Scotland	Beckie Lancaster	Project Manager - Official Observer
Audit Scotland	Kirsten Paterson	Project Officer - Official Observer
BERR	Wendy Kennedy	Director of Offshore Environment and Decommissioning - Exercise Sponsor
BERR	Colin Mulvana	Deputy to the SOSREP - Exercise Director and Director Reporting and Evaluation
BERR	Michael Reid	Senior Investigations Manager - Director Scenario Planning Team and Exercise Controller
BERR	Sarah Pritchard	Head of Offshore Environmental Operations
BERR	Nick Turton	Deputy Head of News
BERR	Philippa Heap	Press Officer
BERR	Craig Bunyan	Senior Manager Environmental Inspectorate - Exercise Evaluator
BERR	Derek Saward	Head of Environment Team
BERR	Steve Fraser	Offshore Environmental Inspector - Official Observer
BERR	Moira Langmuir	Offshore Environmental Inspector
BERR	Cara Moir	Senior Administrator Environmental Inspectorate
BERR	Audrey Banner	Manager - PILOT Secretariat Team - Official Observer
BP	Bernie Bennett	Crisis Manager North Sea SPU 'Advisor'
BP	Sonia Element	Crisis Management Advisor
BP	Steven Chafer	HSE Advisor, Andrew Platform
BP	Angela Dickson	HSE Advisor, Andrew Platform
BP	Steve Howarth	BP Andrew Platform Medic - Official Observer
BP	Derek Porter	Director of Group Crisis and Continuity Management - Official Observer
BP	Claudia Theil	Exercise Evaluator
BP	Luis Gonzalo	Exercise Evaluator
BP	Martin Cosker	Exercise Evaluator
Cabinet Office	Andy Holdsworth	Horizon Scanning and Response, Energy and Transport Team - Assistant Desk Officer - Official Observer

Central Office of Information	Peter Whitbread	Regional Director, COI News and PR South West and Wales - Exercise Evaluator
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA)	Lemszek Szymanski	Project Officer, Operational Activities Pollution Response - Official Observer
Fisheries Research Service (FRS)	Derek Moore	Head of Offshore Environmental Advice Group - Director Environment Group
Fisheries Research Service (FRS)	James McKie	Head of Environment Protection Group
Fisheries Research Service (FRS)	Colin Megginson	Environment Manager
Grampian Police	Ian Birnie	Chief Inspector, Operational Planning Department
Grampian Police	Fay Tough	Sergeant, Energy and Protective Security Unit
Grampian Police	James Urquhart	Superintendent, Operations Planning Department
Grampian Police	Colin Findlay	Inspector, Operational Planning Department
Grampian Police	Scott Forbes	Police Constable, Grampian Police Control Room - Official Observer
Grampian Police	Bruce Sinclair	Controller, Grampian Police Control Room - Official Observer
Health and Safety Executive (HSE)	Fraser Easton	HM Inspector of Health and Safety
Health and Safety Executive (HSE)	Ian Whewell	Acting Head of Division
Joint Nature Conservation Council (JNCC)	Zoe Crutchfield	Senior Offshore Advisor
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)	Peter Cardy	Chief Executive
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)	Hugh Shaw	Secretary of State's Representative (SOSREP) for Maritime Salvage and Intervention
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)	Toby Stone	Head of Counter Pollution and Response Branch
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)	Bill McFadyen	Regional Director Scotland and Northern Ireland

Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)	Mark Clark	Public Relations Manager - Director Media Group
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)	Iain Campbell	Offshore and Emergency Planning Officer Aberdeen - DiStaff
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)	Ian Burgess	Coastal Safety Manager North Scotland - Evaluator
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)	Gail Robertson	Logistics/Claims Officer - Exercise Controller
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)	Donald McDonald	Counter Pollution and Salvage Officer Wales & West of England - DiStaff
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)	Peter Wheeler	HM Coastguard Yarmouth - Evaluator
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)	James Instance	HM Coastguard Falmouth - Evaluator
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)	Sue Todd	Offshore Development Officer Aberdeen - Official Observer
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)	Bill Speirs	Coastal Safety Manager East Scotland – Official Observer
Northern Ireland Environment Agency (NIEA)	Claire Vincent	Principal - Marine Assessment and Team, Water Management Unit - Exercise Evaluator
Oil & Gas UK	Mick Borwell	Environmental Issues Manager
Oil & Gas UK	Stuart Kirk	Business Analyst - Official Observer
OSRL/EARL	Archie Smith	Chief Executive and Director - Official Observer
OSRL/EARL	Matt Simmons	Response Team Leader/Duty Manager
OSRL/EARL	Richard Sims	Operations Manager
OSRL/EARL	Sara Coates	Aberdeen Representative/Spill Response Specialist
OSRL/EARL	Emily Rowe	ERC Duty Manager Southampton
OSRL/EARL	Quek Qui Hui	Duty Manager - Official Observer
Petrofac Training	Andy Lang	Team Leader - DiStaff Controller
Petrofac Training	Chris Lightfoot	Project Manager - DiStaff Controller
Petrofac Training	Albert Thomson	Business Assurance Manager - DiStaff
Petrofac Training	Andy Anderson	Project Manager - DiStaff

Petrofac Training	Dave Cowling	Project Manager - DiStaff
Petrofac Training	Graham Brown	Project Manager - DiStaff
Petrofac Training	Lorne Colmar	Project Manager - DiStaff
Petrofac Training	Neil Fraser	Professional Services Manager - DiStaff
Petrofac Training	Ron Mudie	RPC Coordinator - DiStaff
Petrofac Training	Dave Cowling	Project Manager - DiStaff
Procurator Fiscals Office	Ernest Barbour	District Procurator Fiscal Oil and Gas, Aberdeen
Reconnaissance Ventures Limited (RVL)	Colin Dennis	Chairman and Managing Director - Official Observer
Reconnaissance Ventures Limited (RVL)	Peter Bucke	Coastguard Aircraft
Reconnaissance Ventures Limited (RVL)	Simon Jephcott	Maritime and Operations Manager
Reconnaissance Ventures Limited (RVL)	Stephen Hancock	Avionic Implementation Manager
Scottish Executive	Scott Miller	Emergency Response Manager, Policy and Community Safety Directorate
Scottish Executive	William Millar	Energy and Telecoms Resilience Executive
Scottish Executive	Bruce Stewart	Marine Management Division - Marine Strategy Branch
Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH)	John Baxter	Policy and Advice Manager
Scottish Resilience Development Service (ScoRDS)	John Craig	Exercise Manager
Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA)	Graham Low	Emergency Planning Advisor
Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA)	Bill Lyons	Emergency Planning Manager

Exercise Unicorn Foreword

The North Sea oil and gas industry adopts robust processes and procedures to assess and mitigate the risk of incidents and accidents associated with their offshore operations. However, even with such procedures in place it is not possible to fully eliminate the occurrence of unplanned incidents. It is therefore essential that planned responses to such offshore incidents must be fit for purpose. Key roles and responsibilities must be clearly identified and understood, and it is essential that all individuals concerned have a detailed knowledge of what is expected of them and their organisation. It is vital that the process of integrating different organisations with responsibilities for incident response is clearly defined and understood. Effective lines of communication must also be maintained throughout the incident, between all organisations involved.

Exercise Unicorn was designed to test all the above facets of incident response. It utilised a challenging scenario which incorporated a number of foreseeable risks, all of which have the potential to occur on and/or around offshore oil and gas production facilities. The scenario was designed to ensure that the national interest would be, or was likely to be, comprised and thus trigger the activation of the National Contingency Plan. The response from all organisations involved was measured, timely and effective in dealing with search and rescue issues and the overall containment of significant pollution. These actions ensured the protection of the shoreline and inshore waters, the Exercise Directing Staff were satisfied that had this been a real incident the response would have been appropriate and effective.

As expected, and indeed desired, a number of learning points were ascertained from Exercise Unicorn that can be directly applied to all incidents in the future. These learning points, taken from all the response organisations, are vital to the continued improvement and enhancement of incident response procedures.

The Exercise Directors acknowledge the hard work and professionalism employed by all participants and would like to thank the planning team for the months of preparation that ensured the successful execution of Exercise Unicorn.

Authors Note: Since the completion of Exercise Unicorn the Energy Group within the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform has been formed into a new Department, namely the Department of Energy and Climate Change. For the purpose of this report the former name is used throughout the document.

Glossary

ARCC	Aeronautical Rescue Co-ordination Centre
ARRC	Autonomous Rescue and Recovery Craft
BERR	Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (Department for)
BP	British Petroleum Exploration Operating Company Ltd.
BST	British Summer Time
CPR	Counter Pollution and Response Branch
CPSCO	Counter Pollution and Salvage Officer, MCA
DEFRA	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DfT	Department for Transport
ERC	Emergency Response Centre
ELO	Environment Liaison Officer
EMSA	European Maritime Safety Agency
EG	Environment Group
FPSO	Floating Production Storage and Offloading
FRS	Fisheries Research Services
GNN	Government News Network
HMCG	Her Majesty's Coastguard
HSE	Health and Safety Executive
IBR	Incident Briefing Room (BERR)
JNCC	Joint Nature Conservation Committee
MCA	Maritime and Coastguard Agency
MEIR	Marine Emergencies Information Room
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRC	Marine Response Centre
MRCC	Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre
NCP	National Contingency Plan
NORBRIT	Norway/United Kingdom Agreement for Counter Pollution Response
NOTAM	Notice to Airmen
OCU	Operations Control Unit
OIM	Offshore Installation Manager
OPRC	Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation Convention
OSRL/EARL	Oil Spill Response Limited / East Asia Response Limited
PCZ	Pollution Control Zone
POLREP	Pollution Report
RVL	Reconnaissance Ventures Limited
SAR	Search and Rescue
SG-MD	Scottish Government–Marine Directorate
SNH	Scottish Natural Heritage
SOSREP	Secretary of State's Representative for Maritime Salvage and Intervention
TDA	Temporary Danger Area
TEZ	Temporary Exclusion Zone
TFR	Temporary Flying Restrictions
UKCS	United Kingdom Continental Shelf
UTC	Universal Time Co-ordinate

1. Introduction

1.1 Offshore Brief

1.1.1 Oil and gas reserves were first discovered on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) during the 1960s. The successful production of these reserves presented unique challenges overcoming both technological and geographical difficulties.


1.1.2 Production reached a peak in 1999 and although it is now in decline, it is anticipated that oil production from the UKCS will continue for a further 40 years.

1.1.3 The production of oil and gas in such a hostile environment is not without risk, and in 2002 Exercise Discovery was planned as the oil and gas sector's first full scale national maritime emergency response exercise. This exercise was designed to assess the preparedness of the offshore oil and gas industry, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA), the Department for Business (BERR) (or the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) as it then was), various support agencies and relevant national, regional and local authorities to respond to a major offshore incident involving both Search & Rescue and the containment of significant pollution. Exercise Discovery was also designed to activate the National Contingency Plan.

1.1.4 The National Contingency Plan is maintained by the MCA and is exercised on an annual basis, focusing on shipping incidents. However, every five years the National Exercise will utilise a scenario which incorporates the offshore oil and gas industry. Hence in 2007 the planning of Exercise Unicorn began with the aim of testing the response of the Industry in 2008.

1.2 Purpose of the National Contingency Plan

1.2.1 The purpose of this plan is to ensure that there is a timely, measured and effective response to maritime incidents. The owners and masters of ships and the operators of offshore installations bear the primary responsibility for ensuring that they do not pollute the sea. Harbour authorities are likewise responsible for ensuring that their ports operate in a manner that avoids marine pollution and for responding to incidents within their limits. However, ships, offshore installations and harbour authorities may face problems that exceed the response capabilities that they can reasonably maintain and in these circumstances the MCA may need to use national assets in the response to a marine pollution incident.



1.2.2 The National Contingency Plan sets out the circumstances in which the MCA deploys the UK's national assets to respond to a marine pollution incident to protect the overriding public interest.

1.3 Exercise Description

1.3.1 Exercise Unicorn was designed to test the United Kingdom "National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution from Shipping and Offshore Installations" (Revised in 2006).

1.3.2 The Exercise was conducted in real time over a nine-hour period on Tuesday 10 June 2008. It incorporated elements of Search & Rescue and Counter Pollution and Containment, exercising the operational, tactical and strategic levels of the different organisations involved.

1.3.3 The incident was centred on, and in proximity to, the BP Andrew Installation in the Central North Sea. A number of onshore locations were also involved including BERR Energy Development Unit (Aberdeen), BP (Aberdeen and London), MCA (Aberdeen), FRS Marine Laboratory (Aberdeen), OSRL (Southampton), Grampian Police (Aberdeen), and the Procurator Fiscals Office (Aberdeen).

1.3.4 Several assets including the BP Andrew platform; a BP JigSaw helicopter; a MCA Search & Rescue helicopter; an OSRL-EARL/RVL

surveillance Cessna aircraft; and BP Autonomous Rescue and Recovery Craft (ARCC) participated for real. It was intended that the OSRL/EARL L382 (Hercules C130) aircraft would be deployed for dispersant spraying purposes but due to operational requirement the aircraft was deployed to an incident outwith the UKCS the day before the Exercise.



1.3.5 Exercise Unicorn involved more than 20 participating organisations, hundreds of incident response staff and networks of exercise controlling, directing and evaluating administrators.

1.4 Participants/Stakeholders

Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR)
 Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)
 BP Exploration Operating Company Ltd (BP)
 Fisheries Research Services (FRS)
 Oil Spill Response and East Asia Response Ltd (OSRL/EARL)
 Grampian Police
 Procurator Fiscal (PF)
 Health and Safety Executive, Offshore Division (HSE)
 Reconnaissance Ventures Limited (RVL)
 Scottish Executive
 Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH)
 Scottish Resilience Development Service (ScoRDS)
 Norwegian Coastal Authorities
 Petrofac Training

2. **Aims and Objectives**

2.1 **Introduction**

2.1.1 In 2002 Exercise Discovery realised 55 recommendations - these included, but were not restricted to, procedures, protocols, training, media handling, information dissemination, communication and equipment issues.

2.1.2 Some of the issues raised in the Discovery report were included in the aims and objections of participating organisations in an effort to rectify any previous deficiencies that had not already been addressed.

2.2 **Stakeholders**

2.2.1 Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR)

- Test the National Contingency Plan for marine pollution as it affects offshore installations;
- Test the effectiveness of BP's Oil Spill Contingency Plan;
- Ensure an integrated approach is achieved between BERR, MCA and other stakeholders in responding to a major pollution incident;
- Test the powers of intervention on behalf of the Secretary of State for BERR;
- Test the BERR media response, including liaison and deployment with MCA media personnel;
- Test the BERR Incident Response Manual to ensure a consistent and appropriate approach is undertaken and that it remains fit for purpose;
- Test the Unit's Staff in their roles and responsibilities in responding to a major incident through information management, communication and deployment of resources including manning of the Incident Briefing Room;
- Test the NORBRIT Agreement;
- Lessons learned from the Exercise to be shared with Oil and Gas UK Members as detailed within the Guidance Notes to Operators of Oil and Gas Installations on the Merchant Shipping (OPRC) Regulations, 1998.

2.2.2 Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)

- Exercise the required control cells for the incident;
- Exercise an appropriate SAR response;
- Exercise an appropriate pollution response;
- Exercise appropriate regional and national administrative support to a major incident;
- Exercise links and liaison between marine activities and land co-ordinating authorities;
- Exercise the links and liaison with the devolved administration;
- Test the NORBRIT agreement.

2.2.3 BP Exploration Operating Company Ltd (BP)

- Test the Oil Spill Contingency Plan (OSCP)
- Test new building capabilities;
- Test interfaces with OSRL;
- Test JigSaw (aerial surveillance);
- Test interfaces with SOSREP;
- Test wider elements of Business Support capability including HR and External Affairs Emergency Support Groups.

2.2.4 Secretary of State's Representative (SOSREP)

- Exercise the SOSREP function within Government in relation to a major incident involving an offshore installation;
- Establish an Operations Control Unit (OCU) in relation to a major incident involving an offshore installation;
- Exercise interaction between SOSREP, OCU and BP during response to a major incident.

2.2.5 Environment Group

- Exercise the setting up of an “Offshore” Environmental Group to advise national response units;
- Exercise liaison between the Environment Group and national response units;
- Develop the roles and responsibilities of the Environment Group.

2.2.6 Press Offices (MCA and BERR)

- Exercise the media response and co-ordination with other Government Departments, external agencies and stakeholders.

2.2.7 Oil Spill Response and East Asia Response Ltd (OSRL/EARL)

- Test the mobilisation process and interface with BP Crisis Team;
- Locate personnel (2) into BP Crisis Centre to familiarise them with the activities and processes;
- Utilise the Hercules and ADDS Pack spray system in support of dispersant operations;
- Utilise the RVL surveillance aircraft for spray spotter missions.

2.2.8 Health and Safety Executive, Offshore Division (HSE)

- Respond to the Exercise, on a basis of best endeavours, in line with HSE's major incident and investigations procedures and provide, when requested, advice on health and safety matter;
- Test the fitness for purpose of HSE's procedures, competency of HSE responders and make any necessary changes to improve the HSE's efficiency and effectiveness.
- Contribute towards an improved understanding and good working arrangements between all stakeholders.

2.2.9 Procurator Fiscal (PF)

- Exercise and evaluate integrated procedures for dealing with any casualties involved in a major incident;
- Exercise and evaluate the interface and liaison between the Procurator Fiscal and Grampian Police.

2.2.10 Grampian Police

- Test the flow of information from the principal responding agencies to Grampian Police via Police Liaison Officers.

Authors Note: The aims and objectives are duplicated at the beginning of the evaluation report on individual organisations; this is for ease of reference.

3. Planning and Preparation

3.1 Meetings/Briefings

Date	Group
24.07.2007	Steering Group
02.08.2007	Scenario Planning Group
21.08.2007	Steering Group
31.08.2007	First Stakeholder Multi-Agency Briefing
09.10.2007	Scenario Planning Group
02.11.2007	Scenario Planning Group
05.11.2007	Media Group
23.11.2007	Scenario Planning Group
08.12.2007	Scenario Planning Group
10.01.2008	Second Stakeholder Multi-Agency Briefing
01.02.2008	Scenario Planning Group
24.04.2008	BERR/MCA/Petrofac Training
28.04.2008	Steering Group
29.04.2008	Final Stakeholder Multi-Agency Briefing
30.04.2008	Scenario Planning Group
26.05.2008	Scenario Planning Group
09.06.2008	DiStaff Briefing
09.06.2008	Evaluators' Briefing

3.2 Roles and Responsibilities

3.2.1 Steering Group

Name	Role	Title/Organisation
Wendy Kennedy	Exercise Sponsor	Director of Offshore Environment and Decommissioning, BERR
Hugh Shaw	Exercise Project Manager	Secretary of State's Representative (SOSREP) for Maritime Salvage and Intervention
Colin Mulvana	Exercise Director	Deputy to the SOSREP BERR
Michael Reid	Director Scenario Planning Group/Exercise Controller	Senior Investigations Officer, BERR
Toby Stone	Head of Counter Pollution and Response Branch	Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)
Gail Robertson	Logistics/Claims Officer/Exercise Controller	Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)
Bernie Bennett	Crisis Manager North Sea SPU 'Advisor'	BP
Sonia Element	Crisis Manager Advisor	BP

3.2.2 Planning Team

Name	Role/Title	Organisation
Hugh Shaw	Project Manager	MCA
Michael Reid	Director Scenario Planning Group	BERR
Murray Wood	Administration and Communications	BERR
Steven Fraser	Offshore Environmental Inspector	BERR
Angela Dickson	HSE Advisor, Andrew Platform	BP
Bernie Bennett	Crisis Manager North Sea SPU 'Advisor'	BP
Sonia Element	Crisis Manager Advisor	BP
Steve Chafer	HSE Advisor, Andrew Platform	BP
Derek Moore	DiStaff Environment Group	Fisheries Research Services (FRS)
Gail Robertson	Exercise Controller	MCA
Mark Clark	Public Relations Manager - Director Media Group	MCA
Iain Campbell	Offshore and Emergency Planning Officer	MCA
Andy Lang	Team Leader	Petrofac Training
Chris Lightfoot	Director of Directing Staff	Petrofac Training

3.2.3 Directing Staff

Name	Role	Title/Organisation
Colin Mulvana	Exercise Director	Deputy to the SOSREP, BERR
Michael Reid	Exercise Controller	Senior Investigations Officer, BERR
Gail Robertson	Exercise Controller	CP Resource/Claims Lead, MCA
Andy Lang	DiStaff Controller	Team Leader, Petrofac Training
Chris Lightfoot	DiStaff Controller	Project Manager, Petrofac Training
Derek Moore	DiStaff Environment Group	Head of Offshore Energy Environmental Advice Group, F.R.S., Marine Lab.
Donald McDonald	DiStaff MCA-MRC	Counter Pollution & Salvage Officer, MCA
Iain Campbell	DiStaff MCA-MRCC	Offshore and Emergency Planning Officer, MCA
Albert Thomson	DiStaff BP Incident Management Team	Business Assurance Manager, Petrofac Training
Andy Anderson	DiStaff BP Human Resources Emergency Support Group	Project Manager, Petrofac Training
Dave Cowling	DiStaff Andrew Platform	Project Manager, Petrofac Training
Graham Brown	DiStaff BP External Affairs Emergency Support Group	Project Manager, Petrofac Training
Lorne Colmar	DiStaff BP Operations Command Unit	Project Manager, Petrofac Training
Neil Fraser	DiStaff BP Business Support Team	Professional Services Manager, Petrofac Training
Ron Mudie	DiStaff Role Playing Co-ordinator	RPC Coordinator, Petrofac Training

3.2.4 Evaluation Team


Name	Role/Location	Title/Organisation
Colin Mulvana	Director Reporting and Evaluation	Deputy to the SOSREP, BERR
Craig Bunyan	OCU/BP ERC	Senior Manager Environmental Inspectorate, BERR
Derek Saward	Incident Briefing Room, BERR	Head, Environmental Management Team, BERR
Claudia Theil	BP ERC	Crisis and Continuity Advisor – BP
Luis Gonzalo	BP ERC	Crisis and Continuity Advisor - BP
Martin Cosker	BP ERC	Crisis and Continuity Advisor - BP
Peter Whitbread	Media	Regional Director, COI News and PR, Central Office of Information
Claire Vincent	Environment Group	Marine Assessment and Licensing Team, Water Management Unit, Northern Ireland Environment Agency
Ian Burgess	MRC	Coastal Safety Manager, MCA
James Instance	MRCC	Watch Manager, HM Coastguard, Falmouth
Peter Wheeler	MRCC	Watch Manager, HM Coastguard Yarmouth

3.2.5 Observers

Name	Title	Organisation
Steve Fraser	Offshore Environmental Inspector – Tour Host	BERR
Audrey Banner	Manager PILOT Secretariat Team – Tour Guide	BERR
Beckie Lancaster	Project Manager	Audit Scotland
Kirsten Paterson	Project Officer	Audit Scotland
Derek Porter	Director of Group Crisis and Continuity Management	BP
Steve Chafer	HSE Advisor, Andrew Platform	BP
Steve Howarth	BP Andrew Platform Medic	BP
Andy Holdsworth	Horizon Scanning and Response, Energy and Transport Team Assistant Desk Officer	Cabinet Office
Leszek Szymanski	Project Officer, Operational Activities Pollution Response	European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA)
Bruce Sinclair	Controller, Grampian Police Force Control Room	Grampian Police
PC Scott Forbes	Grampian Police Force Control Room	Grampian Police
Bill Spiers	Coastal Safety Manager East Scotland	MCA
Sue Todd	Offshore Development Officer	MCA
Stuart Kirk	Business Analyst	Oil and Gas UK
Archie Smith	Chief Executive and Director	OSRL/EARL
Quek Qui Hui	Duty Manager	OSRL/EARL
Colin Dennis	Chairman and Group Managing Director	RVL Group

4. Scenario

4.1 The scenario was designed to meet the objectives of all participating organisations. It had to ensure there was a suitable search and rescue element and also ensure the occurrence of significant pollution. The scenario was developed to include “trigger” points that would activate the National Contingency Plan. Key positions and actions throughout the exercise were undertaken either by real assets and participants, or role played. Aircraft were actually flown and real surface vessels were utilised. Exercise Directing Staff were located within all participating groups and were tasked with ensuring the exercise remained on track, on schedule and provided suitable injects of information whenever required. The following summarises events that took place as Exercise Unicorn progressed.



4.2 At 07:00 BST a Russian registered fishing vessel, Berendina Hermina, with 10 persons on board gets into difficulties in the vicinity of the Farragon subsea wellheads, approximately 125 miles East Northeast of Aberdeen. These wells are tied back to the Andrew Platform, operated by BP. Communication with the trawler ascertains that they may have snagged nets on the subsea wellheads and have injured crewmen on board.

4.3 BP mobilises its own rescue and surveillance helicopter (Bond 1) from the Miller Platform to the scene; surface rescue vessels are also dispatched.

4.4 HM Coastguard Search & Rescue helicopter (R102) is also tasked from Sumburgh, Shetland Islands.

4.5 The fishing vessel capsizes and Bond 1 rescues all the crew members from the sea. It also reports that an oil slick is visible in the immediate vicinity; the casualties are transferred to the Andrew Platform.

4.6 The Andrew Platform reports that it has shut down production due to anomalies with pressure readings from the subsea wellheads. They are unable to shut down the Farragon wells and they remain free flowing. A request is made for a pollution surveillance aircraft to be mobilised and dispersant spraying aircraft to be prepared.


4.7 The capsized fishing vessel drifts towards the Andrew Platform. A decision is made to down-man non-essential personnel. Aircraft Bond 1 is required to evacuate three seriously injured crew members from the fishing vessel to hospital onshore. Report from the routine crew change helicopter (88 Alpha) en-route to Andrew Platform, confirms that the oil slick is growing in size.



4.8 88 Alpha reports engine failure and carries out a controlled ditching with 21 passengers and crew onboard. Coastguard helicopter R102 arrives on scene and commences rescue operations. All personnel are recovered from the sea.

4.9 ARRCs report from Farragon area stating that oil continues to bubble to the surface and the slick continues to grow.

4.10 The capsized fishing vessel continues to drift and narrowly misses the Andrew platform.



4.11 The whole of the scenario utilised events that could all potentially occur as a result of offshore oil and gas operations, although admittedly they are unlikely to all take place concurrently.

4.12 The scenario contained triggers designed to activate the National Contingency Plan (NCP), despatch BERR's Environmental Inspector to BP's ERC, mobilise the Secretary of State's Representative (SOSREP) and to establish an Operations Control Unit (OCU). Other cells as described in the NCP such as the Environment Group and Marine Response Centre would also be established. The effectiveness of communications within and between all participant organisations and cells was rigorously tested.

5. Post Exercise

5.1 Wash-ups and Debriefs

Date	Type	Location
10.06.2008	Hot wash-ups	Response Cells
11.06.2008	DiStaff/Evaluator Debrief	BERR, Atholl House, Aberdeen
11.06.2008	Stakeholder Multi-agency De-Brief	Carmelite Hotel, Aberdeen

5.1.1 Hot wash-ups were conducted by response cells immediately after the end of the exercise in order to provide initial feedback from response staff to the DiStaff and other members of their cells to reflect how they felt the exercise went.

5.1.2 The DiStaff/Evaluator debrief was conducted on the morning after the exercise. Its purpose was to provide DiStaff and Evaluators with the opportunity to feed back some of their immediate observations and to record initial findings in preparation for the Stakeholder Debrief scheduled for later that day.

5.1.3 Later the same day a formal presentation detailing the initial findings was made to a wider audience comprising Stakeholders, Senior Personnel and other Exercise participants.

5.2 Draft Reports

Date	Meeting	Location	Attendees
23.06.2008	Strategy	BERR, Atholl House	Colin Mulvana, Murray Wood, Steve Fraser
24.06.2008	Strategy Review	BERR, Atholl House	Colin Mulvana, Murray Wood, Steve Fraser
31.07.2008 01.08.2008	1 st Draft Report produced	BERR, Atholl House	Colin Mulvana, Murray Wood, Steve Fraser
05.08.2008	1 st Draft issued for comments	BERR, Atholl House; MCA Southampton	Hugh Shaw, Wendy Kennedy, Michael Reid, Toby Stone.
18.08.2008	Draft Review	BERR, Atholl House	Colin Mulvana, Steve Fraser, Michael Reid, Wendy Kennedy, Hugh Shaw
05.09.2008	2 nd Draft issued for comments	BERR, Atholl House; MCA Southampton	Hugh Shaw, Wendy Kennedy, Michael Reid, Toby Stone.
04.11.2008	2nd Draft review	BERR, Atholl House	Colin Mulvana, Steve Fraser, Michael Reid, Murray Wood
28.11.2008	3 rd Draft review	BERR, Atholl House	Colin Mulvana & Steve Fraser
05.01.2009	4 th Draft review	BERR, Atholl House	Colin Mulvana
	Report signed off		
	Final Report published and distributed		

6. **Evaluation**

6.1 **General**

6.1.1 The Evaluators were carefully selected for their experience and knowledge in their chosen field, their expertise was fully utilised in order to obtain a full, accurate and honest account of how response cells and individuals reacted, and whether their respective roles and responsibilities were fulfilled.

6.1.2 A generic exercise evaluation template was the selected method of reporting and consisted of seven activities, i.e. SAR. To assist the evaluators, each organisation's aims and objectives were listed against each activity and included check boxes titled, "Fully", "Part" and "Not". These referred to whether, in the evaluators' opinion, the organisation achieved their aims and objectives and to what degree.

6.1.3 Tasks for each operational cell were identified and listed in groups of up to six. The evaluation team ascertained whether these tasks were completed. Check boxes were placed adjacent to the tasks, similar to those which accompanied the aims and objectives. An additional box of "Not Applicable" was introduced as not all areas within the task groups were being exercised. In addition, an area for the evaluators' comments was included under the task groups to ensure accuracy of reporting.

6.1.4 By creating the template it ensured that the evaluation team's assessment was standardised. It had a common theme and was instantly recognisable by the team compiling the final report.

6.1.5 The evaluators' comments have been summarised in this report.

6.2 **Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR)**

6.2.1 The aims and objectives.

- Test the National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution as it affects Offshore Installations;
- Test the effectiveness of BP's Oil Spill Contingency Plan;
- Ensure an integrated approach is achieved between BERR, MCA and other stakeholders in responding to a major pollution incident;
- Test the powers of intervention on behalf of the Secretary of State for BERR;
- Test the BERR media response, including liaison and deployment with MCA media personnel;

- Test the BERR Incident Response Manual to ensure a consistent and appropriate approach is undertaken and that it remains fit for purpose;
- Test the Unit's Staff in their roles and responsibilities in responding to a major incident through information management, communication and deployment of resources including manning of the Incident Briefing Room;
- Test the NORBRIT Agreement;
- Lessons learned from the Exercise to be shared with Oil and Gas UK Members as detailed within the Guidance Notes to Operators of Oil and Gas Installations on the Merchant Shipping (OPRC) Regulations, 1998.

6.3 Incident Briefing Room (IBR)

6.3.1 The evaluators' assessment concluded that the aims and objectives applicable to the IBR were achieved in part or in full.

6.3.2 A number of BERR objectives did not form part of the IBR function and therefore it could not be ascertained if these objectives were met during the exercise. These included:

- Test the effectiveness of BP's Oil Spill Contingency Plan;
- Test the NORBRIT Agreement;
- Test the powers of intervention on behalf of the Secretary of State for BERR.

6.3.3 The above objectives were fully achieved through BERR personnel participating within the OCU.

6.3.4 Summary of Incident Briefing Room Evaluation Report

The Incident Briefing Room (IBR) was quickly and effectively established following notification of the incident and all staff involved were adequately trained and knowledgeable with regard to their roles and responsibilities within the IBR. Both leadership and teamwork within the IBR was effective.

6.3.5 The effectiveness of the IBR was hampered by the functionality of equipment. Remote laptop connections were unreliable or failed completely thereby limiting communications, whilst the use of mobile telephones effectively made IBR telephones redundant. A review of IT equipment and data recording facilities is recommended.

6.3.6 During the initial stages of the incident the IBR was required and played an important part in the incident response. However, once the OCU had been established the role of the IBR diminished and the usefulness of staff working within the IBR became questionable.

6.4 Maritime and Coastguard Agency

6.4.1 The aims and objectives:

- Exercise the required control cells for the incident;
- Exercise an appropriate SAR response;
- Exercise an appropriate pollution response;
- Exercise appropriate regional and national administrative support to a major incident;
- Exercise links and liaison between marine activities and land co-ordinating authorities;
- Exercise the links and liaison with the devolved administration;
- Test the NORBRIT Agreement.

6.5 MRCC Aberdeen

6.5.1 The evaluators' assessments overall concluded that the aims and objectives applicable to the MRCC were achieved in full with one exception:

“To exercise appropriate regional and national administrative support to a major incident”.



6.5.2 Summary of MRCC Evaluation Report

Due to the artificial nature of the exercise the above objective was not tested, comments ascertaining to this item can be found in comments on the activities of the MRC.

6.5.3. The information gathering by the operations room team was good; the computerised Vision system was used effectively and updated on a regular

basis. Broadcast action was initiated providing details of the incident to mariners.

6.5.4 The information received was assessed and evaluated, search plans were developed utilising the MCA Search & Rescue Information System (SARIS) determining the appropriate resources to be tasked to the scene, the search area plans were adaptable and extended as necessary. A second SARIS terminal was activated and utilised for the helicopter ditching element of the exercise.

6.5.5 Communication with the JigSaw helicopter was good, however, the MCA helicopter, R102, is not fitted with HF radio and therefore had no direct contact with the Operations Room, to facilitate the transmission of search instructions and briefings. This is considered a major concern and rectification is, apparently, unlikely to be dealt with until 2012.

6.5.6 Other communication issues were highlighted. The MRC was housed adjacent to the MRCC yet the information flow was inconsistent; for example, updates on the extent of the pollution were not passed to the Operations room.

6.5.7 It appeared that the MRCC was not informed of the decisions and actions taken by the OCU, in particular the appropriate establishment of a Temporary Exclusion Zone (TEZ).

Author's Note: MCA did not task a Coastguard Liaison Officer to the OCU. The CPSO should therefore have provided the communications link to other cells. SITREPs were completed and should have been received by other cells as directed by the CPSO.

6.5.8 Following discussion between the Rescue Co-ordination Centre Manager (RCCM) and the MRC, a TEZ was prepared by the Operations Room. The Operations Room was unable to broadcast details of the TEZ as the MRC is not authorised to give permission.

Author's Note: A TEZ can only be established by the SOSREP or person acting on his authority. On this occasion a TEZ was not deemed necessary and therefore not established.

6.5.9 The incident was controlled effectively by the Watch Manager and though initially slow to brief the team, subsequent briefings were very strong, including those to the Duty Area Officer (DAO). The watch team members displayed competency and were able to work independently without guidance in an appropriate and effective manner. Information was continually sought throughout the incident and the team was able to adapt in what was a challenging and changing scenario.



6.6 Marine Response Centre (MRC)

6.6.1 The evaluators' assessment concluded that the aims and objectives applicable to the MRC were achieved in full with two exceptions:

“To exercise links and liaison between marine activities and land co-ordinating authorities”

This task was achieved with at sea resources only, and :

“To exercise appropriate regional and national administrative support to a major incident”.



6.6.2 Summary of MRC Evaluation Report

There was no regional support to the exercise, rooms were not set up and stationery was not readily available.

Author's Note: It is not certain whether the MCA Scotland and Northern Ireland Region was advised of the requirement for an MRC to be established which would require Administrative Support. If not, then it is considered a missed opportunity,

6.6.3 Communications with the MRCC and OCU were initially poor but improved as the exercise progressed.

6.6.4 The initial alert provided information in order to determine the Tier level and extent of the pollution, and consideration was given to activating the Marine Emergency Information Room (MEIR) and the National Contingency Plan.

6.6.5 Minutes of meetings at the OCU, or at least the actions that may impact on the MRC, were not passed on or were not received, nor were the MRC communications with the OCU considered robust enough to ensure good information flow.

6.6.6 For the purposes of test sprays by the Cessna the operations room established a TDA which would remain in force for the full spraying by the Hercules. A TEZ could have been established by the SOSREP if required.

6.6.7 A good assessment was made of the number of sorties, day and night; this was only after the MRC took operational control later in the day. Exercise artificiality caused some confusion at times, however the EG, FRS and others were passing mixed messages with regard to spraying. The MRC took control and made the decision whether to conduct spraying operations.

6.6.8 Environmental Liaison Officer (ELO) suggested mechanical oil recovery operations as opposed to aerial spraying. This was disregarded at first by the MRC due to resource implications but reassessed after it was discovered that the spill was on course for Norwegian waters.

6.6.9 There was a good incident control handover from BP to the MCA with good authoritative style displayed. There was good teamwork within the MRC but considered to be poorer between groups. Regular structured briefings were held to discuss updates on the situation and proposed actions.

6.6.10 Overall the MRC proved its effectiveness in dealing with pollution response and dissemination of appropriate resources.

6.7 BP

6.7.1 The aims and objectives:

- Test the Oil Spill Contingency Plan (OSCP)
- Test new building capabilities;
- Test interfaces with OSRL;
- Test JigSaw (aerial surveillance);
- Test interfaces with SOSREP;
- Test wider elements of Business Support capability including HR and External Affairs Emergency Support Groups;

6.7.2 Emergency Response Centre (ERC)

The evaluators' assessment concluded that the aims and objectives applicable to the ERC were achieved in full.

6.7.3 Summary of ERC Report - Internal Summary (BP)

The BP ERC incident response was assessed as being generally positive. All units; Incident Management Team (IMT), Business Support Team (BST), Human Resources External Support Group (HR ESG) and Communications and External Affairs Group (C&EA) responded and were established as required. Teams promptly assembled in a clear and organised manner except for the HR ESG which experienced a slightly delayed response in establishing itself.

6.7.4 Facilities and resources were excellent in the IMT room but it was noted the BST room was too small for requirements.

6.7.5 Good leadership style was shown by all the team leaders, very authoritative and decisive, resulting in teams going about their business effectively. All staff exhibited competence and were clear as to their roles and responsibilities. Teams appeared to possess good business knowledge which helped to assess and address the incident response well.

6.7.6 There was good teamwork and support throughout. Time-outs and review meetings were very efficient and well managed. The mid-day handover between BST teams was (unlike the IMT handover) not smooth and it was suggested that a formal handover procedure would be required.

6.7.7 The action list was not utilised in the IMT during the morning period resulting in the IMT Manager and individuals tracking all actions of their own accord. It was concluded that this state of affairs was not good practice and required attention. Maintaining and updating incident logs and status

boards was effective in both IMT and BST. The use of the incident log/prompt sheets and the timeline on the whiteboard in the IMT for tracking asset movements was well maintained.

6.7.8 The information flow between the IMT and BST was conducted via runners resulting in good information exchange. However on at least one occasion details were not correctly transmitted to the BST. It was suggested that a formal report be considered to ensure the quality of information between teams. Information flow out of the BST was poor therefore with Situation Reports (SITREPs) and Major Incident Announcements (MIA) were not issued to Head of Country (HOC) or BP Regional Crisis Centre, Sunbury (BPRCC). Holding statements and press releases were issued at appropriate times.

6.7.9 Good communications were established with Stakeholders including SOSREP, MCA, OSRL/EARL and JigSaw. No major problems were encountered. There were good communication links between JigSaw, the aviation section in the IMT and the Coastguard. The HR ESG responded effectively with “good attitude” to next of kin enquiries; a telephone number for relatives was released just three hours after the incident started.

6.7.10 Initial plotting of the position of the incident and extent of the pollution was not evaluated and it was only after some hours of monitoring that the extent and volume of the spill was appreciated. There was good liaison with the OSRL/EARL representative in the IMT and good linkages (from IMT) into MCA.

6.7.11 To conclude, the new BP facilities tested well with no obvious issues; the leadership and management were excellent and teams responded and performed professionally. Some weaknesses relating to accommodation, the internal practices, procedures and synergies of Business Support Group operations and their business capability when responding to an offshore incident were identified, and several suggestions for improvements made.

6.7.12 Summary of ERC Evaluation Report - External Summary (BERR)

Once notified of the incident BP staff responded promptly and efficiently established the ERC. The staff were aware of their roles and responsibilities and the Incident Response Manager quickly assumed control of the situation.

6.7.13 IMT staff performed extremely well to assess and respond to health and safety issues but there did not appear to be the same level of response with regard to environmental concerns. Information was being gathered and collated but was not effectively assessed. As a result, insufficient environmental information was provided to the IMT Manager which limited their ability to determine an effective environmental response strategy.



6.7.14 BP established an Environmental Support Group (ESG) in order to provide additional resources to the ERC. At times the ESG did not appear to be fully aware of its role and there was a lack of understanding as to the contents of, and the procedures within, the Oil Spill Contingency Plan. Information passing between the IMT and the Environmental Support Group was being lost or misinterpreted which hampered the formulation of an appropriate response.

6.7.15 This became evident upon the arrival of the BERR Environmental Inspector, representing the SOSREP, who did not receive a structured brief of the current situation.

6.7.16 The understanding of the ERC with regard to the function, roles and responsibilities of the SOSREP, BERR and the MCA was very limited. On one occasion an IMT Manager attempted to keep OCU staff out of the ERC. As a result information flow and communication between BP and the responding authorities was ineffective.

Authors Note: This may be a consequence of a change of full IMT personnel. New personnel were unsure as to the identity of the BERR Inspector and consequently she was asked to leave the room. It should be ensured that anyone entering the ERC introduces themselves, or are introduced to, the IMT Manager.

6.7.17 BP did not appear to be aware that the SOSREP/OCU required information in order to establish whether the pollution response was being effectively managed. They also failed to provide effective liaison between BP and the SOSREP. Time was lost during the exercise due to this lack of understanding. Additional learning is required to enable BP staff to fully understand the roles and responsibilities of the SOSREP/OCU which would undoubtedly strengthen their incident response.

6.8 Secretary of State's Representative (SOSREP)

6.8.1 The aims and objectives:

- Exercise the SOSREP function within Government in relation to a major incident involving an offshore installation;
- Establish an Operations Control Unit (OCU) in relation to a major incident involving an offshore installation;
- Exercise interaction between SOSREP, OCU and BP during a major incident response.

6.8.2 Operations Control Unit (OCU)

The evaluators' assessment concluded that the aims and objectives applicable to the OCU were achieved in full.

6.8.3 Summary of OCU Evaluation Report

The BERR Inspector efficiently gathered and assessed the initial incident details and successfully mobilised to the ERC.

6.8.4 On arrival at the ERC, the BERR Inspector was not effectively briefed. This briefing would have been more comprehensive had the Inspector been introduced to the main environmental contact and the IMT Manager. The Inspector could have then provided a brief overview of the role and requirements of the SOSREP/OCU.



6.8.5 Consideration should be given to creating an “aide memoir” to assist the Inspector in gathering the information required by the SOSREP.

6.8.6 The size of the room provided to accommodate the OCU it was just fit for purpose. As a result, the SOSREP did not have direct communication with the OCU administration support staff who were located elsewhere. It was therefore difficult for support staff to maintain records and status boards within the OCU.

6.8.7 Problems with IT equipment also hampered OCU effectiveness.

6.8.8 Leadership and teamwork within the OCU was highly effective.

6.9 Environment Group (EG)

6.9.1 The aims and objectives:

- Exercise the setting up of an Offshore Environmental Group to advise national response units;
- Exercise liaison between the Environment Group and National Response Units;
- Develop the roles and responsibilities of the Environment Group.

6.9.2 The evaluators' overall assessment concluded that the aims and objectives applicable to the EG were met in full.



6.9.3 Summary of the EG Evaluation Report

Liaison with the MRC and OCU was established quickly and an Environment Liaison Officer (ELO) nominated. The ELO waited for an invitation to attend the MRC, it should be considered important that they make early contact and be pro-active in providing views from the EG on proposals for spill response.

6.9.4 POLREP distribution appeared to be slow. Important information should be distributed without delay to enable the group to provide an accurate assessment.

6.9.5 When assessing the environmental risks there were concerns that some steps were overlooked. For example although mackerel spawning ground and nephrops fisheries were identified they appeared to be disregarded almost immediately. It is suggested that these sensitivities should have been taken into consideration due to the use of dispersants, even for a test spray.

6.9.6 The Environment Group communicated effectively with all units throughout the exercise.

6.9.7 Hand written minutes and other information transcribed onto flip charts seemed laborious. Such record keeping could be completed electronically and printed periodically for wall chart to enable all members of the group to access and read the information and proposals.

6.9.8 Teamwork within the EG was considered excellent. There was good interaction within the team, good structured briefings, the location of the EG was good and facilities were fit for purpose. Leadership was authoritative but with a calm and relaxed style putting everyone at ease; thereby getting the most out of the group.

6.9.9 The creation and use of one e-mail address for receiving all correspondence effectively allowed all team members to view the messages rather than relying on an individual to disseminate the information.

6.10 Press Office

6.10.1 The aims and objectives:

- To exercise the media response and co-ordination with other Government Departments, external agencies and stakeholders.

6.10.2 The evaluators' assessment concluded that the aims and objectives applicable to the Press Office were achieved in full.



Author's note: An excellent and very comprehensive Media Handling Report has been provided. However, it is considered too extensive to be included in this document and has therefore been summarised below; the full report will be distributed to the MCA and BERR Press Offices.

6.10.3 Summary of Press Office Evaluation Report

6.10.3.1 Facilities

6.10.3.1.1 Facilities for the pseudo media were excellent.

6.10.3.1.2 There was ample room to establish both a conference facility and, should this have been acted upon, a media briefing centre.

6.10.3.1.3 Wi-fi access, telephones etc worked well and staff were able to carry out a full range of duties. At some points Wi-fi could not cope with the amount of traffic but that portrayed a real time situation.

6.10.3.1.4 A Media Briefing Centre as such was never set up. Questions should be raised as to who forms a media briefing cell and at what time.

6.10.3.1.5 MCA, BERR and BP communication members were on site both in the BP HQ and in MCA's case at the Leisure Centre. The two groups never met to discuss tactics, to agree procedures and protocols, to establish press conferences and many other issues.

6.10.3.2 Initial Information

6.10.3.2.1 MCA put out an early press holding statement and it is believed that BP also put out a statement (although it was not sighted until later).

6.10.3.2.2 MCA press liaison with the pseudo media was excellent. Due to exercise artificiality and in discussion with MCA Press afterwards it was felt that for this type of incident (no casualties, limited Coastguard involvement in SAR after the initial stages) it could be have been handled from Southampton with possibly one press officer flying to Aberdeen to co-ordinate.

6.10.3.2.3 The above was demonstrated to best effect when the Head of MCA Press made the decision to split the calls on SAR and Pollution between his team in Aberdeen and the staff in Southampton.

6.10.3.2.4 The BERR press officer was new to this type of work and after some initial problems benefited from participation in the exercise.

6.10.3.2.5 It was of concern that no proper action log was maintained by either the MCA team, BERR or BP. Individuals were writing on scraps of paper and notebooks and the information could not easily be shared.

6.10.3.2.6 I would recommend that the MCA and BERR look at putting in place instructions to provide a proper record keeping and logging system for all emergencies. However as no electronic recording system was present I would have expected the production of a paper trail. Briefing notes and Press Releases should also be added sequentially to this file. This would eliminate many of the duplications and potential misunderstandings when dealing with the media.

6.10.3.3 Communications

6.10.3.3.1 MCA put out relevant press releases in both SAR and oil spill phases. Due to exercise artificiality they were limited on what they could release.

6.10.3.3.2 BP statements were put out quickly in the morning and then there appeared to be nothing further. BP caused a potentially damaging situation by issuing a press release that contained a serious factual inaccuracy.

6.10.3.3.3 The press conference became the victim of Exercise artificiality, coming too late in the day for the Search & Rescue phase and too early for the oil spill/pollution phase.

6.10.3.3.4 As the media-briefing centre was never established there was minimal consultation between BERR, MCA and BP press officers on the content of the event. In fact it was the MCA team who based themselves in the Exel Centre, set up the venue, and organised the media. The BP team were nowhere in evidence until the actual conference.

6.10.3.4 Teamwork

6.10.3.4.1 It is a concern that BERR did not provide sufficient enough press resource for this exercise. The press officer in question was put under pressure from the start and received little support apart from the BP team with whom they were based. BERR should have been alongside the MCA and this should be noted and acted upon in future.

6.10.3.5 Pseudo Media

6.10.3.5.1 This was provided by Crown Media with some support from COI News and PR (North East Office). The team based at the Exel Leisure Centre was supported by Crown Media and COI staff phoning in remotely from

other places in England to give the press officers in participating organisations a realistic taste of intensive activity.

6.10.3.5.2 The pseudo media team handled everything very well. They did not go over the top when met by stonewalling from BP or when receiving contradictory information.

6.10.3.5.3 Crown Media felt the exercise went well from their point of view. They felt that MCA handled media enquiries and gave relevant interviews in an efficient and timely manner.

6.10.3.5.4 The pseudo media found BP to be, in the main, singularly unhelpful and unforthcoming. Even when they had rescued the crew from the vessel they sought not to make play of this and refused to put anyone up for interview. At one point BP actually stopped answering the phones and the media were left with no information - having to try and piece together strands from other sources but failing to have these corroborated by the BP team.

6.10.3.5.5 There was a key incident when the media went to the MCA at Blaikies Quay and got into the operations room without being stopped and started filming.

6.10.3.6 Equipment

6.10.3.6.1 Reference was made to logging calls and providing a proper briefing system elsewhere, for an organisation that is geared to crisis and emergency response there was a lack of connectivity and compatibility of IT equipment for the media teams.

6.10.3.6.2 The BERR press officer had no equipment apart from a mobile phone. This was a serious deficiency as they were neither able to connect with their parent office, receive e-mails from any of the players or write briefing material.

6.10.3.7 Summary of Main Recommendations

- In future participating organisations must exercise a joint media briefing centre to optimise the value of the exercise and to test contingency plans;
- A proper electronic and paper logging system be introduced to ensure consistency of media messages and to speed up media response;
- BERR media staff should be better resourced and briefed to deal with the intensive demands of handling crisis response in the field;
- Press conferences should be relevant and timely. This press conference came too late for search & rescue and too early for oil spill. It must also be exercised and run by a category one responder under the Civil Contingencies Act;

- Copy produced by the pseudo media including TV, radio and paper must be conveyed to the senior officials quickly so they can see how the media are reporting the incident.
- A full scale media only exercise is produced within the next two to three years to properly test the communications function, media relations, warning and informing messages;
- Both MCA and BERR media emergency planning equipment to be thoroughly reviewed. All media officers should have equipment appropriate to dealing with a major emergency in a situation remote from their offices.

7. Other Evaluation and Comments

Although not officially evaluated, the following participants were invited to contribute to the report.

7.1 **European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA)**

7.1.1 A Project Officer, Operational Activities Pollution Response, representing EMSA, commented that:

“Exercise Unicorn was, in my opinion, a very well prepared and very well conducted exercise. It was unusual that most parts of the Exercise ran in accordance with the planned timetable. The professionalism and good preparedness of the DiStaff and participants was both good and visible. It was a perfect floor for a test of communication and information exchange, as well for the media response on their respective level”.

7.2 **Oil Spill Response and East Asia Response Limited (OSRL/EARL)**

7.2.1 The aims and objectives:

- Test the mobilisation process and interface with BP Crisis Team;
- Locate personnel (2) into BP Crisis Centre to familiarise them with the activities and processes;
- Utilise the Hercules and ADDS Pack spray system in support of dispersant operations;
- Utilise the RVL surveillance aircraft for spray spotter missions.



7.2.2 OSRL/EARL Aberdeen Representative/Spill Response Specialist has confirmed that objectives were achieved and made the following comments in relation to the exercise:

“The BP internal communication routes the practical elements and mobilisation was good.

The aircraft mobilisation forms were completed and sent to the correct number, they were duly signed by a person (position) nominated on the call out authority list held by OSRL/EARL, the data from live downloads was operational and utilised for verification of the spill location.

The notification spill report was missing; having this document would save time later for OSRL/EARL as the information on the report is needed when responding to a call-out. However it would not prevent OSRL/EARL from officially being mobilised. The report is a good source of information to assist in the decision to allow the correct equipment to be deployed.

No physical dispersant spraying was carried out, the L382 (Hercules C130) aircraft was mobilised to attend a real incident. During the exercise there was confusion as to whether permission to spray had been granted or not.

There were some communications errors which could have been due to the exercise artificiality but a more formalised reporting structure with the Environment Group should be looked into to help prevent this. This would feed the relevant information back up to the IMT and inform the EG when decisions have been made.

Different times were being used by different organisations. It may benefit each organisation by having a clearly labelled clock set to UTC.

The IMT room was calm and well managed by the incident commanders.

The MRC appeared to be lacking in equipment, white boards, IT equipment and logs.

Security for the building was found to be inadequate.”

7.3 Grampian Police

7.3.1 The aims and objectives:

- Test the flow of information from the principal responding agencies to Grampian Police via Police Liaison Officers.

7.3.2 Grampian Police raised the following points resulting from the exercise:

“MCA liaison - officers were made to feel very welcome and enjoyed participating in the exercise, difficulty was experienced setting up a fax link between the MCA and BP ERC, it is unclear if the numbers provided were correct or if there was a technical problem.

The time used by the MCA is UTC; this caused some confusion when the ETA for the aircraft was passed.

BP liaison - the main issue arising from the exercise was the lack of fax facility between exercise control and Aberdeen Coastguard, fax numbers for both were initially provided in the exercise instructions, as well as additional numbers being provided by a Police Officer as the day unfolded. It later transpired the fax facility was inoperative in the ESG (HR) arm of the BP facility by the end of the afternoon, meaning ALL fax communications (not just those to the Coastguard) were lost.

Observers - two observers from the Force Control Room felt their day was extremely beneficial and they were very well treated at each location they attended.

Force Control Room - no issues expressed other than the time zone being used by the MCA, a good link was established between FCR/MCA/BP.

A Multi Task Incident for the pollution incident was activated and a task was located to notify DTI, this has been updated to reflect the change in name to BERR.

7.4 Procurator Fiscal (PF)

7.4.1 The aims and objectives:

- Exercise and evaluate integrated procedures for dealing with any casualties involved in a major incident;
- Exercise and evaluate the interface and liaison between the Procurator Fiscal and Grampian Police.

7.4.2 The Procurator Fiscal’s (PF) Office was informed of progress as necessary. If required the PF would have attended Grampian Police Force Operations and Co-ordinating Centre in person however the Exercise Unicorn Scenario did not develop to an extent requiring that level of participation.

7.5 Health and Safety Executive (HSE)

7.5.1 The aims and objectives:

- To respond to the Exercise, on a basis of best endeavours, in line with HSE’s major incident and investigations procedures and provide, when requested, advice on health and safety matters;
- To test the fitness for purpose of HSE’s procedures, competency of HSE responders and make any necessary changes to improve the HSE’s efficiency and effectiveness.
- To contribute towards an improved understanding and good working arrangements between all stakeholders.

7.5.2 HM Inspector of Health and Safety notified that:

“The HSE found that participation in Exercise Unicorn provided a very useful test of their response arrangements”.

7.6 Reconnaissance Ventures Limited (RVL)

7.6.1 RVL’s Survey personnel participated in Exercise Unicorn as advisor for the MCA as required under contractual obligations and with the operation of the Cessna 310 surveillance aircraft under the direction of OSRL/EARL for BP.

7.6.2 During the exercise, a number of observations were made by the RVL aviation advisor to the MCA and are detailed below:

- The flow of information to the assembled parties (for the MCA) appeared to be continuous and satisfactory in content and timeliness;
- Set up of the command centre appeared to be restricted by the availability of resources (charts, telephones, display boards);
- Local Coastguard liaison was very willing to assist;
- Set up of restricted areas (with regards to airspace and sea area) was disjointed and appeared complicated for restriction of sea area. Airspace co-ordination was set up with a fax and a phone call to Kinloss whilst sea area restrictions required SOSREP approval;
- POLREPs from the different organisations were not co-ordinated and confusion occurred over POLREP currency and accuracy. Recommend a method of cataloguing POLREPs be considered;
- Co-ordination of aviation assets was unreliable and difficult due to the use of SAR, OSRL/EARL and the MCA Counter Pollution Assets. The co-ordination of the OSRL/EARL aircraft with the MCA Counter Pollution team was only possible due to the nature of the exercise and that the OSRL/EARL Hercules was not available.

7.6.3 In conclusion, Exercise Unicorn appeared to be an overall success that was of benefit to the staff at the RVL Group. However, a number of minor suggestions would enable potential co-ordination issues to be overcome and allow for an incident to be monitored and controlled with the minimum of confusion and loss of valuable time.

7.7 Secretary of State’s Representative (SOSREP)

7.7.1 SOSREP has advised that, in accordance with the National Contingency Plan (NCP), when the scale of the situation became known a decision was made to establish an OCU. When activated an OCU has a number of functions, however, primarily it is established to enable the SOSREP to monitor the Operator’s response or proposed response at first hand.

7.7.2 The SOSREP has to be reassured that the actions being taken, or being proposed by the Operator, are in the best interests of the environment, the UK and any adjacent coastal states.

7.7.3 To facilitate this process the OCU comprises a small group of specified persons who alone can represent key interests such as the Operator, Insurance and other interests in the installation, and environmental agencies.

7.7.4 The Operator will normally have two representatives. The Emergency Operations Manager (EOM) provides the operational link between the SOSREP, the Emergency Response Centre (ERC) and the Offshore Installations Manager (OIM) and the Operator Representative (Op Rep) who represents the Company at strategic/corporate level and will provide the link between the SOSREP and the Crisis Management Team. The Op Rep should have a strategic view of the Operators’ interests rather than a technical background and will, for example, advise on liability, corporate and any other stakeholder issues.

7.7.5 Prior to commencement of the initial OCU meeting, BP advised that they had made a decision “not” to exercise the above and that they would be represented by a single person who would cover the roles of both the EOM and the Op Rep. The decision was challenged and BP was given the opportunity to reconsider their representation. They decided not to change their position.

7.7.6 As a consequence the nominated EOM was unnecessarily placed under a great deal of pressure from the onset although there was an attempt to redress the situation later on in the day. There was no direct dialogue between any of BP’s Senior Management/CMT and the SOSREP. Communications were all channelled through the OCU EOM.

7.7.7 With support for the EOM lacking, a number of fundamental questions were left unanswered throughout the duration of the exercise. As a consequence it was extremely difficult to ascertain what in fact BP's strategic plan was for dealing with the incident.

7.7.8 Had this been a "real" incident then it may well have led to the SOSREP issuing a Direction and assuming control of the incident/installation.

7.7.9 The OCU itself was small and only just fit for purpose. An extended membership would have made working in the area extremely difficult. Although available, it was disappointing to note that the use of BP's IT within the room was non-existent until the latter part of the Exercise. Appropriate drawings and diagrams, including field and pipeline schematics would have been most useful as part of the initial OCU briefing and would have set the scene better.

7.7.10 Communications with other cells, in particular the MRC, was poor and at times it was difficult to ascertain what in fact was developing outside the OCU.

7.7.11 At the request of the MCA, the SOSREP attended the Media Briefing Conference. By "coincidence" the Conference was scheduled between two consecutive OCU meetings which enabled the SOSREP to participate.

7.7.12 With hindsight there was no role for the SOSREP to play at this briefing and his time would have been better spent in the OCU. It would have been timelier for the SOSREP to speak to the media later on in the incident after all the preliminary investigations had been completed and when the response plan had been agreed with the Operator.

7.8 Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) Press Office

7.8.1 BERR Press Officer commented that:

"participating in Exercise Unicorn was a beneficial experience and, as a result, has recommended to colleagues that they participate when the opportunity arises again".

7.8.2 Recommendations in respect of BERR media response are as follows:

- Two or more people sent to site to share duties of liaising with officials, press and other agencies; monitoring media updates; formulating briefing;
- If only one person sent to site then that person requires two phones or a pager or blackberry so callers do not receive a constant engaged tone;

- To remain aware that private companies can be very closed with their communications - consequently the media person should keep phoning them for updates;
- Introduce yourself to all players, note their role and how they can help you - record all mobile numbers;
- Establish immediately what other players are saying to the press.

7.9 Directing Staff

7.9.1 The MCA Exercise Controller commented:

“The general planning team was kept as small as possible, this proved to be very beneficial.

Response cells need to ensure that all responding organisations are aware that they are fully operational and functional with fax, e-mail and telephone. This was not evident during the exercise. Messages were passed without the originator being fully confident that a particular cell was ready and able to accept information. A sentence outlining the responsibility of that cell would be very useful i.e. cell/centre established and operational at [time]. This could also include a confirmation of the contact numbers and e-mail addresses (if applicable) of that cell/centre)

It was apparent that some of the cells/centres were not fully aware of the roles and responsibilities of other cells, in particular the SOSREP and the MCA, as the competent authority for at sea response and NCP custodian, and BERR as the regulator of the offshore industry. Presentations from these Government departments prior to commencing exercises would be beneficial.’

7.9.2 Head of FRS Offshore Environmental Advice Group and DiStaff Environment Group (EG) reflected that the operation of the EG and the level of participation during the day was often hectic but always controlled and good natured. This led to a positive atmosphere in the meeting room in which good decision-making could take place. He added that in his opinion this was the first exercise in which the Environment Liaison Officer (ELO) function operated efficiently and maintained good communications between the various cells and the parent group.

7.9.3 It was reported that during their visit the “Exercise Unicorn Observer Group” was impressed by the businesslike approach adopted by the EG during their visit and was especially impressed by the fact that they could update themselves on the workings of the Group by reference to the memory sheets which were displayed for all to see.

7.9.4 It was concluded, that it was obvious from the hot wash on the day that most of the participants felt the Exercise was worthwhile and the constructive comments expressed supported this. Similar comments were raised at the stakeholders “hot wash” the following day. Overall comment was:

“viewing the operation of the EG from the privileged “outside” position of DiStaff gave me the rare opportunity to analyse some of the practices used. These observations and the evaluator’s useful and valid comments will be incorporated into the functioning of future environment groups”.

7.10 Observers

7.10.1 The Observer Group consisted of 17 personnel representing 10 organisations. On the morning of the Exercise the Group assembled at BERR, Atholl House where a BERR Offshore Environmental Inspector provided the attendees with a presentation on the National Contingency Plan.

7.10.2 The Group then toured around incident response cells. A day long itinerary had been scheduled that provided the Group with exclusive access to all the cells including those located at the MCA, FRS and BP Headquarters.

7.10.3 All Observers commented that they enjoyed and appreciated the experience of seeing first hand the diversity of emergency response activities. Several comments were also submitted by Observers.

8. Overall Conclusion

8.1 Author's Comments

8.1.1 Exercise Unicorn was well planned and executed. It tested the roles and responsibilities of each participating organisation in accordance with the National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution from Shipping and Offshore Installations.

8.1.2. The response from participants has been positive; the general opinion is one of fulfilling their objectives and enhancing their knowledge of emergency response operations involving an offshore installation.

8.1.3 As with all exercises there were some minor problems that in an actual incident would not have been an issue, for example the use of paper and real assets.

8.1.4 All significant areas for improvement have been identified by the Evaluation Team and Directing Staff. This report captures these areas and has identified them as 'Recommendations' for consideration and inclusion in the NCP and individual organisations' response procedures.

8.1.5 Some observations identified by the Evaluation Team have been considered and entered as 'Best Practice' as they affect individual organisations rather than the NCP as a whole.

8.1.6 The Exercise Director would like to express thanks to all those involved, especially BERR, the MCA, BP and Petrofac in the planning, preparation and direction in making the exercise a success. It takes significant time and effort to co-ordinate an exercise of this magnitude. Hard work, dedication and professionalism ensured a worthwhile and credible scenario was exercised.

8.2 Lessons Learned

8.2.1 It was noted that although a large number of recommendations were identified following Exercise Discovery in 2002, a record of the close out actions was not maintained. Consequently the status of these actions is unknown.

Recommendation 1/15 refers.

8.2.2. In order to progress an incident to a successful conclusion in the most effective manner it is vitally important that information is distributed to response authorities and agencies as quickly as possible. It has been identified that details of the installation were not readily available to the SOSREP and the OCU which caused a delay in appropriate action being taken.

Recommendation 2/15 refers.

8.2.3 It is essential that all participating authorities, agencies and companies engaged in oil spill response are aware of the specific roles of individuals and groups. This will facilitate effective and efficient working relationships.

Recommendation 3/15 refers.

8.2.4 BERR's Incident Briefing Room (IBR) has the function to gather and disseminate information at the onset of an incident. However once the Operations Control Unit (OCU) has been established the function and resource utilisation of the IBR has been called into question.

Recommendation 4/15 refers

8.2.5 A fundamental requirement for 'field' operatives during major incident response is that IT equipment is fit for purpose. Equipment should allow these operatives to conduct their roles and responsibilities in an effective and efficient manner. This will ensure good communication links with other organisations and dissemination of appropriate information in a timely fashion.

Recommendation 5/15 refers

8.2.6 In order to establish good communications with other response resources it is of paramount importance that those resources have the necessary radio communication equipment.

Recommendation 6/15 refers

8.2.7 MCA stations respond to a large number of incidents which are dealt with very efficiently. However the use of intervention powers to establish Temporary Exclusion Zones (TEZ) during incidents is uncommon and the role and responsibilities of the SOSREP are not fully understood.

Recommendation 7/15 refers

8.2.8 To implement the procedures and processes contained within the NCP, the training of appropriate staff is essential. This ensures the effectiveness of relevant cells when dealing with pollution, containment and salvage. A number of Regional MCA staff are not trained or qualified to provide such assistance.

Recommendation 8/15 refers

8.2.9 Ensuring that all organisations, authorities and response cells receive correct and pertinent information during major incidents can be difficult. Messages are often transmitted to a single individual instead of a common address and reliance is then placed upon that individual to disseminate the information to others.

Recommendation 9/15 refers

8.2.10 A large number of exercises are conducted by the MCA and operators of offshore installations, with the main focus being on the preservation of life, and are therefore well practised. Pollution response is not as well practiced on a large scale and the annual National Contingency Plan (NCP) Exercise rectifies this requirement.

Recommendation 10/15 refers

8.2.11 It is essential that any information released to the public during a major maritime incident is accurate, factual, timely and co-ordinated. In order to achieve this press officers must be effectively resourced.

Recommendation 11/15 refers

8.2.12 The Press and Media cells of organisations play a very important role during incident response and exercise scenarios. However the establishment of a Media Briefing Centre (MBC) is only set up during major incidents and therefore not practiced on a regular basis.

Recommendation 12/15 refers

8.2.13 Access to premises must be regulated to ensure that only authorised persons are admitted. Failure to do this compromises the security of the building, personnel and the effectiveness of the response. Security at premises during exercise scenarios must be controlled as it would be at any other time.

Recommendation 13/15 refers

8.2.14 A vitally important action by any response cell is to ensure that, when established, a transmission via e-mail or fax is made to other cells advising them of their operational readiness.

Recommendation 14/15 refers

8.2.15 Response cells can only be effective if the core membership comprises suitably qualified personnel. The correct equipment must be in place and there must be robust procedures and protocols to ensure an efficient and effective response.

Recommendation 15/15 refers

ANNEX 1 – Recommendations

The assigned names are a focal point and the task may be delegated, however the responsibility for implementing the recommendation, or providing a rationale for non implementation, rests with the person assigned.

No.	Reference	Recommendation	Purpose	Assigned
1	Not applicable. Observation from Exercise Discovery.	Establish an exercise recommendation and best practice review group	To ensure agreed recommendations and best practice are considered and implemented in a timely fashion as deemed appropriate.	BERR (Colin Mulvana)
2	6.7	Provision of an offshore installation fact sheet to be incorporated into OSCP's and Guidance Notes.	To ensure the SOSREP and OCU has readily available information pertaining to the installation to enable a response strategy to be developed without delay. Information to be passed to those compiling OSCP's.	BERR (Craig Bunyan)
3	6.7 & 7.9	Conduct appropriate and suitable presentations to Government, agencies, authorities and organisations who have a responsibility to respond to major oil spills	To ensure that they fully appreciate the roles and responsibilities of specific individuals and response cells during large scale maritime incidents whereby activation of the National Contingency Plan has been invoked.	MCA/BERR (Colin Mulvana)
4	6.3	Review of the IBR function with regard to dealing with incident response prior to and following activation of the Operations Control Unit (OCU).	To identify whether current remit provides effective response and resource utilisation	BERR (Michael Reid)

5	6.3 & 6.8	Review of IT equipment for field operatives during incident response	To ensure there is an effective response to incidents, participants are able to operate effectively in remote locations.	BERR/MCA (Craig Bunyan & Toby Stone)
6	6.5	Review the MCA helicopter requirement for a HF radio	To enable MCA helicopters to contact other aircraft and RCC's ensuring safety of assets and a response to co-ordinating authorities	MCA (John Morpew)
7	6.5	Conduct appropriate and suitable presentations to MCA stations, Operations and Survey, on the intervention powers and the role of the SOSREP and his responsibilities.	To ensure Coastguard watch teams and Marine Surveyors are fully aware of the rules and regulations surrounding the intervention powers, their establishment and implementation.	SOSREP (Hugh Shaw)
8	6.6	MCA staff, administration and operations, to be trained in order to be of assistance during major incident response.	To ensure there are trained MCA administration and operational staff to provide support to the response cells as identified in the NCP.	BERR (Colin Mulvana)
9	6.9	Consideration to creating a single contact e-mail address during major maritime incident response	To provide ease of access to, and dissemination of, information to relevant staff within an organisation and to provide an instantly recognisable address to other organisations for incident response.	MCA (Toby Stone)
10	No Direct Reference	Exercising of SAR response in testing the NCP to be proportionate in relation to the scenario of an offshore pollution response exercise.	To ensure that the MCA National Exercise incorporates all areas of response whilst maintaining a balance of exercise requirements.	MCA/BERR (Toby Stone / Michael Reid)

11	6.10	Review and consider the resources and equipment requirement for BERR press officers	To ensure the press officer(s) have appropriate equipment to be fully operational during maritime incident response.	BERR (Michael Reid)
12	6.10	To conduct a full scale 'media only' exercise within the next 2-3 years which involves setting up of a media briefing centre.	To test the communications function, media relations, warning and informing messages and general dissemination of information between press officers and the general public.	MCA (Mark Clark)
13	6.10	Review of security measures at Marine House, Blaikies Quay	To prevent unauthorised access into the building.	MCA (Steve Pigott)
14	7.9	Individuals and operational cells to submit a message to other participating groups/cells when they are established and operational. The message should also include confirmation of contact details. Template to be created.	To ensure that all participating cells are aware that other established cells are 'up and running' and ready to accept information to progress the incident/exercise.	BERR (Colin Mulvana)
15	No Direct Reference	Review of facilities for Cells and procedures highlighted to strengthen current arrangements including the roles and responsibilities of all individual post holders. The core membership of the MRC to be reviewed in particular the EG input and the requirement, or otherwise, for FRS and local fishery interests particularly with regard to the use of dispersants.	To ensure that the operational cells have the correct equipment and robust procedures in place in order to function more efficiently. To ensure that members of the MRC have a role within the cell for the benefit of oil spill response	MCA (Toby Stone) BERR (Michael Reid)

ANNEX 2 - Areas for Improvement

Areas for improvement have been identified by evaluators, DiStaff and observers which should be reviewed and addressed as appropriate. They refer to individual organisations rather than a recommendation to the NCP.

The assigned names are a focal point and the task may be delegated, however the responsibility for considering the possible implementation rests with the person assigned.

No	Reference	Areas for Improvement	Objective	Assigned
1	6.6.2	MCA stations to be included in the distribution of exercise requirements.	To ensure accommodation and equipment for exercise participants is prepared and ready for use and that Administration Support is available.	MCA (Toby Stone)
2	6.7.4	Consideration should be given to reviewing the current accommodation assigned to BP BST.	To ensure sufficient room is available allowing the team to conduct their duties in a more suitable environment.	BP (Sonia Element)
3	6.7.6	Formal handover procedure to be developed for the BP IMT during maritime incident working.	To ensure a smooth transition from one team to another whilst retaining an efficient response capability.	BP (Sonia Element)
4	6.7.8	Formal report to be developed for distribution of information between BP ERC Teams during incidents.	To ensure the accuracy of information distributed between teams.	BP (Sonia Element)
5	7.3.2	Organisations to ensure and check procedures are in place to confirm validity of contact details on a regular basis, disseminating changes to relevant authorities and agencies. Inclusion as an Offshore Installation Notification exercise as presently conducted by ports and harbours.	To ensure all parties receive pertinent information in a timely manner and received at the correct location.	BERR (Craig Bunyan)

ANNEX 3 – Exercise Evaluation Report Example Template



National Contingency Plan – Exercise Evaluation

Exercise Evaluation Guide

Description:

To evaluate the cells and centres established in response to a major maritime pollution incident involving shipping and an offshore installation within the United Kingdom Pollution Control Zone (PCZ).

Objective:

Provide an accurate and factual account of response centres/cells activities in accordance with agreed procedures and protocols, make recommendations and comments as necessary to improve response mechanisms as contained in the National and local contingency plans.

Name of Exercise:	Date:
Activity:	Organisation:
Evaluator:	Evaluator Contact Info:
<i>Note to Exercise Evaluators: Only review those activities listed below to which you have been assigned</i>	

Activity 2: Pollution Response – Marine Response Centre (MRC)

Activity Description: **Monitor and provide assessment of oil spill response operations.**

Maritime & Coastguard Agency (MCA) Objectives:

Objectives achieved:

	Fully	Part	Not
❖ To exercise the required control cells for the incident	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
❖ To exercise an appropriate SAR Response	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
❖ To exercise an appropriate pollution response	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
❖ To exercise appropriate regional and national administrative support to a major incident	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
❖ To exercise links and liaison between marine activities and land co-ordinating authorities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
❖ To exercise the links and liaison with the devolved administration	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
❖ Test the NORBRIT agreement	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Tasks Observed *(check those that were observed and provide the time of observation)*

<p>2.1 Initial Alert</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – <i>Ascertain extent, type of pollution and flow rate</i> – <i>Determine Tier Level</i> – <i>Consider activation of NCP and MEIR</i> – <i>Prepare briefing for senior staff ie.Ch Exec, SofS DfT</i> – <i>Establish communications with MRCC and OCU</i> 	<p>Task Completed?</p> <p>Fully <input type="checkbox"/> Partially <input type="checkbox"/> Not <input type="checkbox"/> N/A <input type="checkbox"/></p>
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Comments:	
2.2 Airborne Response <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – <i>Aerial surveillance response</i> – <i>Consider dispersant spraying aircraft options</i> – <i>Photographic/video evidence</i> – <i>Aircraft observer report/assessment</i> 	Task Completed? Fully <input type="checkbox"/> Partially <input type="checkbox"/> Not <input type="checkbox"/> N/A <input type="checkbox"/>
Comments:	
2.3 Sea Response <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – <i>Oil Recovery vessel and equipment requirement / availability</i> – <i>Samples taken</i> – <i>Photographic/video evidence</i> – <i>Equipment deployed, if applicable</i> 	Task Completed? Fully <input type="checkbox"/> Partially <input type="checkbox"/> Not <input type="checkbox"/> N/A <input type="checkbox"/>
Comments:	
2.4 Logistics/Finance. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – <i>Contractors advised and mobilised</i> – <i>Asses equipment requirements ie. fax, telephones etc.</i> – <i>Consider Staffing requirements</i> – <i>Assess catering and accommodation issues</i> 	Task Completed? Fully <input type="checkbox"/> Partially <input type="checkbox"/> Not <input type="checkbox"/> N/A <input type="checkbox"/>
Comments:	

<p>2.5 Environmental</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>ELO liaison</i> - <i>OSIS Modelling</i> - <i>Establish and maintain communications with EG</i> - <i>Ascertain identity of high risk/sensitivity areas</i> 	<p>Task Completed?</p> <p>Fully <input type="checkbox"/> Partially <input type="checkbox"/> Not <input type="checkbox"/> N/A <input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p>Comments:</p>	
<p>2.6 General</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>POLREP formulation and distribution including timely updates</i> - <i>Invoke International agreements if deemed necessary</i> - <i>Program of meeting requirements</i> - <i>Identification of temporary storage sites</i> 	<p>Task Completed?</p> <p>Fully <input type="checkbox"/> Partially <input type="checkbox"/> Not <input type="checkbox"/> N/A <input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p>Comments:</p>	
<p>2.7 Teamwork</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Incident Control</i> - <i>Effective leadership / authoritative style</i> - <i>Conducted staff consultation</i> - <i>Prepare for long term incident: staffing levels, catering etc.</i> - <i>Information flow</i> - <i>Staff Interaction</i> - <i>Regular structured team briefings/time-outs</i> - <i>Reviewed roles and responsibilities</i> 	<p>Task Completed?</p> <p>Fully <input type="checkbox"/> Partially <input type="checkbox"/> Not <input type="checkbox"/> N/A <input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p>Comments:</p>	

Evaluator Observations

Please provide three main observations as bullet points for your assigned area of activity in the table provided below; your observations can be references to specific tasks or the section as a whole.

The bullet points will form the basis of discussion at the hot-wash following the exercise.

If you have further comments, observations and/or recommendations these are to be documented, electronically if possible, and returned to Murray Wood, Administration and Communications Officer, BERR, murray.wood@berr.gsi.gov.uk by 30 June 2008, these will be reviewed and considered for inclusion in the final report prior to distribution.

Area of Activity:	
1)	
2)	
3)	